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ABSTRACT 
Many animalists assert the following propositions: 
(1) We are human organisms. 
(2) For any organism O1 at a time, t1, and for any organism O2 at a time, t2, O1 and 
O2 are identical if and only if the simples that compose O1 and the simples that 
compose O2 are constituents of the same life. 
(3) We will die. 
 
Christians assert the following proposition: 
 
(4) We will exist (after our deaths) on the Last Day. 
 
Propositions (1)–(4) are rendered logically inconsistent if the following two 
propositions are true:  
(A) Necessarily, the life of an organism, O1, at one time, t1, is identical with the 
life of an organism, O2, at another time, t2, if and only if, the simples that 
compose O1 and the simples that compose O2 are immanent-causally 
connected.  
and 
 
(B) Necessarily, when we die the simples that last composed us will cease to bear 
any immanent-causal connection to any organism. 
 
If (A) is true, then for us (human organisms) to exist on the Last Day (proposition (4)) 
the simples that compose us at the moment of our deaths need to bear some 
immanent-causal connection to an organism that exists on the Last Day. If (B) is true, 
however, then when we die (proposition (3)) the simples that compose us cease to 
bear any immanent-causal connection to any organism. Both (A) and (B) are, it is 
argued, true on animalism. In consequence, it is argued that necessarily, for any 
human organism, O, if O has died then O can never exist again. It is also argued, 
therefore, that it is unreasonable to believe (1)–(4) and, therefore, it is unreasonable to 
be both an animalist and a Christian.  
Christian animalists (and their sympathisers) have recently responded to arguments of 
this kind by arguing that (A) and (B) are false; in particular, they have described 
possible scenarios at which (A) or (B) are false but at which human organisms survive 
their death. That is, they not only demonstrate that (A) and (B) are false but also that 
(1)–(4) are not logically inconsistent.  
In this thesis, my overall argument is that, while animalists may have demonstrated 
that it is possible for an organism that has died to exist again on the Last Day by 
demonstrating that (A) and (B) are false, they have not demonstrated that it is 
reasonable to believe that an organism that has died can exist again on the Last Day. 
This is because the worlds at which (A) or (B) are false may be possibilities, but they 
are not possibilities that it is reasonable to believe may be actual.  
 ii 
I carry out this project as follows. In Part I, I state what I take animalism to be, what 
animalists take our persistence conditions to be, what animalists take death to be and 
what Christians take (minimally) life after death to be. In Part II, I state what I call the 
‘problem of life after death’ and the, more specific, ‘logical problem of life after 
death’. Put simply, the ‘logical problem of life after death’ states that, given that (A) 
and (B) are true, propositions (1)–(4) are logically inconsistent and it is, in 
consequence, unreasonable to believe in life after death, given animalism. I then 
respond to the logical problem of life after death on behalf of the animalist; I argue 
that it is unsound because (A) and (B) are false. In Part III, among other things, I 
argue that while animalists may have responded to the logical problem of life after 
death, and assuming that modal scepticism (the view that we should be sceptical 
about our justifiably asserting certain exotic modal claims) is false, the more general 
problem of life after death remains. Put simply, the more general problem of life after 
death states that, while (1)–(4) are not logically inconsistent, it is still not reasonable 
to believe (1)–(4) simultaneously. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Materialists or physicalists, for the purposes of this thesis, should be understood as 
those folk who believe that we, human persons, are composite objects that are 
composed entirely of material parts.1 Traditionally, Christians have been substance 
dualists. Substance dualists believe one of two things. They believe that either there 
are material objects and immaterial objects but that we are among the immaterial 
objects (souls), or that there are material objects and immaterial objects but that we 
are composite objects, composed of both material objects and an immaterial object (a 
soul).2 Call the left-hand side of the above disjunction ‘the simple soul view’ and the 
right-hand side of the above disjunction ‘the material-immaterial composite view’ or 
‘the composite view’ for short.3 
These traditional views have recently been challenged by a number of contemporary 
Christian philosophers and theologians, most notably: Peter van Inwagen (1990; 
1995; 1998b), Lynne Rudder Baker (1995; 2007), Hud Hudson (2001), Trenton 
Merricks (2001; 2006), Kevin Corcoran (2006; 2001b), Nancey Murphy (2006), Joel 
Green (2008) and Greg Bahnsen (1972) In its place, they aim to offer a materialist 
alternative. Call these folk ‘Christian materialists.’ 
The motivations for challenging the traditional Christian view and accepting a 
materialist alternative are numerous. The most common objection to substance 
dualism that I receive from the Christian laity and theologians is that belief in 
substance dualism entails some false Gnostic or Platonic belief.4 In general, I regard 
arguments such as these as fallacious, since the substance dualist can agree that the 
Gnostics and the Platonists were substance dualists but deny that belief in substance 
dualism entails any of the false beliefs held by Gnostics or Platonists. For example, 
                                                
1 Physicalism is different from materialism. The physicalist can include non-material physical things 
like forces as objects in her ontology, the materialist cannot. For the purposes of this thesis I will use 
the two terms interchangeably. Where possible, however, I will only use the term ‘materialism.’ I use 
the terms interchangeably because van Inwagen, as far as I can tell, uses the terms interchangeably. I 
will use ‘materialism’ where possible because van Inwagen uses ‘materialism’ more frequently than 
‘physicalism’. In particular, my main target in this thesis are those materialists who believe that there 
are simple material objects (i.e., not gunk theorists). 
2 There are, of course, some Christians who believe that there are only immaterial objects; idealists. I 
leave them out of consideration in this thesis. 
3 I assume throughout this thesis that souls are simple: i.e., that they do not have any proper parts. 
4 Or, at least, like van Inwagen, they suspect that ‘dualism is a Greek import into Christianity’ (van 
Inwagen 1995, 475). 
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the Christian lay person that I have in mind may argue that the belief that one’s soul 
can be separated from one’s body is a belief held by Platonists and Gnostics. 
Platonists and Gnostics also thought that one’s soul was better off without one’s body. 
Therefore, Christians that are substance dualists accept an account of the nature of 
human persons that entails a false belief; namely, that one’s soul is better off without 
one’s body. This argument is obviously fallacious. The substance dualist can agree 
with Plato that one can exist without one’s body, but it hardly follows from this belief 
that one’s soul is, therefore, better off without one’s body. I have yet to read a 
plausible charge of ‘Platonism’ or ‘Gnosticism’ brought against the substance dualist. 
The predominant reason for the rejection of substance dualism by Christians 
(especially Christians in the academy), however, is due to a commitment to a form of 
methodological naturalism. By and large Christian materialists have accepted a form 
of local methodological naturalism.5 Methodological naturalism, put simply, is the 
view that in answer to the question ‘what entities are there?’ the response should be 
‘those entities that our best scientific theories commit us to’. Local methodological 
naturalism is the view that methodological naturalism is true at least with regard to 
the human person. In answer to the question ‘what entities compose persons?’ local 
methodological naturalists answer ‘those entities that our best scientific theories 
commit us to’. The argument then proceeds: since our best scientific theories do not 
commit us to belief in the existence of souls, we should not believe in the existence of 
souls. As Lynne Rudder Baker puts it,  
I believe that immaterialism [what I have been calling substance dualism] 
should be rejected. My reason for rejecting immaterialism has…to do…with 
the natural world. Immaterial souls just do not fit with what we know about 
the natural world. We human persons evolved by natural selection (even if 
God actualized this world on the basis of His foreknowledge of the outcome). 
Immaterial souls would simply stand out as surds in the natural world. (Baker 
2007, 341) 
                                                
5 It is not clear to me what local methodological naturalism is. I do not see a better way to characterise 
the Christian materialist’s position, however. 
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In short, Christian materialists believe that substance dualism should be rejected 
because souls do not fit with our current understanding of the natural world.6 Souls, 
rather, stand out as objects that cannot be accounted for by the natural sciences and, in 
consequence, should be rejected. This argument is not likely to convince the Christian 
substance dualist. She will likely respond that methodological naturalism is flawed. The 
Christian has reasons to reject it, reasons independent of belief in the existence of the 
soul. Alternatively, the Christian will find an acceptance of local methodological 
naturalism ad hoc. Why not accept a methodological naturalism with regard to the 
whole created order? Why believe in angels and other non-human spirits? 
Some Christian philosophers (and non-Christian philosophers) have, however, in my 
view, offered some more persuasive philosophical arguments against substance 
dualism. Peter van Inwagen, for example, gives a number of philosophically astute 
arguments both for the denial of substance dualism and for materialism (see van 
Inwagen (1993a)). In particular, van Inwagen gives ‘four good arguments for 
physicalism’ (van Inwagen 1993, 178). These are the ‘interaction argument’, the 
‘argument from common speech’, the ‘remote control argument’ and the ‘duplication 
argument’. Van Inwagen writes of this last argument, the ‘duplication argument’, that 
it ‘is the single argument for physicalism that I find the most persuasive’ (van 
Inwagen 1993, 180). These arguments do not assume methodological naturalism but, 
rather, are arguments to the effect that there is some internal incoherence in the notion 
of one’s being a soul.7 I will not rehearse these arguments here. This is because these 
arguments, and others, have been well-worn and, I think, responded to. Van Inwagen 
himself, for example, notes that ‘[t]hese arguments convinced no one’ (van Inwagen 
2007, 206). I think that those who were not convinced by his arguments were right not 
to be.  
Some Christian materialists have argued that substance dualism is not merely anti-
scientific but that it is not given the scriptural support that many exegetes thought it 
                                                
6 This is more radical than the expression of local methodological naturalism outlined above. On 
Baker’s account angels or non-human spirits, for example, are also surds in nature and so we should 
not be committed to their existence.  
7 These arguments do not concern hylomorphic substance dualism. 
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had.8 This argument is not so much an argument against substance dualism but an 
attempt to remove support for substance dualism. 
Scripture is perhaps the most fruitful place to begin discussion among Christian 
believers (especially evangelicals) about our nature. If Scripture is one’s supreme 
authority on all matters of truth and if the debate about what we are has been settled 
by appeal to Scripture, then we should take the debate to have been settled.  
Appeal to Scripture, however, has proven to be problematic. I, for example, think that 
the Scriptural data is more consistent with a substance-dualist view of the human 
person than a materialist one.9 I find that the following passages good support for the 
truth of substance dualism individually and cumulatively: Ecclesiastes 12:7; Matthew 
10:28; Luke 16:22-28 Luke 23:43; John 19:30; 2 Corinthians 5:1-9; Philippians 1:20-
24; Hebrews 12:22-23; 1 Peter 3:18-20; Revelation 6:9-11; Revelation 20:4. 
Materialists offer their own interpretations of these passages.10 Of course, rather than 
arguing that these passages (or others) support materialism, materialists tend to argue 
that these passages (and others) underdetermine which view about our nature is 
correct. 
In this case, consensus about which view is true (substance dualism or materialism) 
will not (so it appears) likely be settled by appeal to Scripture alone. Some are happy, 
in this instance, to defer to tradition. By this I mean that in cases where Scripture does 
not determine whether a particular view is true and we have no compelling reasons 
one way or the other, one has warrant to believe that the orthodox view is true until 
one has compelling reasons to reject it. As Peter van Inwagen points out, the orthodox 
view has largely been substance dualism11 or, at least, it has been, until the twentieth 
century, largely left unchallenged. He writes, ‘no ecumenical council or 
denominational synod or inquisitorial office or faculty of theology, no Pope or 
                                                
8 See especially Green (2008), van Inwagen (1995) and Cooper (1989). 
9 One may think that this is an understatement. One may think that to affirm certain passages of 
Scripture one needs to believe in the existence of souls. Matthew 10:28 seems to be an obvious 
example. I do not know what Matthew 10:28 could mean on a materialist reading (Cooper seems to 
agree (Cooper 1989, 117–119)). Van Inwagen does offer an argument in defence of materialism in the 
light of Matt. 10:28 but I find it unpersuasive. In short his argument is that one can understand the 
(proverbial) spirit of the passage even if one thinks that Matthew’s utterance is literally false. I am not 
so sure. The reader can decide (see (van Inwagen 1995, 482)). 
10 See, again, Green (2008) and van Inwagen (1995). 
11 Hylomorphism is, of course, an orthodox view too. The materialists I have in mind tend to reject 
hylomorphism. 
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archbishop or reformer, has, to my knowledge, condemned dualism per se’ (van 
Inwagen 1995, 487). Many, however, are not happy to defer to the orthodox view. 
They either think that tradition should play no part in determining which beliefs we 
should hold to be true, or else they think that there are compelling reasons to reject 
tradition. Van Inwagen, I believe, thinks the latter: at least in this instance he thinks 
that there are compelling reasons to reject tradition. 
The question remains: if the jury is out (for one reason or another) with regard to 
whether philosophical argument alone can settle the debate about what we are, and if 
one does not want to appeal to tradition, then what is left for the substance dualist to 
do? How are we to decide which view is true in this case? 
To my mind there is one option left. One can try to demonstrate that materialism and 
a Christian belief are incompatible.12 This thesis begins at this juncture. In order to 
demonstrate that materialism is incompatible with Christian belief one can (rather 
than demonstrating that the view is unScriptural, unorthodox or philosophically 
problematic) demonstrate that there is a particular Christian belief that conflicts with 
materialism. What Christian beliefs may be incompatible with materialism? I think 
that they include the belief that God is essentially tri-personal13 and the belief that we 
can survive our deaths. 
This thesis considers the second of these beliefs, namely, that we can survive our 
deaths. In particular, this thesis defends the claim that it is not reasonable to believe in 
the possibility of life after death given (a certain form of) materialism.  
Materialism, however, comes in a variety of forms. I cannot consider all forms of 
materialism in this thesis. This is primarily because it would take too long. The focus 
of this thesis will be the materialist view known as ‘animalism’. Among all the 
materialist views out there I take animalism as my target for a number of reasons. My 
main reason for taking animalism as my target is because I think that if any materialist 
metaphysics of the human person is true, it will be a form of animalism. Animalism 
has a vast number of theoretical virtues that, I think, are missing in other materialist 
                                                
12 If one allows emotion or aesthetics to settle metaphysical debates, then one may appeal to these 
sources too. I will not. 
13 See Leftow (2015). In particular, Leftow has Trenton Merricks’ version of animalist Christology in 
mind here. 
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metaphysics of the human person such as property dualism, four-dimensional 
materialism, the brain view or the constitution view (which is animalism’s main 
rival). I will not rehearse these virtues now, nor at any point in this thesis.14 This 
thesis assumes that if any materialist account of the human person is true it will likely 
be animalism.  
One should not, however, worry too much about the limited scope of this thesis. 
Much of what I say in this thesis, I think, can be quite easily applied to other 
materialist accounts of the human person; in particular, materialist accounts of the 
human person that require there to be causal continuity between a human person that 
exists at one time and a human person that exists at another time. Moreover, I think 
that any plausible account of materialism with regard to the human person will require 
there to be causal continuity between human persons, and so my arguments can apply 
to all of those accounts of materialism with regard to the human person.15  
Animalism itself, however, also comes in a variety of forms (as will be discussed).16 
This thesis will focus on Peter van Inwagen’s expression of animalism in his book 
Material Beings.17 This is for two reasons. First, van Inwagen is a Christian animalist 
and so he has a particular interest in providing an animalist theory that is consistent 
with the belief in life after death. Moreover, second, besides some controversial points 
regarding the existence of ordinary objects, other animalists have taken their lead 
from van Inwagen’s work. Eric Olson, for example, assured me that his version of 
animalism and van Inwagen’s version of animalism are nigh-on identical.18 In Part I, I 
will clarify precisely the kind of animalism with which this thesis is concerned. 
I am now in a position to state my thesis: 
Thesis statement:  
it is unreasonable to believe in the possibility of life after death given 
animalism.  
                                                
14 I direct one to (Olson 2007, 48–75) for an assessment of some animalist virtues over and against the 
virtue of constitutionalism.  
15 Zimmerman writes, ‘[b]ut most metaphysicians seem to agree with van Inwagen that there must be a 
causal element in any adequate “criterion of identity” for persisting material objects’ (Zimmerman 
1999, 195). 
16 For full and thorough discussion see Bailey (2015), Thornton (2016), Blatti (2014) and Olson (2015). 
17 It should be noted that, as far as I am aware, van Inwagen never uses the term ‘animalism’ to refer to 
his view. His view is, however, taken to be a form of animalism by animalists and non-animalists alike. 
18 Personal correspondence. 
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The following chapters all contribute to defending the above thesis. This thesis is split 
into three parts. In Part I will better define animalism and some of the relevant 
concepts needed for this thesis, namely, the concepts of personal identity across time, 
death and life after death. In Part II, I will state my argument against animalism and a 
version of the argument already found in the literature. The argument already found in 
the literature I will call ‘the argument from the logical problem of life after death’; the 
argument that I will advance is ‘the argument from the problem of life after death’. In 
Part II I will then consider some responses to these arguments that are already 
available in the literature. In Part III I put forward several new arguments in defence 
of my thesis.  
 
Before I embark on this project however, I must outline some assumptions that I will 
hold throughout this thesis. For the purposes of this thesis these assumptions should 
not be considered controversial. Most of the assumptions that I will make as also are 
assumed by my primary interlocutor; van Inwagen.19 
 
Assumptions 
In van Inwagen’s preface to Material Beings and in the book’s précis van Inwagen 
puts forward several assumptions. These assumptions can be stated as follows: 
(i) The classical view of the identity relation is true. 
(ii) Three-dimensionalism and endurantism are true. 
(iii) I will adhere to standard logic as an ideal. 
(iv) I will not adopt a counterpart-theoretical understanding of modal 
statements about individuals. 
(v) Matter is particulate.  
(vi) Two objects cannot be composed of exactly the same (proper) parts at 
the same time.  
(vii) In the case of any particular episode of thought or sensation, there must 
be a thing, one thing, that is doing the thinking and feeling. 
(viii) Objects such as	Descartes, you, and I, are material objects.  
(ix) What there is is never a matter of stipulation or convention. 
                                                
19 See van Inwagen (1993b; van Inwagen 1990, 3–13). 
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(x) Whether certain objects add up to or compose some larger object does 
not depend on anything besides the spatial and causal relations they 
bear to one another. 
I will make all of these assumptions except (viii). This will not matter for the 
purposes of this thesis. Van Inwagen merely assumes (viii), as far as I can tell, so that 
he need not spend time arguing against any non-materialist theses. I take it that he 
thinks that he has successfully done this elsewhere. 
 
Perhaps, the most controversial of the above assumptions are (ii) and (v). I will not 
argue for (ii) or (v). This, again, should not matter for the purposes of this thesis. The 
primary aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that it is unreasonable, given van 
Inwagen’s materialist metaphysics of the human person and the assumptions that he 
holds to be true, to believe in the possibility of life after death. 
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PART I – HUMAN ORGANISMS 
Before I introduce the problem of life after death four things are in order. First, I must 
state the view that I am considering in this thesis as clearly as possible. In Chapter 1, I 
will outline what I take ‘animalism’ to be and the metaphysics of material constitution 
that underlies it. Second, since I am interested in the survival of human persons I must 
identify what the persistence conditions of human persons are given animalism 
(Chapter 2). Third, since I am interested not merely in how human persons persist from 
one moment to the next but, specifically, how human persons persist from one moment 
to the next with death occurring in between, I must state what animalists take the death 
of human persons to be (Chapter 3). Fourth, in this thesis I am interested in a particular 
kind of life after death: the kind spoken of in, for example, the early creeds of 
Christianity. I must, in consequence, describe what kind of life after death this is 
(Chapter 3).  
I will discuss these four things in the following three chapters. These three chapters will 
form the foundation upon which I will launch the problem of life after death. That is, 
having outlined what animalism is, what animalists propose our persistence conditions 
to be, what animalists propose amounts to death, and what kind of life after death I am 
interested in, I will be able to show that, given animalism (or, at least, a particularly 
popular version of animalism), it is unreasonable to believe that we, human persons, 
can live after death.  
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CHAPTER 1 – MATERIAL CONSTITUTION 
First, then, what is animalism? Animalism can be expressed using the following 
sentence (call this the central ‘animalist assertion’):  
(AA) We are human organisms.  
Let us consider each constituent part of that sentence.  
1.1 ‘We’ 
First, consider the word ‘we’. ‘We’ refers to ‘those things to which we ordinarily refer 
with our personal pronouns’ (Bailey 2015, 867). Things like, for example, 
philosophers; you and me, David Lewis and Timothy Williamson. One thing that 
these things all have in common is that, at some point in time, they have all been (or 
are) persons. Animalists, in general, hold that the concept person is a phased sortal 
concept. A phased sortal concept ‘is a concept to which its instances belong 
temporarily, for a phase of their existence’ (Blatti 2014, sect. 2.2). I am, for example, 
a postgraduate student. By registering for a postgraduate degree at the University of 
Liverpool something that was not a postgraduate student (namely, me) became a 
postgraduate student. I, however, will cease to be a postgraduate student if I graduate, 
withdraw or die. 
 
Animalists think that a thing can lose or acquire the psychological capacities that are 
jointly necessary and sufficient for personhood (e.g., the capacities for intelligent 
thought, for reason and reflection and for considering oneself as oneself, the same 
thinking thing, in different times and places (cf. Locke 1979, 335). When we (human 
organisms) possess these capacities, so the animalist says, we can rightly say that we 
are persons. When we lose these capacities, we cannot rightly (indeed we likely will 
not be able to) say that we are persons. We, however, are not necessarily the only 
things that are persons (in this sense). As Olson points out, animalism is consistent 
with the view that there are ‘people who are not animals (gods or angels, say)’ (Olson 
2007, 24); beings that can also possess the psychological capacities constitutive of 
personhood. 
If we may be persons for a time shorter than our existence, then  we are not 
essentially persons. Olson gives a rather short argument that, I take it, supports the 
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claim that we are only persons for a time shorter than our existence and, hence, that 
we are not essentially persons. (Olson takes this argument to be an argument for a 
related claim discussed in a moment but it can, equally, be taken to support the claim 
that we are not essentially persons.) Olson writes,  
when you lapse into a persistent vegetative state, the human animal associated 
with you appears to survive. There is still a living human animal there even 
after your psychological features have been completely and irrevocably 
destroyed; your life-sustaining functions were never disrupted. With its mind 
destroyed, that animal might not have much of a ‘life’. There is nothing it is 
like to be that animal. But it is clearly a biological organism, alive in the same 
sense as a goldfish or a rosebush is alive. Nor does it seem that one animal has 
ceased to exist and been replaced by a new and numerically different animal. 
Hence, the animal that survives the loss of its mental properties is you, if you 
are an animal, and so you can persist without psychological continuity of any 
kind. Perhaps we cannot properly call that vegetable animal a person, since it 
has none of those psychological features that distinguish people from non-
people (rationality, the capacity for self-consciousness, or what have you). If 
so, that simply shows that you can continue to exist without being a person, 
just as you could continue to exist without being a philosopher, or a student, or 
a fancier of fast cars (Olson 1999, 17). 
Put simply, if we (human organisms) can enter a persistent vegetative state, and if 
when we enter a persistent vegetative state we do not possess the psychological 
capacities required for personhood, then we are not persons essentially; something 
cannot possess certain properties essentially and then exist without them. The above 
quotation from Olson, however, may also be taken as demonstration that 
‘psychological continuity is neither necessary nor sufficient for a human animal to 
persist’ (Olson 1999, 17). This is because we persist (in this scenario) as human 
organisms with none of the relevant psychological capacities for personhood. I will 
say something more positive about what the animalist understands our persistence 
conditions to be in a moment. 
The two questions ‘what are we essentially?’ and ‘how do we persist?’ may be 
related. If the kind that we belong to is defined in terms of persistence conditions, 
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then20 whether we belong to a certain kind will depend on what our persistence 
conditions are. I will return to the animalist answer to the question ‘how do we 
persist?’ in Chapter 2. In this thesis, however, I do not assume that the kind that we 
belong to needs to be defined in terms of persistence conditions.21 However, it should 
be noted that the animalist position with which this thesis is primarily concerned 
defends biological persistence conditions. 
1.2 ‘Are’ 
Second, consider the word ‘are’ in the sentence ‘we are human organisms’. The 
sentence ‘we are human organisms’ is the first-person-plural present-tense form of the 
sentence ‘she is a human organism’. For our purposes, it will help to render the 
sentence ‘we are human organisms’ in the third-person-singular present form as 
follows: ‘she is a human organism’. The ‘is’ in this sentence is, according to the 
animalist, the ‘is’ of numerical identity.22 That is, when one utters the sentence ‘she is 
a human organism’, according to the animalist this is shorthand for ‘she is 
numerically identical to a human organism.’ Likewise, the sentence ‘we are human 
organisms’, according to animalists, is shorthand for the sentence ‘we are numerically 
identical to human organisms’.  
 
One might think that this just is what the sentence ‘we are human organisms’ means. 
Although prima facie this is what the sentence means, those that hold to ‘the 
constitution view’ disagree. Someone that holds to the constitution view may also 
assert ‘she is a human organism’ but, when the constitutionalist utters the word ‘is’, 
by it she means the ‘is’ of constitution (cf. Olson 2015, 89). Sydney Shoemaker, for 
example, uses the word this way. He writes, ‘a person “is” an animal, not in the sense 
of being identical to one, but in the sense of sharing matter with one’ (Shoemaker 
                                                
20 As Thornton (2016, 523) notes that Johansson (2007) seems to assume.  
21 After all, one may be an animalist and an anticriterialist. That is, one might think that there are no 
informative sufficient conditions for our identity across time but believe that we are essentially human 
organisms (see Merricks (2001). 
22 Olson (2015, 88–94) has some worries about describing animalism as, at least in part, the thesis that 
we are numerically identical to human organisms. He writes, ‘it may be no mistake to state animalism 
as the view that we are identical to animals, since that formulation is equivalent to the simpler one [i.e., 
we are animals]. But it encourages a number of thoughts that are mistaken: that the identity 
formulation is clearer than saying simply that we are animals, that it implies that we are animals in a 
stricter sense than we are people or parents, and it employs the “is” of identity’ (Olson 2015, 94). 
While I think Olson’s worries are well-founded I simply register them and move on. I use the identity 
formulation of animalism to distinguish animalism from a close cousin, namely the constitution view. 
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1984, 113). It should be noted I take the ‘is’ in the sentence ‘she is a human organism’ 
to be the ‘is’ of identity and not the ‘is’ of constitution. I am excluding the 
constitution view as a form of animalism.23 I will return to the constitution view when 
I consider possible responses to the problem of life after death and not before. 
 
1.3 ‘Human Organisms’ 
Third, consider the phrase ‘human organisms’. Elsewhere animalism has been stated 
as follows:  
– ‘[a]nimalism may be stated with pleasing brevity: “we are animals”’ (Bailey 
2015, 867);  
– ‘the animalist asserts simply,…we are animals’ (cf. Blatti 2014, sect. 1.1); 
– ‘[e]ach of us is identical with, is one and the same things as, an animal’ 
(Snowdon 2014, 7); 
– ‘one of the main questions about the metaphysics of human people is whether 
we are animals: biological organisms. Snowdon, van Inwagen and I say yes’ 
(Olson 2015, 84); 
– ‘we are animals: biological organisms, members of the primate species Homo 
sapiens’ (Olson 2007, 23); 
– ‘I believe that human persons are material objects (living human organisms)’ 
(van Inwagen 2007, 206).  
Among these quotations one may notice a distinction: some animalists say that we are 
‘animals’ while some say that we are ‘human organisms’. For the purpose of this 
thesis I will understand the phrases ‘human organism’ and ‘human animal’ to be 
synonymous. Indeed, as Stephen Blatti notes, ‘participants on both sides of the debate 
over animalism tend to treat these terms interchangeably’ (Blatti 2014, sect. 1.1). I 
will continue to do so. My preferred term however is ‘organism’ because the 
animalist philosopher with whom I am primarily engaging in this thesis, Peter van 
Inwagen, prefers to use the term ‘organism’ in his work.  
That we are human organisms is supposed to conflict with the following views. That 
we are: souls, material bodies, body-soul composites, spatial or temporal proper parts 
                                                
23 This is standard practice. As it turns out, however, I think that a version of the problem of life after 
death can be run against the constitution view too. I will return to this point later in my thesis.  
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of organisms, bundles of mental states or computer programs. It is by contrast to some 
of these other views (like the soul view, or the body-soul composite view) that 
animalism distinguishes itself as a materialist view. That is, human organisms, 
according to animalists, are composed entirely from matter. Andrew Bailey notes that 
in answer to the question ‘are human animals wholly material beings?’, ‘[m]ost 
contemporary animalists say “yes”’ (Bailey 2015, 868).  
It is not obvious, however, that this needs to be the case. Aristotle, for example, may 
be an animalist; he thought that the sentence ‘we are human organisms’ is true. 
According to some, however, Aristotle did not think that human organisms were 
wholly material beings; they were to be understood as composites of matter and form. 
Other non-materialist animalists include Aquinas and Patrick Toner (2014).24 
For all I know, it could be the case that we are human organisms that have an 
immaterial part. Or, if we are a being especially liberal, that we could be human 
organisms and that human organisms are souls.25 For the purposes of this thesis I will 
accept that these two proposals are possible. 26 The target of my arguments in this 
thesis, however, is the materialist kind of animalism. In particular, the target of this 
thesis is the animalist who espouses Peter van Inwagen’s materialist version of 
animalism. I focus on the materialist version of animalism because the problem of life 
after death is not supposed to be an objection to ‘animalism’ in its broadest form but 
to the thesis that we are, as organisms, wholly material beings. Most contemporary 
                                                
24 To be clear, van Inwagen has rejected hylemorphism. Van Inwagen writes, albeit referring to 
Thomas Aquinas’ hylemorphism specifically, ‘St Thomas Aquinas, as every schoolman knows, teaches 
that we are some sort of union or amalgam or compound, of a material and an immaterial substance; 
and such a union could not be classified as either material or immaterial. But the form the position 
takes seems scarcely coherent’ (van Inwagen 2007, 204). His argument for this claim follows this 
passage immediately. 
25 Alison Thornton sees no reason to rule out the possibility that we are human organisms that are 
souls. She writes, ‘[b]ut whether animalism rules out these putative opponents [e.g., the view that we 
are souls] seems to be underdetermined. That we are animals rules out that we are souls, for example, 
only if animals aren’t or can’t be souls, but maybe they are or can be’ (Thornton 2016, 516). Moreover, 
Josh Thurrow tells me (albeit in an unpublished manuscript) that it is a possibility that we are human 
organisms that have an immaterial part (and this view need not be hylomorphic, like the view described 
above). He writes, ‘it is broadly logically possible for an animal to be an object made of both material 
parts and an immaterial soul as a part’ (Thurrow, n.d.). 
26 These two views, interestingly, remove a rather popular argument for materialist animalism. The 
argument trades on the apparently very strong intuition that we are animals (see (Licon 2014)). If this 
argument is supposed to be an argument for a materialist position, then the above two positions 
undermine this argument. 
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animalists are materialist animalists.27 There are versions of materialist animalism 
other than the version espoused by Peter van Inwagen. I will consider some of these 
versions of animalism when I come to consider death in a moment.28  
When I use the term ‘materialism’ for the purposes of this thesis, I am referring to the 
view that we are composed entirely by a material substance. This view sometimes 
gets called ‘local materialism’ (van Inwagen 2007, 206). It stands in contrast to the 
view, sometimes  called ‘global materialism’, that every concrete thing is material. 
Materialist animalists need not be committed to global materialism. Unless otherwise 
noted, the term ‘animalist’ will henceforth include in its extension both local and 
global materialist animalists; i.e., it will include any animalist that holds to the view 
that we are human organisms and human organisms are wholly material beings. 
What precisely are human organisms? First, we are human organisms. That is, the 
things to which we refer with our first-person pronouns are organisms that belong to 
the species Homo sapiens. Second, organisms, the animalist believes, are ‘concrete 
particulars. They are substances, and not events or states or aspects of something 
else…they are made up entirely of matter: they have no immaterial or nonphysical 
parts’ (van Inwagen 2007, 206). This tells us something about what organisms are: 
substances made up entirely of matter. The following question, however, remains: 
what distinguishes an organism from other (supposed) substances made up entirely 
from matter, say, chairs, or computers? After all, chairs and computers are 
(apparently) concrete particulars, substances, and not events or states or aspects of 
something else, and they are made up entirely of matter.  
In order to answer this question, I will now introduce Peter van Inwagen’s 
metaphysics of material constitution. Before I do, however, I should make one thing 
clear: one could run the problem of life after death against animalism without relying 
on every axiom of van Inwagen’s metaphysics of material constitution. I, however, 
will consider the problem of life after death for animalism in the light of van 
Inwagen’s metaphysics of material constitution. This is not merely because I am 
                                                
27 Animalists such as Olson, for example, write, ‘organisms are made up entirely of matter: they have 
no immaterial or nonphysical parts’ (Olson 2007, 27). Moreover, van Inwagen writes, ‘I believe that 
human persons are material objects (living human organisms), and that they have no part or aspect that 
is in any way immaterial’ (van Inwagen 2007, 206). 
28 In particular, I am thinking of somaticist animalism. 
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primarily engaging with van Inwagen but also because I think that his metaphysics of 
constitution plays a powerful explanatory role when spelling out the intricacies of the 
problem of life after death. Whether or not one accepts the more controversial aspects 
of van Inwagen’s metaphysics of material constitution will not matter for this thesis. 
The controversial aspects include one that is especially controversial: the view that 
the only material things that exist are organisms and material simples.  
Van Inwagen’s general metaphysical project as outlined in Material Beings (van 
Inwagen 1990) is to answer the special-composition question (SCQ). That is,  
 
(SCQ) ‘when is it true that $y the xs compose y?’ (van Inwagen 1990, 30). 
Let the xs be material simples. Simples are objects that have no proper parts. Material 
simples are those material objects that have no proper parts. We (currently, at least) 
are, I would argue, committed to the existence of material simples such as fermions, 
quarks, leptons and gauge bosons. Material simples, however, need not be fermions, 
quarks, leptons and gauge bosons. Suppose that it were to turn out that we were 
wrong that these were the fundamental particles (i.e., particles that have no proper 
parts), but that these particles were in fact composed of other simples. The simples 
that compose fermions, quarks, leptons and gauge bosons could then be considered 
the ‘material simples’ (i.e., if they do indeed turn out to be material themselves and 
are not composed of any proper parts).29 Let y be a composite object, that is, an object 
composed of parts.  
Van Inwagen is unsatisfied with the extreme answers to the special-composition 
question: Nihilism (put simply, the view that there are no composite objects) and 
Universalism (put simply, the view that for any plurality of objects, those objects 
compose something) (van Inwagen 1990, 72-74). Van Inwagen proposes what he 
takes to be a moderate answer to this question.  
Put simply, van Inwagen holds that there is one and only one way in which it can be 
true that $y the xs compose y. This is when  
                                                
29 As mentioned in the preliminaries section this thesis assumes that matter is ultimately particulate. 
 17 
(SCQANS) ‘the activity of the xs constitutes a life’ (van Inwagen 1990, 90).30  
A life, according to van Inwagen, is a natural biochemical process or, I might add, a 
collection of natural biochemical processes31 that material simples get ‘caught up’ in 
(van Inwagen 1990, 94). When these material simples get ‘caught up’ in a life they 
come to compose an organism. Van Inwagen thinks that it is the job of biology to 
supply us with the relevant definition of a life; he writes, ‘[i]n the last analysis, it is 
the business of biology to answer this question [i.e., what is life?]’ (van Inwagen 
1990, 84). Van Inwagen, however, does not provide us with a biological definition of 
a life. This may be for a number of reasons. First, as Mark Bedau notes, ‘[t]he nature 
of life is notoriously controversial. The lack of consensus among the scientists and 
philosophers who are interested in the question is well known. The standard views 
about the nature of life are quite diverse, and most seem to have straightforward 
counter examples’ (Bedau 2014, 14). Second, van Inwagen admits, ‘it may be 
indeterminate whether the activity of certain objects constitutes a life’ (van Inwagen 
1993b, 685). To supply van Inwagen with a complete biological description of life 
here would take me too far from the main aim of this thesis.32 Instead, I point the 
interested reader to Bedau’s recent paper ‘The nature of life’ (Bedau 2014) to begin to 
determine what biological processes, precisely, are required for ‘life’.33  
Van Inwagen does, however, provide us with an analogy. This analogy describes an 
event that is supposed to have features similar to those of a life. He then uses this 
analogy to give us a working definition of a life. Van Inwagen writes,  
 
[i]magine a club the new members of which are always shanghaied. When a 
new member is wanted, a press-gang is sent to find a suitable candidate. When 
one is found, he is dragged to the club’s premises and forcibly inducted. The 
induction ceremony (we may imagine) is so impressive that members are 
fiercely loyal to the club as long as they remain members. But few if any 
members remain members long. When a member is exhausted by his efforts 
                                                
30 Van Inwagen calls this the ‘Proposed Answer’ (van Inwagen 1993c, 710). 
31 Van Inwagen writes, ‘life is the sum of a great many chemical processes’ (van Inwagen 1990, 146). 
32 Indeed, an entire book on the topic would, so it seems, be insufficient.  
33 Moreover, Bedau provides an overview of a number of different approaches that one can take to 
defining life. I will return to the consideration of a biological definition of life when I consider the 
problem of life after death. 
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on the club’s behalf, and after his resources have been appropriated and placed 
in the club’s treasury, he is ruthlessly expelled. The membership of the club is 
its constitution (which, of course, is not an identifiable object but rather a 
complex set of dispositions and intensions that is maintained by the assiduous 
indoctrination of new members). One important feature of this constitution is 
its prescription that whenever anyone ceased to be a member, a press-gang is 
to be sent out to capture a replacement for him, someone who is as much like 
the way he was when he was inducted as possible. As a consequence, the club 
‘looks’ much the same from one year to the next despite the continual 
replacement of its members. It is important to note that the relatively 
unchanging aspect of our club is due to what might be called ‘internal 
causation,’ to the causal relations its members bear to one another, and is not 
due to the actions of any external ‘policing’ or monitoring or maintenance 
agency (van Inwagen 1990, 84). 
 
The club represents an organism. The club-candidates are simples that are not yet 
constituents of the life of the club. Club-candidates that are inducted get ‘caught up’ 
in the ‘life’ of the club, just as simples get caught up in the life of an organism. Just as 
club-members do not last long before they are expelled, so the material simples that 
get caught up in a life get expelled through excreta.  
 
To this analogy van Inwagen says that he will ‘add a few notes’ (van Inwagen 1990, 
87). I take these ‘few notes’ to be three (non-biological) conditions for some z’s being 
a life. I, following van Inwagen, define ‘life’ as follows: 
 
Life = z is a life iff z is an event that is (i) well-individuated (ii) self-
maintaining and (iii) jealous (van Inwagen 1990, 87–89). 
 
‘Event,’ ‘well-individuated,’ ‘self-maintaining’ and ‘jealous’ as used by van Inwagen 
are all technical terms. I shall say a little about each here. First, I shall consider 
events. Van Inwagen refrains from offering an ontology of events34 but he does say 
                                                
34 Eric Olson has brought it to my attention that van Inwagen has stated that he thinks that events do 
not exist. Van Inwagen writes, ‘[m]y extreme ideas about ontology also imply either the falsity or the 
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that lives are, of course, events that are individuals or particulars and not ‘events’ in 
the sense ‘that can recur’ (van Inwagen 1990, 82). It should also be said that van 
Inwagen understands a life to be a particular type of event, a process, since he refers 
to the event type—life—as a natural ‘process’ (van Inwagen 1990, 146) (or, indeed, 
sum of natural biochemical processes). Van Inwagen also says of lives that they are 
homeodynamic events. By this van Inwagen means that particular lives can undergo 
change of a certain sort yet remain the same throughout this change. In particular, the 
simples that are, for example, caught up in my life were once not caught up in my life 
but came to be by my, say, digesting some food of which the simples that compose 
me now were (virtually) a part. Moreover, these simples will, at some point, over a 
period of time, all cease to be caught up in my life. Some of them will cease to be 
caught up in my life by virtue of my defecating, giving blood or having an organ 
removed etc. Throughout all of these changes, however, my life will continue. The 
life that the simples became caught up in when I digested the food was the same life 
that certain simples were caught up in before I digested the food and when I gave 
blood three months later.  
 
‘Well-individuated’, put simply, means that it is ‘reasonably clear...whether a life 
[that] is observed at one time…is the same life as a life that is observed at another 
time (or place)’ (van Inwagen 1990, 87). It is reasonably clear, I take it, to a biologist 
studying a particular plant, that the biological processes going on ‘within’ the plant at 
one time are the same biological processes that are going on within a plant at another 
time.35 ‘Self-maintaining,’ says that lives need no external support for their 
                                                
mere vacuous truth of the so-called identity thesis—the thesis that every mental event is a physical 
event. They have this implication because they imply that there are no events, no events of any 
description, either mental or physical’ (van Inwagen 2014a, 245). One may think that this is 
problematic for the following reason. If human organisms exist in virtue of the fact that the simples that 
compose them are constituents of events (lives) but events do not exist, then lives do not exist. This, on 
first appearances, implies that organisms do not exist for organisms exist if and only if the simples that 
compose them are constituents of a life. I do not know what to make of this point. I hope that van 
Inwagen can clear this up at some point. I will return to this point in Chapter 5. 
35 There may be some occasions when it is not clear whether an organism has produced a descendent or 
is continuing to live itself. In these cases it may be argued that it is not clear whether a life that is 
observed at one time is the same life as the life that is observed at another. Examples where it is not 
clear are cases like the amoeba and the immortal jellyfish. (I thank Daniel Hill for drawing these 
examples to my attention.) Van Inwagen considers amoebas in (1990, 150–151). I take it that cases like 
these are the reason that van Inwagen uses the adverb ‘reasonably.’ 
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existence.36 A shoot of water from a fountain, for example, is not a self-maintaining 
event. It needs a pump to keep it going, whereas a life needs only the biological 
processes that are inherent to it for it to persist. These processes are, I take it, those 
processes that biologists refer to as metabolic processes (or, at least, metabolic-like 
processes).37 As Bedau notes, metabolic processes are those processes that are 
features of ‘self-maintaining…chemical system[s]’ (Bedau 2014, 14). ‘Jealous,’ put 
simply, says that ‘it cannot be that the activities of the xs constitute at one and the 
same time two lives’ (van Inwagen 1990, 89). No matter how close to another 
organism I get it will never be the case that the xs that compose me will, at the same 
time, compose another organism.  
 
This answer to the special-composition question (i.e., $y iff there are some xs the 
activity of which constitute a life) means that there are no material objects that are not 
organisms or material simples. Van Inwagen writes, ‘my position vis-a-vis tables and 
other inanimate objects is simply that there are none’ (van Inwagen 1990, 99). This is 
because, on van Inwagen’s metaphysics of material constitution, the only objects that 
exist are material simples and objects that are composed of material simples. The only 
objects that exist, therefore, besides material simples, are organisms. The material 
simples that seemingly compose chairs, tables, and computers, therefore, do not 
actually compose these (supposed) things since these simples are not caught up in 
(i.e., constituents of) a well-individuated, self-maintaining and jealous event. We 
might say, with van Inwagen, that the simples that seemingly compose such seeming 
objects only ‘virtually’ (van Inwagen 1990, 133) compose them.  
 
It must be noted at this point, however, that van Inwagen holds that uttering, say, 
‘there are two very valuable chairs in the next room’ is not false. Even though he 
thinks that chairs do not exist he holds that there is a way of paraphrasing statements 
(such as the one mentioned in the previous sentence). For example, ‘there are two 
chairs’ might simply be paraphrased ‘there are simples arranged chair-wise in two 
                                                
36 Besides, perhaps, God’s on-going external support, oxygen in the organism’s environment, a stable 
atmosphere, and a regular supply of food and water. These may be serious exceptions (serious for van 
Inwagen’s project). I leave it to my reader to decide. For the sake of argument, I will assume that they 
are not serious exceptions. 
37 Strictly speaking metabolic processes are internal to cells. When biologists speak of the metabolic 
processes of organisms I take it that they speaking analogously.  
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different spatial locations’. Van Inwagen claims that what we really mean by ‘there 
exist two chairs’ is ‘there exist simples arranged chair-wise in two different spatial 
locations’. Thus, we are not saying anything false provided we accept van Inwagen’s 
rules for paraphrase. He likens this to the utterance, ‘The sun has moved behind the 
elms’. Ordinarily, we do not take this utterance to be false, while we recognize that 
the sun does not, in fact, move behind the elms. 
 
What is important for the purpose of this thesis, however, is not that there may be no 
tables, chairs or computers etc. Rather, what matters for our purposes is that 
organisms are objects composed entirely of material simples and they are composed 
of material simples in virtue of the fact that these simples come to be constituents of 
lives.38 Perhaps one can salvage the existence of tables and chairs while at the same 
time believing that organisms exist in virtue of the fact that the simples that compose 
them are constituents of a life, perhaps not. What is important is that lives themselves 
are necessary for the existence of organisms. 
 
In sum, according to animalists we are human organisms. Human organisms are 
composite objects that are composed entirely of material simples. The simples that 
compose a particular organism compose it by virtue of the fact that those simples are 
constituents of a life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
38 To be clear, for the rest of this thesis I will follow van Inwagen by saying that simples are 
constituents of lives and compose human organisms. Simples do not constitute organisms or compose 
lives. 
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CHAPTER 2 – PERSONAL IDENTITY 
So far I have primarily commented on what animalists think we are, and have tried to 
avoid stating how animalists think that we persist across time. In this thesis, however, 
since I am interested in our persistence across death and since animalists think that we 
are human organisms, we will need to know what the persistence conditions of human 
organisms are. 
 
Specifying what the animalist thinks our persistence conditions are is not 
straightforward. Animalism has come to be identified with the central animalist 
assertion (AA). This position (so it is argued) is neutral with regard to how we, human 
organisms, persist from one time to the next.39 I will start, however, by identifying the 
animalist account of our persistence conditions that is favoured by the type of 
animalism that is central to this thesis: that type of animalism held by, for example, 
van Inwagen and Olson. This type of animalism does hold that our persistence 
conditions are determined by the kind of thing that we are. We are human organisms 
and in consequence, have the persistence conditions of human organisms. Human 
organisms exist in virtue of the fact that the simples that compose them are 
constituents of lives. It is natural to think, therefore, that the persistence of human 
organisms will be determined by, or at least dependent upon, the persistence 
conditions of lives.  
 
Peter van Inwagen puts forward a criterion for the persistence of human organisms. 
Van Inwagen calls this the criterion for the persistence of human organisms ‘Life’40. It 
can be stated as follows: 
 
Life = ‘if the activity of the xs at t1 constitutes a life, and the activity of the ys 
at t2 constitutes a life, then the organism that the xs compose at t1 is the 
organism that the ys compose at t2 if and only if the life constituted by the 
activity of the xs at t1 is the life constituted by the activity of the ys at t2’ (van 
Inwagen 1990, 145). 
                                                
39 See Bailey (2015) and Thornton (2016). 
40 Van Inwagen uses the term ‘life’ in two ways. First, ‘life’ (non-italicised) denotes an event, as 
defined above. Second, ‘Life’ (italicised) denotes his criterion for the persistence of an organism. I will 
follow van Inwagen. 
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Put simply, an organism persists when and only when its life persists. This is a 
version of the view known as the ‘Biological Approach’ to personal identity. It is 
called this because if an organism persists when and only when its life persists and it 
is the job of biology to supply us with the correct definition of life then our 
persistence conditions will be biological in nature. It is also called the ‘Biological 
Approach’ to differentiate it from psychological approaches. Psychological 
approaches say that x is identical with some future or past being y if and only if x and 
y have the same relevant mental properties. Which mental properties are relevant 
depends upon the kind of psychological approach one takes. For example, one may 
think that necessarily, for some person, y, at a time t2, to be the same as some person, 
x, at an earlier time t1, y needs to remember some experience had by x. 
 
The Biological Approach, however, is not the only animalist account for the 
persistence conditions of human organisms. Let us distinguish between the ‘personal 
ontology question’ and the ‘persistence question’. An animalist may answer the 
personal-ontology question what are we? ‘human organisms’, but the persistence 
question do we have biological persistence conditions?41 ‘no.’ There are two reasons 
for this negative answer. First, the animalist may be an anticriterialist. That is, she 
may believe that there are no informative sufficient42 conditions for our persistence 
across time. Second, the animalist may believe that the human organism can persist 
even when its life processes cease. I will return to these negative answers to the 
persistence questions later. (I will discuss the view that we persist when our life 
processes have ceased in Chapter 3 and the view that there are no informative 
sufficient conditions for our persistence across time in Chapter 7. 
 
Let us, therefore, return to Life. One may think that while Life is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the persistence of organisms in general, it is not a sufficient 
condition for the persistence of human persons in particular. One reason for thinking 
this is the fact that many of us have the intuition that ‘in Daniel Dennett’s words, 
where my brain goes, go I’ (van Inwagen 1990, 169). 
                                                
41 See Bailey (2015, 868). 
42 See (Duncan 2014; Merricks 2001). 
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Consider, for example, the following brain-transplant scenario. Let us say that you 
undergo a terrible accident that leaves you paralyzed; you cannot engage in the 
normal use of your motor skills. You cannot ride a bike. You cannot do a push-up. 
You cannot pick up your pen. You are, subsequently, taken to hospital. You stay in 
hospital for a very long time; ten years, let us say. Your body43 begins to show signs 
of significant aging. So much so that even if you could be helped, even if you were to 
regain some of your motor skills, your body would be in such a bad way that you 
would never be very active ever again. Let us also say that in the bed next to you there 
is a patient who has long been in a vegetative state. Let us call him ‘Smith’. Let us 
also say that Smith has said that were he to be in a vegetative state for long enough he 
would donate his body to a worthy cause. He has been in this vegetative state for a 
sufficient length of time for his body to be donated to any worthy cause. A very 
talented brain surgeon, upon viewing you and Smith side-by-side, sees an obvious 
solution to your problem. With your approval he decides to transfer your brain to the 
body of Smith and Smith’s brain to your body. The question is: in this case, where do 
you go? Most of us, I hazard, have the intuition that we go with our brains. That is, 
when the surgeon removes your brain from your body you are being removed from 
your body. When the surgeon places your brain in Smith’s body you come to be 
composed of your brain and all of the parts that recently composed Smith. 
 
According to animalism you go where your life-processes go. On the face of it, 
however, in the above scenario your life-processes stay behind with your body. Even 
though the surgeon switches your brain with Smith’s brain it seems that, according to 
animalism, we should say that Smith would wake up from the surgery with your 
memories, your beliefs, your desires and would think himself married to your wife 
etc. but Smith would not be you. This is a rather counter-intuitive result of animalism. 
Most of us share the brain-transplant intuition. According to animalism, however, a 
                                                
43 When I use the term ‘body’ I mean to refer to a certain set of simples caught up in a life. Or, if you 
prefer, ‘your body’ may be read as ‘the animal with which you are identical’. I say this because I know 
that animalists often say that they think the word ‘body’ is problematic (see, for example, van Inwagen 
(1980)). I keep the word ‘body’ in my thesis, however, for expunging it completely would be 
excruciating for both the reader and myself. Moreover, non-animalists frequently use the word ‘body’ 
when engaging in the debate that this thesis concerns. 
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brain transplant simply moves one organ from one organism to another, like a liver or 
kidney transplant. 
 
One may think that this provides us with a reason to reject the claim that Life is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for our persistence, for the thought experiment 
suggests that this persistence requires the persistence of psychological properties. Van 
Inwagen does not think this. Despite Dennett’s objections to the slogan ‘where my 
brain goes, go I’, van Inwagen believes that one does, in fact, go with one’s brain. Not 
only this but van Inwagen thinks that this belief can be shown to be ‘a natural 
consequence of the principles governing the unity and persistence of organisms’ (van 
Inwagen 1990, 169). Van Inwagen thinks that one goes with one’s brain and that this 
is consistent with his materialist metaphysics and Life. 
 
As Paul Anders notes (2011), there are several stages to van Inwagen’s argument for 
the claim that one goes with one’s brain. First, van Inwagen argues that it is correct to 
say ‘I exist’, and he bases this claim on the Cartesian argument for one’s existence 
without making any commitment to the existence of immaterial beings (cf. van 
Inwagen 1990, 116). Second, van Inwagen argues that it is correct to say that I exist 
as a composite object. He defends this claim by arguing that, as Anders notes, 
‘thinking requires a unified and organized interaction of parts that the mere coming 
together of material simples cannot produce’ (Anders 2011, 30). Consequently, he 
concludes that if I am a material object then I am a composite object. Third, van 
Inwagen argues that it is the simples that compose one’s brain (a virtual object) that 
are, in part, the simples that compose one. He is able to argue for this claim because, 
as Anders highlights, the brain is, according to van Inwagen, ‘the seat of the 
information that directs the homeodynamic event that is the life of the entire human 
organism’ (Anders 2011, 30). Van Inwagen calls the seat of the information that 
directs the homeodynamic event that is the life of the entire human organism the 
‘organ of maintenance’ (van Inwagen 1990, 208), it is the organ that maintains all of 
the relevant life processes. The organ of maintenance in human organisms is the brain 
(or, rather, some particular part of the brain).44 It is in virtue of this fact that van 
Inwagen thinks that it is appropriate to say that one goes with one’s brain.  
                                                
44 See Shewmon (2001) and Olson (2016) for recent challenges. 
 26 
 
Van Inwagen provides us with an analogy to demonstrate this point. Imagine an 
empire, which ‘is governed almost entirely from the Imperial Palace’ (van Inwagen 
1990, 175). Intelligence flows into the palace from the empire and information and 
instructions flow out of the palace to the empire. Van Inwagen then gets us to 
‘imagine that some catastrophe isolates the palace. No instructions can leave it’ (van 
Inwagen 1990, 174). When this happens, according to van Inwagen, ‘the 
empire…shrank to compose the isolated palace staff’ (van Inwagen 1990, 174).45 
Having laid out his analogy, van Inwagen writes:  
[t]he fact that there was no preexistent political entity distinct from the empire 
that the empire became corresponds to the fact that, when one’s brain and 
brain-complement [the pile of simples that remain once one’s brain has been 
removed] are separated and one shrinks to a three-pound object, there is no 
pre-existent material object, initially distinct from one’s self, that one becomes 
(van Inwagen 1990, 174).  
In other words, when your brain is removed you do not then become identical with 
your brain where once you were identical with a human organism. Rather, certain 
simples that once composed you have ceased to compose you and you have been 
pared down to the size of your brain, just as when the Imperial Palace gets cut off 
from the rest of the empire, the empire is reduced to the size of the Imperial Palace. 
So, when your brain gets removed you are reduced to the size of your brain. (I should 
make it clear that this is supposing the brain is, somehow, still functioning. Perhaps it 
is gradually hooked up to an elaborate ‘life-support machine’ (cf. van Inwagen 1990, 
177) as it is removed). It must further be added, however, that a surgically removed 
brain, or relevant part of that brain, that is not able to function as a living organism 
has ceased to exist and, therefore, cannot compose a particular organism. 
Consequently, the simples that compose the brain need to constitute a life for a 
particular organism to exist and for personal identity to be maintained. 
                                                
45 That the empire shrinks to compose the isolated palace is not obvious to all. For example, it seems 
that the members of the British Antarctic Survey still belong to that organisation when they are isolated 
in the South Pole. (Thanks to Daniel Hill for this example.) For the sake of argument, however, I will 
assume that van Inwagen is right.  
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Given that human organisms can go where their brains go, Anders offers the 
following principle, the principle of personal identity with regard to human 
organisms, or PPIHO. 
 
PPIHO The person that the zs compose at t1 is the person that the zs* compose 
at t2 iff:  
(1) the activity of the xs that virtually compose a brain, or the relevant 
portion thereof, at t1 are a subset [sic] of the zs whose activity 
constitutes a life at t1; 
(2) the activity of the ys that virtually compose a brain, or the relevant 
portion thereof, at t2 are a subset of the zs* whose activity constitutes a 
life at t2; 
(3) the life constituted by the activity of the zs at t1 is the life constituted 
by the activity of the zs* at t2 (Anders 2011, 30). 
 
Put simply, Anders concludes that the sufficient condition for personal identity of 
human organisms across time is as follows: ‘a human person exists as long as there 
persists a human life-event that arises from the ongoing interaction of simples a 
portion of which continually46 compose a human brain’ (Anders 2011, 31). This is 
consistent with Life but includes the relevant consideration of the place of the brain, 
or portion thereof, which directs a human life. We should not think that it must be the 
whole brain since the whole brain is not needed to direct a homeodynamic event, a 
life. In fact, animalists (of the variety with which I am concerned) have taken the 
organ of maintenance in human organisms to be, specifically, the brainstem (in 
particular, see Olson (2016) and Tzinman (2016)). 
 
While PPIHO is a helpful clarification and will be important later in this thesis, at the 
moment Life will be sufficient. When relevant, however, I will employ the more 
specific PPIHO.  
 
 
                                                
46Note that Anders includes ‘continually’ though this word does not appear in PPIHO.  
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CHAPTER 3 –  DEATH AND LIFE AFTER DEATH 
3.1 Death 
Third, and finally, because we are interested in the persistence of human organisms 
through death we need to know what the animalist counts as death for human 
organisms. For the time being let us assume that death simply is the cessation of life. 
Cody Gilmore calls this ‘the cessation thesis’. He writes, 
 
‘when does a thing die?’ One natural answer to this question is, ‘when it stops 
being alive.’…I dub [this answer] the Cessation Thesis (CT): 
 
CT Necessarily, for any x and any t, if t is an instant, then x dies at t if and 
only if x   ceases to be alive at t’ (cf. Gilmore 2013, 5).47 
On the assumption that CT is true we may understand van Inwagen to have given two 
ways by which an organism can die, two ways by which an organism can cease to be 
alive. I call these two ways ‘modes’ of death.48 First, he gives the mode of death that 
he calls ‘disruption’. This can be put as follows, using the abbreviation “MD” to 
indicate a mode of death: 
(MD1) Disruption = O’s life has been disrupted at t if the simples that 
composed O have been dissociated from one another. 
For example, van Inwagen writes that this dissociation has occurred when the 
organism ‘has been blown to bits by a bomb or…died naturally and has been subject 
to the normal “room-temperature” processes of biological decay for, say, fifteen 
minutes’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147). The important point is that when an organism gets 
blown to bits by a bomb, or has died naturally and has been subject to normal 
processes of biological decay for around fifteen minutes, the xs that composed that 
organism before it was subject to normal processes of biological decay cease to be 
constituents of a life. This is a rather unambiguous mode of death. Suppose I am 
                                                
47 Since we are interested in organisms, specifically, one should read CT as: necessarily, for any 
organism, O, and any time, t, if t is an instant, then O dies at t if and only if O ceases to be alive at t. 
48 It should be noted that van Inwagen never discusses death in his book Material Beings: i.e., he never 
discusses when human organisms die and what this might amount to. Rather, he merely discusses ‘the 
cessation of life’. I assume for the moment that death is the cessation of life, however, as will become 
apparent, van Inwagen will need an account of death like CT in order for his defence of the possibility 
of resurrection to be considered plausible. 
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blown to bits by a bomb. Once I have been blown up, there are no relations that are 
characteristic of the relations between simples that are constituents of a life among 
any of the simples that used to compose me; likewise if my remains are subject to the 
normal processes of biological decay. 
Before I introduce van Inwagen’s second mode of death I must first raise a major 
problem for CT. One might argue that CT is false because there are cases (real and 
imaginary) where the life of an organism has ceased but it is not dead. This occurs, so 
it is argued, when an organism undergoes cryptobiosis. As Gilmore notes, ‘the term 
“cryptobiosis” was introduced by the entomologist and biochemist David Keilin’ 
(Gilmore 2013, 15). Cryptobiosis is ‘the state of an organism when it shows no visible 
signs of life and when its metabolic activity becomes hardly measureable, or comes 
reversibly to a standstill’ (Keilin 1959, 166). There are many forms of cryptobiosis: 
cryobiosis, anhydrobiosis, anoxybiosis, chembiosis and osmobiosis. This thesis is 
primarily concerned with cryobiosis.49 Keilin describes a clear case of cryobiosis. 
Keilin recounts that Paul Becquerel cooled desiccated, anhydrobiotic tardigrades to 
0.008 and 0.0047 degrees above absolute zero. When the tardigrades reached these 
temperatures, their metabolic activity was hardly measureable. These tardigrades were 
then successfully revived after two hours (Keilin 1959, 178–179; Gilmore 2013, 15). 
Van Inwagen provides his own, albeit imaginary, example of (what I take to be) 
cryobiosis; namely, cryogenic freezing. Van Inwagen asks us to imagine that we take 
a cat and ‘we reduce its body temperature to very nearly absolute zero by some 
technique (not currently available, by the way) that does no irreversible organic 
damage’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147) and later revive it. 
In both cases, it seems that most of us believe that the tardigrades and the frozen cat 
that have been warmed up and thawed are identical to the tardigrades and the cat that 
were cooled to very nearly absolute zero. Van Inwagen writes, ‘suppose that we then 
revive the cat…[i]t seems clear that the revived cat is the cat we started with’ (van 
Inwagen 1990, 146). Indeed, as van Inwagen writes, ‘[t]he phrase “the revived cat” 
                                                
49 Van Inwagen’s suggestion that when we die ‘God preserves our corpses contrary to all appearances’ 
(van Inwagen 1998b, 49) has been read as follows: when we die ‘God cryogenically freezes our 
corpses contrary to all appearances’. See, for example, (Hasker 1999, 223). But perhaps God uses 
cryobiosis, anhydrobiosis, anoxybiosis, chembiosis, osmobiosis or some as-of-yet-undiscovered 
preservation process. Little hangs on this point. What is important is not the method that God uses per 
se but whether the method that he uses suffices as a form of death. 
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strongly suggests, if it does not entail, that there is only one cat in our story’ (van 
Inwagen 1990, 146). Likewise, Gilmore says that the cooled desiccated tardigrades 
were revived. I take it that Gilmore thinks that these tardigrades are the very same 
tardigrades as the tardigrades that had been previously cooled. 
The question remains, however, what is the, we might say, ‘vital status’ of the 
tardigrade and the imaginary cat that have been cryogenically frozen? Are they dead 
or alive? The answers to these questions are important. This is primarily because 
whether or not CT is true depends on the vital status of the organism that has 
undergone cryptobiosis. If the organism that has been cryogenically frozen is dead in 
virtue of the fact that its life processes have ceased, then CT is true. If the organism is 
alive then CT is false; it is alive even though its life-processes have (apparently) 
ceased.50 
There are, however, three possible options here; not two. First (i), in cases like the 
two mentioned above, it could be argued that the organism undergoing cryptobiosis is 
alive and not dead. Second, (ii) it could be argued that the organism undergoing 
cryptobiosis is dead and not alive. Third, (iii) it may be argued that the organism 
undergoing cryptobiosis is neither dead nor alive. In this case ‘dead’ and ‘alive’ are 
contraries, not contradictories. Something cannot be both death and alive but 
something can be neither dead nor alive. For example, as Gilmore points out, ‘[m]y 
wallet is not alive, but it’s also not dead’ (Gilmore 2013, 17). Or, if you do not believe 
in wallets, a material simple is not alive but it is also not dead. 
There are adherents to each of these views. First, one may argue that the organism is 
dead (ii). Take the tardigrade, for example. One reason for arguing that the 
cryogenically preserved tardigrade is dead is that, as Keilin notes, the tardigrade’s 
metabolism and other life-processes ‘have stopped’ (Gilmore 2013, 15). They have 
stopped because, according to James Clegg, the ‘removal of all but, say, 0.1g H2O/g 
dry weight (easily achieved by anhydrobionts), will inevitably result in the cessation 
                                                
50 Moreover, the vital status will help us determine whether or not we are correct in identifying an 
organism that has been warmed up after it has been cryogenically frozen with the organism that 
occupied the exact same region of space moments before it was cryogenically frozen. For if, say, the 
cat’s life-processes have ceased and (as will become apparent) lives that have ceased can never begin 
again, then the cat that has undergone cryptobiosis can never exist again; the cat after thawing is not 
the same cat as the cat that was cryogenically preserved (relatedly, whether or not we should say that 
the organism that has undergone cryopreservation exists). I will say more about this as I go. 
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of metabolism’ (Clegg 2001, 615). If one holds that metabolic processes are necessary 
for life and that an organism that has undergone cryptobiosis displays none of these 
metabolic processes, then one can argue that the organism that has undergone 
cryptobiosis is dead. On this view, CT is true. The processes that are apparently 
necessary for life have ceased and the organism is considered dead. Many argue, 
however, that this is implausible (including, although for different reasons, (Luper 
2009, 44; Gilmore 2013, 16)).  
On the other hand, some argue (or, at least, would prefer to say) that the organism that 
has undergone cryptobiosis is alive (ii). One reason for thinking that an organism that 
has undergone cryptobiosis is alive is that, although its metabolic processes have 
ceased, they can still, relatively easily, return. The intuition here is that in order for 
something to be classed as ‘dead’ it has to not merely have its life-processes cease but 
it has to lose the capacity to live. Underlying this reasoning is the belief that 
something like the incapacity thesis (IT) is true. It can be stated as follows: 
(IT) Incapacity thesis = Necessarily, for any x and for any t, if t is an instant, 
then x dies at t if and only if  ‘at t, x loses the capacity to live’ (Persson 1995, 
501).51 
IT is inconsistent with CT. If IT is true it is not the case that necessarily, for any x and 
any t, if t is an instant, then x dies at t if and only if x ceases to be alive at t, for it also 
needs to lose the capacity to live. The ramifications for this thesis is that if the 
organism that has undergone cryogenic freezing is alive then CT is false. 
Third, (iii) one may want to argue that the organism that has undergone cryptobiosis 
is neither dead nor alive. Cody Gilmore takes this view. Gilmore argues that the 
organism that has undergone cryptobiosis is not alive because its life-functions have 
ceased.52 Gilmore writes, ‘a thing is alive at a time just in case it’s performing “the 
right sorts of life-functions” at a time. Whatever those life-functions may be, it seems 
unlikely that they are being performed by a frozen or thoroughly desiccated cell or 
multicellular organism’ (Gilmore 2013, 16). But, according to Gilmore neither is the 
                                                
51 Gilmore (2013) discusses this thesis in great depth. I should add that Gilmore thinks that IT is only a 
necessary condition for his incomplete definition of death (see (Gilmore 2013, 39–40)). 
52 I take life-functions to be related to life-processes in the way that, say, the function of my digestive 
system is related to the processes of absorption and assimilation. For my digestive system to function it 
requires the digestive processes to be occurring. 
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organism that is undergoing cryptobiosis dead. It is not dead because, as Gilmore 
notes, ‘it is structurally intact and undamaged in a way that makes it relatively easy 
for it to be alive in the future’ (Gilmore 2013,17). On this view it is argued that CT is 
false too. The life of the cryogenically preserved organism has ceased but it is not 
dead because it retains the capacity to live. 
At the moment, I will remain neutral with regard to which of the above (i)–(iii) is true 
(I will return to this point at sect. 6.1.1). What matters at the moment is stating what 
van Inwagen thinks the vital status of an organism that has undergone cryptobiosis is. 
Van Inwagen’s preferred view, although he says that ‘it is not really essential to [his] 
position’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147), is to say that the cat is alive. In one way, this is 
the most common-sense understanding of what occurs when an organism undergoes 
cryptobiosis; the cat that has undergone cryptobiosis has, literally, had its life (biosis) 
merely hidden (crypto) i.e., it has not ceased. 
Importantly, however, according to van Inwagen it is alive, but this is not because the 
cat retains the capacity for life (as on IT). Rather, van Inwagen thinks that there are 
some processes going on within the frozen cat that are sufficient for life: sufficient for 
saying that the cat is alive. Van Inwagen describes what happens to the life of the cat 
as follows: the cat’s life, which (before it was frozen) ‘consisted mostly of chemical 
reactions and various relatively large-scale physical processes (the breaking and 
establishing of chemical bonds, the movement of fluids under hydraulic pressure, the 
transport of ions)’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147), upon freezing gets ‘“squeezed into” 
various small-scale physical processes (the orbiting of electrons and the exchange of 
photons by charged particles). Its life became the sum of those subchemical changes 
that underlie and constitute chemical and large-scale physical unchange’ (van 
Inwagen 1990, 147). 
We can call this ‘squeezing’; the cat has had its life-processes squeezed into 
submicroscopic processes. He writes that although the life of the cat ‘has ceased’ (van 
Inwagen 1990, 147), there is a sense in which the life is still ‘there’ (van Inwagen 
1990, 147). In fact, van Inwagen writes of the frozen cat ‘I, who am fond of 
oxymorons, would describe the frozen cat as a living corpse’ (van Inwagen 1990, 
147). As mentioned van Inwagen would prefer to say that the organism that has 
undergone cryptobiosis is alive. The life is still there; but it is not there in virtue of the 
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fact that there is some biochemical process (or collection of processes) occurring, nor 
is it there merely in virtue of the fact that the corpse retains a sufficient degree of life-
apt structure, rather it is there in virtue of the fact that there are some subchemical 
processes occurring that suffice for life. 
Having said this, van Inwagen admits that if someone says that the cat is not alive ‘I 
do not think that he is misusing the word “alive” I would say that he is assuming a 
stipulative sharpening of the meaning of “alive”’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147). In 
consequence, van Inwagen allows it to be the case that the organism that has 
undergone cryobiosis is either dead or neither dead nor alive. 
I think that van Inwagen should accept his interlocutor’s stipulative sharpening. In 
fact, I think he should say not only that the cat is not alive but that the cat is dead. My 
reason for saying this is that if we want to maximise the number of possibilities for an 
organism’s being ‘dead’ and coming back to life i.e., maximise the number of 
possible explanations that van Inwagen can appeal to for saying that organism O has 
survived its death, then we should say that an organism that has undergone 
cryptobiosis is dead. By way of a brief explanation here, van Inwagen, correctly in my 
view, believes that ‘all men who share in the sin of Adam must die’ (van Inwagen 
1998b, 49) and will later exist again on the Last Day. Put simply, van Inwagen 
believes that we (human organisms) all die but that we can come back to life. If he 
holds that an organism that has undergone cryptobiosis is dead, then it can come back 
to life. If, on the other hand, he holds that this organism is alive then it cannot come 
back to life again (for it has not died). Likewise, if he holds that an organism that has 
undergone cryptobiosis is neither dead nor alive then it can come back to life for, 
although it never died, it ceased to be alive. 
Van Inwagen says that if we should take his interlocutor’s stipulative sharpening, we 
should not say that the cat is alive but say that the cat’s life has been suspended. If, as 
van Inwagen argues, the life of an organism that has been suspended has ceased and if 
we hold that CT is true (as I have argued van Inwagen should), then suspension is a 
mode of death.  
We can define suspension as follows: 
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(MD2) Suspension = O’s life has been suspended at t if the life, L, in virtue of 
which the simples that composed O has ceased and the simples that were 
caught up in L retain—owing to the mere absence of disruptive forces—their 
individual properties and their relations to one another. 
How different is this suggestion (that a life has been suspended) from the suggestion 
that the life has not been suspended but merely squeezed? I think it is merely 
terminological. That is, there is no difference between an organism that has had its 
life suspended and an organism that has had its life ‘squeezed’. More precisely, the 
individual properties of, and relations between, the simples that compose an organism 
that has had its life squeezed are identical with the individual properties of, and 
relations between, the simples that compose an organism that has had its life 
suspended. Rather, some may prefer to say that a life that has been ‘squeezed’ is still 
there (and, in consequence, the organism is still alive) while others may prefer to say 
that since the life processes have been ‘suspended’ the life has ceased (and, in 
consequence, the organism is no longer alive). Both I think are permitted by van 
Inwagen.  
However, if one wants to say that the organism that has had its life suspended still 
exists, something else needs to be said about the nature of an organism that has had its 
life suspended. This is because if an organism has had its life suspended and the 
simples that compose an organism need to be constituents of a life in order for that 
organism to exist (as is implied by van Inwagen’s answer to the special-composition 
question), then, prima facie, an organism whose life has been suspended does not 
exist. Van Inwagen would prefer to say that the organism whose life has been 
suspended still exists. One reason for this may be that one would rather not say that an 
organism that has had its life suspended and then restarted has ceased to exist and 
then exists again. That is, most of us find it intuitive to say of an organism that has 
had its life suspended that it still exists.  
To clarify, I will distinguish between two types of life: macroscopic-life and 
submicroscopic-life. An organism that is composed of simples the activity of which 
are constituents of macroscopic-life is ‘alive’ and an organism that is composed of 
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simples the activity of which are constituents of submicroscopic-life is ‘not alive.’53 
These two kinds of life can be distinguished by the processes involved. Processes that 
are essential to macroscopic-life are those processes like the breaking and establishing 
of chemical bonds, the movement of fluids under hydraulic pressure, and the transport 
of ions. Processes that are essential to submicroscopic-life include’ the orbiting of 
electrons and the exchange of photons by charged particles. 
When we say that an organism’s life has been suspended what we mean is that its 
macroscopic-life processes have ceased, but its submicroscopic-life processes 
continue. In this case when an organism has had its life suspended we can still say 
that the organism exists; the simples that compose it are still constituents of a life, just 
a submicroscopic-life.  Moreover, if van Inwagen allows it to be the case that a 
necessary condition for some object’s being ‘alive’ is that the simples that compose it 
constitute a macroscopic-life and a sufficient condition for some object’s being dead54 
is that the simples that compose it constitute a submicroscopic-life, then squeezing 
can count as death.55  
There is, in fact, no difference (ontologically speaking) between a corpse whose life 
has been squeezed but is still there (i.e., the organism becomes a living corpse) and a 
corpse whose life has been suspended. In practice, what this means is that I will use 
interchangeably van Inwagen’s description of what happens to a cat when it is frozen 
and has its life ‘squeezed’ and what happens to a cat whose life has been suspended. 
Before I move on I should say a bit more about suspension. It must be noted that the 
fact that the simples retain individual properties and relations to one another (a 
necessary condition for suspension) is not a sufficient condition for the continuation 
of any submicroscopic process sufficient for life. After all, the simples that virtually 
compose a corpse that has had its life disrupted (perhaps a corpse that has been 
                                                
53 This may strike my reader as problematic. That is, to say that some things can ‘have a life’ (albeit a 
submicroscopic one) and yet not be ‘alive.’ I think that this is problematic too. But the problem is van 
Inwagen’s and not mine. Existence requires a ‘life’ processes and if (as it appears) there are corpses 
that exist but they are not alive, then van Inwagen is committed to the view that some things can have a 
life and yet not be alive. In this passage, I am merely trying to make this notion as clear as possible. 
54 One may object here, that this is not a case of death. The organism should be classified as ‘alive’. 
This objection is an important one and will be considered later in this thesis. For the time being, 
however, I set it to one side. 
55 If one wants to be particularly pedantic one can adapt CT by putting forward the ‘macroscopic-life 
cessation thesis’. It can be stated as follows. Macroscopic-life cessation thesis = ‘an organism O has 
died at some time t if and only if O’s macroscopic-life processes have ceased’. 
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subject to the processes of biological decay for more than fifteen minutes) retain some 
of their individual properties and relations to one another (call the virtual corpses that 
have had their lives disrupted ‘disrupted-corpses’) but are not disposed to have their 
lives begin again. For example, the up quark that, in part, virtually composes a 
disrupted-corpse retains its essential property of having the electric charge of +2⁄3 e 
and retains the external relation ‘being to the left of’ to another quark. Likewise, the 
up quark to the right of the quark mentioned in my previous sentence may retain the 
essential property of having an electric charge of +2⁄3 e and the external relation of 
‘being to the right of’ the quark mentioned in the previous sentence. But nothing 
about these simples having these properties and standing in these relations entails that 
they are still constituents of small-scale submicroscopic processes sufficient for 
submicroscopic-life.56 For one thing the simples that compose an organism that has 
had its life suspended are related in a specific way; namely, causally related. Indeed, 
as van Inwagen writes, ‘parthood essentially involves causation. Too many 
philosophers have [wrongly] supposed that objects compose something when and 
only when they stand in some (more or less) stable) spatial relationship to one 
another’ (van Inwagen 1990, 81).  
At least some of the causal relations that hold between simples that compose an 
organism whose life has been suspended might be, as van Inwagen notes, the mere 
‘orbiting of electrons and the exchange of photons by charged particles’ (van Inwagen 
1990, 147). I do not think, however, that these are the only processes of which these 
simples need to be constituents. This is for the same reason just mentioned, i.e., 
disrupted-corpses are virtually composed of orbiting electrons and charged particles 
that exchange photons. 
How, then, does a disrupted-corpse (a virtual object) differ from a corpse that has had 
its life suspended (in other words, a suspended-corpse)? The only condition that van 
Inwagen cites to differentiate between disrupted-corpses and suspended-corpses is 
that the submicroscopic activity of a cryogenically frozen corpse (a suspended-
corpse) and that of a corpse that has not been cryogenically frozen (a disrupted-
                                                
56 When I refer to an organism whose life has been suspended I mean to refer to an organism whose 
macroscopic-life has been suspended. I do not think that a submicroscopic-life can be suspended. 
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corpse)57 is the fact that the ‘microlevel activity of a cryopreserved [corpse] is 
disposed to expand into its normal state at the moment sufficient energy should 
become available to it’ (Eberl 2008, 71), while the microlevel activity of a corpse that 
has not been cryogenically frozen is not disposed to expand into its normal state at the 
moment the same amount of energy should become available to it. Since this is the 
case, for any corpse, that corpse exists if and only if the microlevel activity of that 
corpse is disposed to expand into its normal state at the moment a certain amount of 
energy should become available to it. I call this the disposition condition:  
Disposition condition = an object, x, is disposed to have its suspended life 
begin again if the requisite energy is supplied to the simples whose activity 
has been suspended.58  
Given the above discussion, (MD2) suspension should be further qualified. The 
individual properties and relations that the simples have and bear to one another upon 
suspension need to be properties and relations of specific kinds. In particular, first, 
some of the relations that they bear to one another need to be causal relations. Second, 
the individual properties and relations that the simples have and bear to one another 
upon suspension need to be properties and relations that enable their bearers to be 
disposed to expand into macroscopic-life. I do not know, however, what any of those 
properties and relations might be and van Inwagen never tells us.  
What I have said so far helps us to deal with an apparent contradiction in van 
Inwagen’s work. Van Inwagen writes, ‘[w]hat does it mean to say that I must die? 
Just this: that one day I shall be composed entirely of non-living matter; that is, I shall 
be a corpse’ (van Inwagen 1998b, 49). The question remains: how are we to make 
sense of these sentences given that van Inwagen believes that composite objects exist 
if and only if the simples that compose them are ‘caught up’ in a life but, when we die 
we shall be composed of non-living matter. Non-living matter is, I take it, matter that 
is not caught up in a life. 
                                                
57 Disrupted-corpses, strictly speaking, do not exist given van Inwagen’s metaphysics of material 
constitution. 
58 I note here that this condition and surrounding issues will be important at several points thought this 
thesis.  
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Using the above description of what happens when a particular organism dies we may 
amend the problem this way: so long as an organism’s life is not disrupted its 
macroscopic-life can cease and yet the organism can still exist. The reason for this is 
that the simples that compose an organism whose macroscopic-life has ceased can 
still be caught up in a submicroscopic-life. Submicroscopic lives display very few of 
the relevant characteristics usually taken to be definitive of macroscopic-life i.e., 
metabolic processes. The simples (or matter) that compose an organism whose life 
has been suspended are ‘non-living’ in the sense that they are not constituents of a 
macroscopic-life process.  
Given these two modes of death, van Inwagen lays down the following two principles 
‘[i]f a life has been disrupted, it can never begin again; any life going on after its 
disruption is not that life. If a life has been suspended, it can begin again; if the 
requisite energy is supplied to the simples whose activity has been suspended’ (van 
Inwagen 1990, 147). 59 For example, the cat’s life can begin again perhaps with ‘a 
gentle prod…an electrical stimulus to the heart muscle of the just-thawed cat, or 
something of that sort’ (van Inwagen 1990, 148).60 
At this point I should clarify van Inwagen’s position with regard to a debate that is 
internal to animalism, the debate over whether or not ‘organicism’ or ‘somaticism’ is 
true. I think that what I have said so far clarifies the situation somewhat. Somaticism 
is the animalist view that being alive is not a necessary condition for the persistence 
of human organisms.61 According to Blatti there are some animalists on whose view 
‘a human animal (like all organisms) is a functionally organized physical object 
whose membership in a particular species is attributed to its origin and structure. Only 
if it is so gruesome as to destroy this structure will an organism’s death bring about its 
nonexistence’ (Blatti 2014, sect. 1.2). David Mackie, for example, is an animalist of 
the somaticist kind. He thinks that, given that an organism is a functionally organized 
physical object, so ‘long as this organisation of constituent parts remains sufficiently 
                                                
59 We will come to van Inwagen’s reasons for saying that a life that’s been disrupted can ‘never begin 
again’ later in this thesis.   
60 While, according to van Inwagen, the life has ceased, we should agree (unless there is a good reason 
not to) that the organism that has had its life suspended still exists. As van Inwagen writes, ‘[i]t is not 
absolutely essential to my position to say that the organism exists when its life is suspended, but I feel 
inclined to say that it does’ (van Inwagen 1990, 148). I will return to this consideration momentarily. 
61 Somaticists may answer the persistence question ‘do we have biological persistence conditions?’ 
‘no.’ 
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nearly intact’ (Mackie 1999, 237) then that human organism persists. Since it is the 
organization of the constituent parts that is sufficient for the persistence of a particular 
human organism the somaticist animalist must reject Life. Instead, the somaticist says 
that an organism, O2, at one time, t2, and an organism O1 at an earlier time, t1, are 
identical if and only if O2 ‘retains a sufficient degree of the life-apt structure of 
constituent parts previously exhibited by O1’ (Blatti 2014, sect. 1.2). Organicism, on 
the other hand, is the animalist view that being alive is a necessary condition for the 
persistence of human organisms. This view is often attributed to Aristotle, Locke and 
Wilson (Wilson 1999, 89–99) and is the animalist view I have been assuming thus far. 
One important difference between the two views is how they handle the problem of 
the apparent existence of corpses. Somaticist animalists say that you (the human 
organism) will persist after death so long as your corpse retains a sufficient degree of 
life-apt structure. Organicist animalists, on the contrary, think that you do not persist 
after your life processes have ceased. In fact, it follows from the organicist view that 
when you die you cease to exist. Uttering the words, for example, ‘there rests Aunt 
Maud’ after she has been subject to the normal room-temperature processes of 
biological decay for around fifteen minutes is, at least in the ontology room, false.62 
The question remains, should we consider van Inwagen to be an organic animalist or a 
somaticist animalist? Van Inwagen’s version of animalism has been classed as a form 
of ‘organicism’. As Blatti notes, ‘[n]otable advocates of this view [i.e., the organicist 
view] include Olson and van Inwagen (1990)’ (Blatti 2014, sect. 1.2). This is because 
van Inwagen believes that organisms persist if and only if their lives persist (implied 
by Life). This seems to me to be the correct reading of van Inwagen. Even when an 
organism has had its macroscopic-life processes cease van Inwagen still thinks that 
the organism exists. This is not because the organism retains life-apt structure but 
because the simples that compose this organism may be constituents of a process (or 
processes) sufficient for life. The simples that compose an organism whose life has 
been suspended are ‘caught-up’ in a (we might say) submicroscopic-life. He writes,  
[w]hat about the organism whose life is suspended? Does it exist during the 
suspension of its life, or does it go out of existence when its life stops and 
come back into existence when its life starts again? (According to Life, 
                                                
62 See van Inwagen (2014b, 1–14). 
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remember, if a life is suspended and then begins again, the revived organism is 
the organism whose life was suspended.) It is not absolutely essential to my 
position to say that the organism exists when its life is suspended, but I feel 
inclined to say that it does. That it does is a consequence of Life and my earlier 
contention that the life of a frozen, undamaged organism—in the actual world, 
I think, suspending the life of an organism as complicated as a cat must come 
down to freezing the organism; other laws of nature might allow other types of 
suspension—continues at the subchemical level (van Inwagen 1990, 148). 
What is the difference between an organism that has had its macroscopic-life 
processes cease, but retains a sufficient degree of the life-apt structure of constituent 
parts, and an organism whose macroscopic-life processes have ceased, but whose life 
persists in virtue of its persisting subchemical life processes? There may be no 
difference here. If life-apt structure requires persisting subchemical processes, then 
both animalists of the somatic and organic kinds, at least concerning freshly dead and 
cryogenically preserved organisms, hold the same view. The difference between the 
two views, therefore, primarily comes down to what they think the persistence 
conditions are of not-recently-dead and not-cryogenically-preserved organisms, that 
is, normally functioning human organisms. Organicists claim that you persist in virtue 
of the fact that there are life-processes that are going on within you. Somaticists think 
that you persist so long as you retain a certain level of life-apt structure. 
This should not be too problematic for this thesis, however. Whether or not one is an 
organist or a somaticist, both somaticists and organicists think that one ceases to exist 
when one’s bodily remains have been decaying for long enough. It appears that 
everyone’s bodily remains will decay substantially enough for them to die. For the 
purposes of this thesis I take organicist animalists as my target. However, one could 
reword my arguments with not much difficulty to take aim at somaticist animalists. 
3.2 Life after death 
We have examined one case of life after death already. Cooled desiccated tardigrades 
can (given a few crucial assumptions) live after death. It also seems possible that 
cryogenically preserved cats may (again, given a few crucial assumptions) live after 
death. This kind of life after death, however, is not what this thesis is about. This 
thesis concerns life after death of the kind that is discussed by the authors who wrote 
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the Nicene Creed. The authors who wrote, ‘we look for…the life of the world to 
come.’  
How is this kind of life after death different from the kind of life after death of the 
tardigrade or the frozen cat? I think that it is different in, primarily, two respects.63 
First, when the authors of the Nicene Creed penned the above statement their 
expectation was that this statement would be true of a human being that was about to 
be, apparently, subject to the normal room-temperature processes of biological decay. 
All of those human organisms whose remains are (apparently) buried in, for example, 
the local cemetery would have been able to utter it. Existence in the world to come is 
not the preserve of those who can afford cryogenic services. 
Second, ‘the world to come’ refers to a place at which all who have died will live 
again and where these people will come back to life at the same time. The life of the 
world happens at a time when Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Winston Churchill, you and I, 
for example, all come back to life simultaneously. Van Inwagen calls this time, the 
first period of time during the life of the world to come, the ‘Last Day’ (van Inwagen 
1998b, 45). This is different to the kind of life after death that a tardigrade 
experiences for the life after death of a particular tardigrade, O1 may occur at a 
different time to the life after death of a different tardigrade O2.  
These are the primary ways in which the afterlife that this thesis concerns differs from 
the afterlife that a tardigrade may experience. There are two further assumptions that 
are held throughout this thesis that should be made clear. First, it is assumed that it is 
you that must survive. It cannot be a replica of you. It cannot be a replica of you that 
has, say, the same practical concerns as you.  
Second, the being that satisfies the first personal pronoun ‘you’ in the afterlife must 
retain some psychological connectedness with the bring that satisfies the first personal 
pronoun ‘you’ now. I do not mean to say that the being with which you are identical 
in the afterlife needs to be psychologically continuous with you in order for you to 
exist in the afterlife; this would be to accept a form of the Psychological Approach. I 
                                                
63 Two different respects that are of first importance for the purposes of this thesis. There are other very 
important theological distinctions between the kind of life after death that a human organism that has 
been frozen and subsequently thawed may enjoy and the kind of life after death that the writers of the 
Nicene creed were talking about. Having one’s suspended life begin again before Christ’s return, for 
example, does not entail that one will no longer experience pain and suffering. 
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mean that you now and the being with which you will be identical in the afterlife need 
to share some of the same mental properties. Perhaps you need to share some of the 
same interests, desires and tastes. I say that this needs to be the case because an 
afterlife at which you survived but you survived in, say, a persistent vegetative state 
or as a being with none of the interests, desires or tastes that you had previously had is 
not, I take it, the kind of afterlife we are interested in. It will be assumed throughout 
this thesis that a being that has died will, in the afterlife, be psychologically connected 
to its earlier self (i.e., to the human organism that it was before it died).  
Finally, one may note that I have omitted a part of the sentence from the Nicene 
Creed quoted above. The full sentence reads: we look for the resurrection of the dead 
and the life of the world to come. I have omitted ‘the resurrection of the dead’ for the 
following reason. Although many of the debates in the contemporary literature 
concerning life after death defend or attack the possibility of the resurrection of the 
dead, most contemporary philosophers of religion defending the possibility of the 
resurrection of the dead are not really defending the possibility of resurrection per se: 
the view that the very same body with which we are related in this life, we will be, in 
some way, the body with which we will be related in the afterlife.64 What they are 
defending is the mere possibility that a human organism that exists before death can 
be identical with a human organism that exists in the world to come.  
Consider the following two views: animalism and the simple soul view. The simple 
soul view says that you are identical to an immaterial substance that has no proper 
parts: a soul. You are not identical to a body-soul composite. On this view, it is 
relatively easy for you to exist after your death. 65 If you are an immaterial soul and 
the organism with which you are related on earth is, say, blown to bits by a bomb (and 
this, let us say, results in ‘your death’) then you can persist after your death by virtue 
of the fact that you are an immaterial soul. For on the simple soul view, you do not 
cease to exist when the organism with which you are related ceases to exist. The 
explosion has no effect upon your persistence on this view; it only affects the 
                                                
64 I understand that this is a minimal explanation of resurrection but it will suffice for my purposes. 
65 Here one may understand the phrase ‘your death’ in the same way that one may understand ‘you’ve 
stubbed your toe’ given the simple soul view. On the simple soul view, you have died in virtue of the 
fact that the organism with which you are intimately related has died. Likewise, you have stubbed your 
toe in virtue of the fact that the organism with which you are intimately related has stubbed her toe. 
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organism with which you are intimately related. On this view, resurrection is not 
required for you to exist in the world to come. 
The animalist, however, says that you exist after death if and only if the organism 
with which you are identical exists after your death. This is required because you are 
an organism. Thus, resurrection is, it seems, necessary for life after death given 
animalism; that there exists a certain set of material simples caught up in a life (and, 
in consequence, composing an organism) with which you are identical is required for 
life after death given animalism. Animalism therefore contrasts markedly on this 
point with the simple soul view. 
Contemporary debates concerning the ‘possibility of resurrection’, however, do not 
primarily concern how it is that any person (whether persons be organisms or souls) 
persists into the afterlife but how it is that persons that are wholly material beings 
persist into the afterlife. The fact this question has become a question concerning 
whether or not the resurrection is possible is, therefore, somewhat misleading. In 
short, the ‘resurrection of the body’ is required for a materialist account of life after 
death, it is not for a simple soul account. This is why I will refer to the problem that I 
am concerned with in this thesis ‘the problem of life after death’ rather than ‘the 
problem of the resurrection’. 
This completes my overview of animalism, our persistence conditions, death and life 
after death. To summarise, animalists believe that we are human organisms. In 
particular, they believe that we are numerically identical to human organisms. The 
animalists that I am concerned with in this thesis are those animalists who believe (i) 
that we are human organisms that are wholly material and (ii) that one human 
organism, x, at one time, t1, is identical with another human organism, y, at another 
time, t2, if and only if the simples that compose x and the simples that compose y are 
constituents of the same life (implied by Life). Animalists that accept (ii) are organic 
animalists. According to the organic animalists there are two ways by which an 
organism’s life may cease. It may be disrupted and it may be suspended. If an 
organism has had its life disrupted it can never begin again. If an organism has had its 
life suspended it can begin again. It was argued that van Inwagen, or any animalist 
that wants to believe that the survival of death is possible, should believe that death is 
the cessation of life; in particular, the cessation of macroscopic-life processes. ‘Life 
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after death’ happens during an epoch in which there exist all of the human organisms 
that have previously died. In particular, it happens when there exist human organisms 
that have apparently been subject to the normal room-temperature processes of 
biological decay for around fifteen minutes. The first period of time that occurs 
during the life of the world to come we will call the ‘Last Day.’ 
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PART II – SURVIVAL 
In this section I introduce the argument from the problem of life after death and the 
more specific argument from the logical problem of life after death (Chapter 4). I then 
survey several responses already in the literature to the argument from the logical 
problem of life after death (Chapters 5 and 6). These responses take two necessity-
claims as their target ((A) and (B) as set out at Chapter 4 section 1). I demonstrate that 
the majority of responses to the argument from the logical problem of life after death 
are successful in their aim: they demonstrate that it is not impossible for an organism 
that has died to exist again on the Last Day. I will return to the more general problem 
of life after death in part III. Finally, in this section I will also, for the sake of 
completeness, consider proposition (2) of both the logical problem of life after death 
and the, more general, problem of life after death. 
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CHAPTER 4 – THE PROBLEM ARTICULATED 
In this chapter I introduce the argument from the problem of life after death and, more 
specifically, the argument from the logical problem of life after death. The argument 
from the problem of life after death is the argument that this thesis is ultimately 
concerned with. It is this argument that I will defend in part III. In this section, 
however, I will merely state the argument from the problem of life after death and the 
argument from the logical problem of life after death. I focus, in this section, on this 
more specific argument because it is the argument that has been most widely 
discussed in the literature thus far. 
4.1 The argument from the problem of life after death 
I am now in a position to formulate the ‘argument from the problem of life after 
death’. It can be put as follows: 
(1) We are human organisms. 
(2) For any organism O1 at a time, t1, and for any organism O2 at a time, t2, O1 and 
O2 are identical if and only if the simples that compose O1 and the simples that 
compose O2 are constituents of the same life. 
(3) We will die. 
(4) We will exist (after our deaths) on the Last Day. 
(5) It is unreasonable to believe propositions (1)–(4) at the same time. 
(6) The animalist who believes that human organisms that have died can exist 
again on the Last Day believes propositions (1)–(4). 
 
Therefore, 
 
(7) It is unreasonable to believe that animalism is true and that human organisms 
that have died can exist again on the Last Day. 
 
We might say the ‘problem of life after death’ is the problem that it is unreasonable to 
believe (1)–(4) simultaneously. The ‘argument from the problem of life after death’ 
supplements the problem of life after death with some further premises. 
Premise (1) of the argument from the problem of life after death is the central 
animalist assertion as put forward and discussed in Chapter 1. Proposition (2) is a 
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version of the Biological Approach to personal persistence as outlined in Chapter 2 
(in particular, (2) is entailed by Life). Proposition (3) is a relatively uncontroversial 
truth: we will all die.66 I will discuss this more in a moment. Proposition (4) is the 
proposition that, so I am arguing, it is not reasonable to believe given (1)–(3). I will 
consider (5) in a moment. (6) is consistent with what has been said in Part I. (7) can 
be deduced from (5)–(6). 
So far I have not given a justification for belief in premise (5) of the above argument; 
that is I have not given an argument as to why it is unreasonable to believe 
propositions (1)–(4) at the same time. One way to demonstrate that it is unreasonable 
to believe the conjunction of a certain set of propositions is to demonstrate that those 
propositions form a logically inconsistent set. A set of propositions is logically 
inconsistent if it is impossible for those propositions to all be true at the same time. To 
demonstrate that it is impossible for a certain set of propositions to all be true at the 
same time one can do a number of things. First, one can show that any one of the 
propositions in the set directly contradicts another proposition in that set. Second, one 
can show that any conjunction of any of the propositions in that set directly 
contradicts any of the other propositions in that set (or any other conjunction of any of 
the other propositions in that set). 
Proponents of the logical problem of evil, for example, argued that it was 
unreasonable to believe that (1b) God is omnipotent, (2b) God is omniscient, (3b) 
God is omnibenevolent and that (4b) evil exists. Their strategy was to demonstrate 
that (1b)–(4b) form a logically inconsistent set; in particular, (since there is no direct 
contradiction to be found among propositions (1b)–(4b)) proponents of the logical 
problem of evil attempted to demonstrate that a direct contradiction could be deduced 
from (1b)–(4b).67  
This is how the debate has progressed thus far with regards to the problem of life after 
death too. That is, like the problem of evil, the problem of life after death involves 
showing how it is that a contradiction can be deduced from the above propositions. 
Those who have put forward the problem of life after death intend to put forward an 
argument to the effect that it is impossible to believe that (1)–(4) are simultaneously 
                                                
66 Unless, of course, Christ returns. 
67 To see how see section 9.1. 
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true. Olson, for example, writes ‘[o]n the view that you are an animal…existence after 
death seems to be ruled out. Once biological death has occurred, not even God can 
call you back into being’ (Olson 1999, 71). That is, if it is the case that when one dies 
not even God can bring one back into existence then it is logically impossible for one 
to exist again after one’s death because God can do anything that it is logically 
possible to do.  
In the light of this we can restate the argument as follows: 
4.2 The argument from the logical problem of life after death 
(1) We are human organisms. 
(2) For any organism O1 at a time, t1, and for any organism O2 at a time, t2, O1 and 
O2 are identical if and only if the simples that compose O1 and the simples that 
compose O2 are constituents of the same life. 
(3) We will die. 
(4) We will exist (after our deaths) on the Last Day. 
(5') The above propositions (1)–(4) form a logically inconsistent set. 
(6') It is unreasonable to believe a set of propositions that are logically 
inconsistent. 
(7') The animalist who that believes that human organisms that have died can exist 
again on the Last Day believes propositions (1)–(4). 
Therefore, 
(8') It is unreasonable to believe that animalism is true and that human organisms 
that have died can exist again on the Last Day. 
Like the logical problem of evil, however, the propositions that together form the 
problem of life after death do not directly entail a contradiction.68 That is, (1)–(4) do 
not, prima facie form a logically inconsistent set and, as such, premise (5¢) seems 
unjustified. In consequence, I will now explain why (1)–(4) have been taken to form a 
logically inconsistent set. 
(1)–(4) form a logically inconsistent set if the following propositions are true: 
  
                                                
68 More precisely, there is no syntactic contradiction to be found between propositions (1)–(4).  
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(A) necessarily, the life of an organism, O1, at one time, t1, is identical to 
the life of organism, O2, at another time, t2, if and only if, the simples 
that compose O1 and the simples that compose O2 are immanent-
causally connected.  
and 
 
(B) necessarily, when we die the simples that last composed us will cease 
to bear any immanent-causal connection to any organism. 
  
If (A) is true, then for us (human organisms) to exist on the Last Day (proposition (4)) 
the simples that compose us at the moment of our deaths need to bear some 
immanent-causal connection to an organism that exists on the Last Day. If (B) is true, 
however, then when we die (proposition (3)) the simples that compose us cease to 
bear any immanent-causal connection to any organism. In consequence, to believe 
(1)–(3) and (4) is to believe a contradiction (given the truth of (A) and (B)). 
I have yet to provide an explanation of, and reasons for believing, (A) and (B). I will 
do so now. 
Van Inwagen refers to (A) and (B) as two apparent ‘facts about the present age’ (van 
Inwagen 1998b, 45). Let us consider these two facts in reverse order. The first fact 
about the present age is the fact that (B) necessarily, when we die the simples that last 
composed us will cease to bear any immanent-causal connection to any organism. 
Take Judas Iscariot, for example. Judas, we are told, ‘hanged himself’ (Matthew 
27:5). Not only that but Judas then apparently ‘fell headlong, his body burst open and 
all his intestines spilled out’ (Acts 1:18). Hanging oneself and subsequently having 
one’s body burst open and all of one’s intestines spill out is, uncontroversially, an 
instance of death; in particular, MD1 disruption. The simples that composed Judas 
were seemingly sufficiently disassociated from one another for Judas’ life-processes 
(both macroscopic and, eventually, submicroscopic) to have ceased. We can safely 
assume that after a certain period of time had elapsed (and after Judas’ remains had 
been placed in the ground and had been left there for a few minutes) Judas’ remains 
ceased to bear any significant causal relationship to each other (any causal 
relationship that may dispose them to expand into a life again should the requisite 
energy be supplied). Moreover, and crucially, these simples ceased to bear any 
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significant causal relationship to any other organism. They ceased, at least for a while, 
to be constituents of any life (macroscopic or submicroscopic). Let us call this 
‘physical dissolution’ (van Inwagen 2015, 7).69 
We have good reason to believe that this was not merely the fate of Judas but that it 
has been the fate of all human organisms that have died and will be the fate of all 
human organisms that will die. When we die, so it seems, the simples that compose us 
will cease to be constituents of a life, our remains will be burned or will rot and they 
will all cease to be (at least for a time) constituents of an organism. In consequence, 
(B) seems to be true. Necessarily, when we die the simples that last composed us will 
cease to bear any immanent-causal connection to any organism. 
The second fact about our present age is that (A) necessarily, the life of an organism, 
O1, at one time, t1, is identical to the life of an organism, O2, at another time, t2, if and 
only if, the simples that compose O1 and the simples that compose O2 are immanent-
causally connected. 
 
Stating what immanent-causal relations are is difficult. I will try nonetheless.70 Take 
an object, organism O1, and an object, organism O2. O1 and O2 exist at two different 
times (say, O1 exists at time t1 and O2 exists at some later time t2). O1 is immanent-
causally related to O2 if and only if the causal relationships between the simples that 
compose O1 and the simples that compose O2 do not ‘go entirely outside’ (cf. Olson 
2010, 56) of the simples that compose O1 and the simples that compose O2.  
Immanent-causation stands in contrast to transeunt causation. Let us say that I come 
across a sculpture, Sc1. It is old, very rare and very fragile. If handled it too firmly it 
would fall to pieces. So that others may experience what this sculpture is like I take a 
high-resolution photograph from multiple angles of Sc1 and plan to move the 
sculpture to a museum. This picture is at such a high-resolution that when I zoom in 
on this picture I can see that it is composed of very dry, very small particles of clay. 
Let us say that I try to take the sculpture to the museum but as soon as I try to move it 
it crumbles. All that remains are these very dry, very small particles of clay. I sweep 
                                                
69 This paper is now forthcoming in (Loose, Mengue, and Moreland, forthcoming). In this thesis I will 
cite the online version (van Inwagen 2015). 
70 For a very in-depth and rather challenging explanation of immanent-causation see Zimmerman 
(1997). 
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up the remains of the sculpture and take them home. When I get home, from these 
clay particles, I carefully and painstakingly put the pieces that composed the sculpture 
back together again; placing the parts of the sculpture in the exact spatial arrangement 
in which they had previously stood. I know that I have put them in the exact spatial 
arrangement because I can examine the high-resolution picture and see that they stand 
in the correct spatial arrangement. After this process there is another sculpture Sc2. In 
this case Sc2 is (at least) qualitatively identical to Sc1. This is not due to any immanent 
causal relationships between the particles of clay that compose Sc1 and the particles of 
clay that compose Sc2, however. The causal processes between the simples that 
compose Sc1 do not cause Sc2 to exist at some later time. Rather, the causal 
relationships between Sc1 and Sc2 pass outside of Sc1 and Sc2 and through my mind, 
as it were. 
Most of us, so it is argued, think that immanent causal relations are required between 
two ordinary objects for them to be considered identical. Olson asserts, for example, 
that ‘[i]f something tomorrow were exactly like your cat or your tooth brush is today, 
it wouldn’t be your cat or your toothbrush unless there were a significant immanent 
causal connection’ (Olson 2010, 57). Van Inwagen thinks that this is true of 
organisms too. That is, van Inwagen thinks that for the life of an organism, O1, at one 
time, t1, to be identical to the life of an organism, O2, at another time, t2, (and, in 
consequence, for O1 to be considered identical with O2) the simples that compose 
both O1 and O2 need to be immanent-causally related.71 Call this the ‘immanent-
causation requirement.’  
Van Inwagen does not, however, give a direct argument as to why this needs to be the 
case. By this I mean that he never tells us why it is a consequence of his materialist 
metaphysics that the simples that compose two organisms need to be immanent-
causally related in order for the organisms to be considered identical.72 In a moment 
                                                
71 Most philosophers who are concerned with the identity of organisms through death do not put the 
requirement in this way; in particular, they talk of the identity of organisms across time rather than the 
identity of lives across time. Since, however, van Inwagen’s criterion of organism identity across time 
requires the mention of lives I too will try to include mention of lives where possible. This is why I 
spell out the immanent-causation requirement by appeal lives. 
72 Defending the immanent-causation requirement without running a reductio is very difficult. As 
Olson notes, ‘[t]he trouble is, arguing that you can’t survive without an appropriate causal connection 
to your past is like arguing that contradictions can’t be true…No reasoning for these claims is going to 
be of much use, as it is bound to have a premise that is less obvious than the conclusion. At most one 
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(Chapter 5) I will consider an indirect argument for the immanent-causation 
requirement. First, however, since this thesis is a thesis that primarily engages with 
van Inwagen’s materialist metaphysics of the human person, it is worth pointing out 
that van Inwagen does believe that the immanent-causation requirement is true.  
Demonstrating that this is the case, however, is difficult. Especially, since van 
Inwagen says ‘I confess…to an inability to supplement Life with a coherent, general 
statement of conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the 
persistence of an individual life’(van Inwagen 1990, 157–158). Even so van Inwagen 
does seem to think that he can supply us with at least one necessary condition for the 
persistence of an individual life; namely, immanent-causation between simples that 
compose two organisms at different times is a necessary condition for the persistence 
of a life. Demonstrating this will be sufficient for my purposes. 
Consider van Inwagen’s concession that a human organism may persist through time 
when that organism’s macroscopic-life processes have been suspended. Van Inwagen 
writes that the following is, at least, necessary for the persistence of lives, ‘if a life is 
going on at t1 and t3 [assuming that it is the same life], then for any time between t1 
and t3 there must be objects whose activity at t2 constitutes or results from that life’ 
(van Inwagen 1990, 149). If we can translate ‘activity at t2’ as ‘causal relationships at 
t2’ then we can take van Inwagen here to mean that necessarily, for the life of an 
organism, O1, at one time, t1, to be identical to the life of an organism, O2, at another 
time, t2, the simples that compose both O1 and O2 need to be immanent-causally 
related. I do not think that this is an incorrect translation. I do not know what ‘activity 
at t2’ could mean if not, at least in part, ‘causal relationships at t2’. 
In fact, the above passage commits van Inwagen to something stronger than the 
immanent-causation requirement; namely, what we may call the ‘material and causal 
continuity requirement’. It says that, necessarily, the life of an organism, O1, at one 
time, t1, is identical to the life of an organism, O3, at another time, t3, if and only if, 
for any intervening period of time, t2, there exists an organism, O2,73 the simples of 
                                                
can try to articulate what would follow from rejecting the principle and hope that someone might find 
the result even more repugnant than the falsity of the principle itself’ (Olson 2010, 59). I will follow 
Olson’s strategy. 
73 Note that van Inwagen would prefer to say of an organism that has had its life suspended that it still 
exists (cf. van Inwagen 1990, 148). 
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which are continually immanent-causally connected to both O1 and O2. If one believes 
in immanent-causation across temporal gaps (like Zimmerman does), however, one 
will find the above necessary condition for the persistence of lives too strong. For my 
purposes the weaker condition will do; what I have called the ‘immanent-causation 
requirement’. 
As mentioned, van Inwagen, however, does not tell us why it is a consequence of his 
metaphysics of material constitution that the simples that O1 and O2 need to be 
immanent-causally related in order for O1 and O2 to be considered identical. He does, 
however, say that if a life is going on at t1 and t3, then for any time between t1 and t3 
there must be objects whose activity at t2 constitutes or results from that life so as to 
avoid ‘implausible consequences for the persistence of organisms’ (van Inwagen 
1990, 149). I will examine, in a moment, one reason why for any organism O1 and 
any organism O2 to be identical the simples that compose O1 and O2 need to be 
immanent-causally related so as to avoid implausible consequences for the persistence 
of organisms.  
For the time being, however, I should say that ‘physical dissolution’ (B) and the 
‘immanent-causation requirement’ (A) together render (1)–(4) logically inconsistent. 
If, when we die, the simples that compose us cease to bear any immanent-causal 
relations to any organism (B) and in order for an organism, O1, at one time, t1, to be 
identical an organism, O2, at another time, t2, the simples that compose both 
organisms need to be immanent-causally related (A), then it is not possible that when 
we die, we can exist again on the Last Day. 
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CHAPTER 5 – (A) 
So far I have not given a defence of proposition (A). In this chapter I will give a 
defence of (A); in particular, I will show why it is the case that rejecting (A) is absurd. 
I will do this by considering a number of models of the resurrection at which (A) is 
false but which entail some absurdity. In consequence, this chapter will serve to 
demonstrate not only that (A) is plausible but that certain appeals to the possibility of 
our existing on the Last Day given animalism are to be avoided. 
Secondarily, however, it will be demonstrated that while rejecting (A) may entail 
some implausible consequences for the persistence of human organisms, rejecting (A) 
does not commit one to a contradiction. In consequence, I will argue that the 
argument from the logical problem of life after death is unsound. While denying that 
(A) is implausible it is still not necessarily the case that the life of an organism, O1, at 
one time, t1, is identical to the life of an organism, O2, at another time, t2, if and only 
if, the simples that compose O1 and the simples that compose O2 are immanent-
causally connected.  
5.1 The recomposition model 
One way to respond to the argument from the logical problem of life after death is to 
reject either (A) or (B). Some philosophers have tried to reject the immanent-
causation requirement (A). I will now examine two ways by which one can reject 
immanent-causation requirement (sections 5.1 and 5.2). In the course of responding to 
these objections I will argue that if one rejects the immanent-causation requirement 
then this has some implausible consequences for the persistence of organisms. My 
responses to these objections will, in consequence, also serve as a defence of the 
immanent-causation requirement. 
 
Importantly, (A) and (B) are both modal claims; in particular, they are necessity-
claims. In this thesis I reserve uppercase letters (P, A, B,…) for modal claims and 
lowercase letters (p, a, b,…) for the non-modal versions of those claims. I will let ‘P’ 
and ‘p’ be variables. (A) and (B) are given above. To be clear if (A) = necessarily, the 
life of an organism, O1, at one time, t1, is identical to the life an organism, O2, at 
another time, t2, if and only if the simples that compose O1 and the simples that 
compose O2 are immanent-causally connected, then (a) = the life of an organism, O1, 
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at one time, t1, is identical to the life of an organism, O2, at another time, t2, if and 
only if the simples that compose O1 and the simples that compose O2 are immanent-
causally connected (the modal term is omitted). Likewise, if (B) = necessarily, when 
we die the simples that last composed us will cease to bear any immanent-
causal connection to any organism, then (b) = when we die the simples that last 
composed us will cease to bear any immanent-causal connection to any organism. 
 
One way by which one can show that some necessity-proposition P (in our case (A) 
and (B)) is not necessary is to demonstrate that possibly not-p (in our case possibly 
not-a and possibly not-b). For if possibly not-p then it is not the case that necessarily p 
(i.e., P). To demonstrate that possibly not-p one can describe a possible world (or, 
describe a situation or, put forward a model or tell a story)74 at which not-p is true. In 
order to demonstrate that, for example, (A) is false one can describe a world at which 
not-a is true. A world at which an organism dies and ceases to exist and exists again 
on the Last Day without any immanent-causal relationships between the simples that 
compose that organism at the time of its death and the simples that compose it on the 
Last Day. Consider the following model. 
Suppose that an organism, O1, that has died via MD1 disruption and has undergone 
physical dissolution (the organism’s remains bear no significant causal relationship to 
one another and are not constituents of any other life-processes). That is, in this 
circumstance what can God do on the Last Day but bring the simples that composed 
O1 moments before its death back together again and arrange them in the same spatial 
and chemical relationships in which they previously stood? This act on God’s part, we 
might think, is similar to that of a watch-maker recomposing a watch that he has taken 
                                                
74 I use the terms, ‘story,’ ‘scenario,’ ‘model,’ and ‘world’ interchangeably. This is primarily because 
van Inwagen uses these terms and, as far as I can tell, uses them synonymously. One might note, 
however, that there is an important distinction between these terms. One might note that a possible 
world ‘is a whole coherent reality…in which p is true, of which the truth of p is an integral part’ (van 
Inwagen 1998a, 77) while a ‘story,’ ‘scenario’ or ‘model’ is merely, say, a part of a seemingly ‘whole 
coherent reality’. This may be how philosophers use the terms, however, when we commit S to 
imagining a possible world at which p is possibly true, we’re not committing S to having imagined a 
whole coherent reality, but only a part of a seemingly whole coherent reality. That is, we’re committing 
S only ‘to imagin[ing] a p-verifying world while leaving matters visibly irrelevant to p’s truth 
unspecified’ (Yablo 1993, 29). To be clear, then, in this paper I take the term ‘world’ in ‘a p-verifying 
world that leaves matters visibly irrelevant to p’s truth unspecified’ to be equivalent to a ‘story,’ 
‘scenario’ or ‘model.’ 
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apart.75 Trenton Merricks notes that, for a very long time, this was the dominant view 
of the resurrection; ‘resurrection was akin to the reassembly of a watch’ (Merricks 
2001, 186).76 This is supposed to be one way in which God can achieve the 
resurrection of the dead without requiring that there be immanent causal connections 
between the organism that has died and an organism that exists on the Last Day.  
Van Inwagen considers a model of the resurrection like this and argues that it 
commits one to some implausible consequences for the persistence of organisms. In 
consequence, van Inwagen concludes that there is ‘some sort of material and causal 
continuity’ (van Inwagen 2015, 7) between an organism that has died before the Last 
Day and an organism that exists on the Last Day. Let us call this model the 
‘recomposition model’ after God’s attempt at recomposing the organism that has died 
and undergone physical dissolution. 
To explain the recomposition model in more detail van Inwagen gives the following 
analogy, based loosely on Aristotle’s metaphysics. This story is supposed to illustrate 
the possibility of God’s resurrecting a human organism by recomposing it from the 
simples that composed it at the moment of its death. Van Inwagen writes, 
Augustine’s manuscript consisted of a certain ‘parcel’ of matter upon which a 
certain form had been impressed. It ceased to exist when this parcel of matter 
was radically deformed. To recreate it, God needed only to collect the matter 
(in modern terms, the atoms) that once composed it and reimpress that form 
upon it (in modern terms cause these atoms to stand in the same spatial and 
chemical relationships they previously stood in) (van Inwagen 1978, 118).77  
According to the recomposition model God needs only to bring the simples that 
composed the manuscript back together again and arrange them in the correct spatial 
and chemical relationships that they previously stood in for that manuscript to exist 
again. Similarly, the recomposition model says that the same could, conceivably, be 
done with the simples that compose a human organism.  
                                                
75 Nevertheless, of course, the watch on a watch-maker’s desk retains a large proportion of its 
characteristic structure. A corpse that has been burnt or has succumbed to rot does not. 
76 See also Bynum (1995). 
77 The term ‘atom’ is, for our purposes, synonymous with ‘simple’. 
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Van Inwagen, however, rejects the recomposition model. He writes,  
The atoms of which I am composed occupy at each instant the positions they 
do because of the operations of certain processes within me (those processes 
that, taken collectively, constitute my being alive). Even when I become a 
corpse –provided I decay slowly and am not, say, cremated– the atoms that 
compose me will occupy the positions relative to one another that they do 
occupy largely because of the processes of life that used to go on within me: 
or this will be the case for at least some short period. Thus a former corpse in 
which the processes of life have been ‘started up again’ may well be the very 
man who was once before alive, provided the processes of dissolution did not 
progress too far while he was a corpse. But if a man does not simply die but is 
totally destroyed (as in the case of cremation) then he can never be 
reconstituted, for the causal chain has been irrevocably broken. If God collects 
the atoms that used to constitute that man and ‘reassembles’ them, they will 
occupy the positions relative to one another they occupy because of God’s 
miracle and not because of the operation of the natural processes that, taken 
collectively, were the life of that man (van Inwagen 1978, 119). 
The important point here is that the simples that compose the organism that exists on 
the Last Day are caused to stand in the relevant relations to one another not by the life 
processes that were going on ‘inside’ an organism that had died but by God. The 
underlying contention here is that for an organism, O1, at one time to be identical with 
an organism, O2, at another time, both organisms need to be composed of simples that 
are immanent-causally related. 78 
But why hold that immanent-causation between organisms at times is required for 
organism identity across time? The primary reason for holding the immanent-
causation requirement to be true is that rejecting it leads to an absurdity. Let us 
assume for reductio that it is true that God could bring me back from the dead in say, 
a thousand years, by recomposing me from the simples that composed me at the time 
of my death as the recomposition model demands. If, so the argument goes, God can 
                                                
78 For more on this point see (Zimmerman 2013, 134–146; Olson 2010, 56–60; van Inwagen 1998b, 
47).  
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do this, then he can also bring me back from the dead by recomposing me from the 
simples that composed me when I was seven, twenty or that compose me now.79 If 
God can do this, then God could make it the case that (in, say, a thousand years from 
now) the simples that compose me now and the simples that composed me when I 
was seven stand in the exact same spatial and chemical relations in which they stood 
when they composed me a thousand years (and over) earlier. If God were to do this, 
then there would exist two organisms that are equal candidates for identification with 
me. 
What are the ramifications of this for the possibility of life after death? Van Inwagen 
asks: in this scenario which organism would be me? He replies, ‘[n]either or both, it 
would seem, and, since not both, neither’ (van Inwagen 1995, 486). I could not be 
both because it is logically impossible (assuming, as we are, that stage theory is false) 
for one concrete object to be wholly in two places at once.80 So, I must be neither. If I 
must be neither, however, then I have not been brought back from the dead. 
Now someone may object that God would never make it the case that there are two 
organisms in existence on the Last Day that both have equal claim to being identified 
as me. Van Inwagen agrees that this may well be the case. More generally, God may 
never make it the case that there exist two organisms on the Last Day that both have 
equal claim to identity with an organism that existed and died before the Last Day. 
But the point is that if God were to, say, recompose me from the simples that 
composed me at the moment of my death (and leave the simples that composed me at 
aged seven, and all other ages for that matter, in the ground), then I would be identical 
(according to the recomposition model) with the organism that God has created. In 
this case, however, I am only identical to this post-resurrection organism in virtue of 
the fact that God does not also bring back together the simples that composed me 
when I was seven. My identity with this organism is dependent on the fate of some 
                                                
79 This is provided, of course, that the simples that composed me when I was seven, twenty or now are 
not the same simples. 
80 One may think that this principle is false. One may argue that it is logically possible for a time-
traveller to go and meet herself, or for Christ to be wholly present in, for example, the bread and the 
wine offered in the Eucharist (see Pruss (2013)). I assume that van Inwagen thinks that these examples 
are incoherent or, in any case, he may add the caveat ‘except for cases of time-travel’ or ‘except for 
cases of the multiple location of Christ in the bread and the wine’ or, indeed, both.   
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other set of simples (the set of simples that composed me aged seven). This, so van 
Inwagen concludes, is absurd. He writes,  
it is absurd, it is utterly incoherent, to suppose that [my] identity could depend 
on what might happen to some atoms other than the atoms that compose [me]. 
In the end, there would seem to be no way round the following requirement: If 
I am a material thing, then if a man who lives at some time in the future is to 
be I, there will have to be some sort of material and causal continuity between 
this matter that composes me now and the matter that will then compose that 
man (van Inwagen 1995, 486).  
David Hershenov (2003), however, is not so quick to reject recomposition models. 
Hershenov thinks that van Inwagen’s argument trades on an intuition that not 
everyone holds. Hershenov says that his intuition is not that the recomposed 
manuscript is a new manuscript, but that it is the same manuscript as the manuscript 
that was burned. Likewise, Hershenov takes issue with van Inwagen’s suggestion that 
a recomposed human organism is not the same human organism as one that had 
previously been destroyed.81 In both cases Hershenov thinks that van Inwagen ignores 
an important feature of recomposition. Hershenov thinks that ‘if the parts [of an 
object], no matter how small and scattered, are deliberately reassembled in 
accordance with the original intention of its maker, it strikes me as intuitively the 
same object’ (Hershenov 2003, 27).82 That is, Hershenov thinks that once we attend to 
the fact that the artificer is recomposing the object that was previously destroyed we, 
intuitively, think that the recomposed object is the same object as the object that was 
destroyed. Hershenov provides his own thought experiment to pump our intuitions in 
this direction. 
Consider, for example, a sculpture in an artist’s studio. This sculpture is being 
prepared to be moved by the master sculptor’s assistant for display in a local gallery. 
The assistant breaks the sculpture down into smaller bits so as to aid its transit. 
                                                
81 Van Inwagen offers three examples. An ancient manuscript that is burned and then (apparently) 
reassembled by God, a human organism that has been blown to bits by a bomb and (apparently) 
reassembled by God, and a child’s house of blocks that is knocked down and (apparently) reassembled 
by a parent. Van Inwagen thinks that all of these examples are consistent with the intuition that the 
reassembled object is not identical with the object that was burned, knocked down, or blown to bits 
(see Hershenov (2003, 36 fn. 5)). Another popular example is the reassembly of the Colossus of 
Rhodes by some LA hoteliers. See Sturch (2015, 348) and Olson (2010, 52).  
82 The italics are mine. 
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Hershenov claims that when a sculpture has been broken down into its constituent 
parts (no matter how small) and these parts are brought back together again at some 
later time (no matter by whom) this sculpture will be the same sculpture as the 
sculpture that was earlier broken down into its constituent parts. This is regardless of 
the fact that there are no immanent causal relations between the sculpture before it 
was taken apart and the sculpture that exists at some later time after the master 
sculpture’s assistant has been to work. Indeed, this seems to be the intuition that most 
of us have about sculpture identity. Most of us seem to believe, when watching a 
sculptor’s assistant, for example, break a sculpture down into its constituent parts (so 
as, for example,  to ease its transit from the sculptor’s workshop to an art gallery) and 
then put it back together again that the sculpture pre-disassembly is the same 
sculpture as the reassembled sculpture. Hershenov claims that, like our sculptor’s 
assistant, God should be understood to be the reassembler of our bodies. The 
important point, says Hershenov, is that whenever the simples that compose a human 
organism at the moment of its death are reassembled they are reassembled ‘in 
accordance with the original intention of its maker’ (Hershenov 2003, 27). If the 
simples that composed me at the time of my death are not reassembled in accordance 
with the original intention of my maker then the resulting organism would not be 
identical with me.  
Perhaps Hershenov has successfully pumped our intuitions regarding the 
recomposition model. There is, however, a response. Whether or not Hershenov’s 
added consideration of God’s intention makes the recomposition model more 
intuitive, his view still has an implausible consequence for the persistence of human 
organisms; namely, that if one accepts the recomposition model, then it is still 
possible (on Hershenov’s view) for God to recompose me from the simples that 
composed me when I was seven and the simples that composed me when I was 
twenty. It is still possible that there exist two organisms on the Last Day that are both 
equally good candidates for identification with an organism that has died. 
Hershenov, however, responds to this argument. His response has two steps. First, 
Hershenov argues ‘van Inwagen’s thought experiments do not support the conclusion 
that the resurrection is impossible’ (Hershenov 2003, 31). That is, in order for van 
Inwagen’s thought experiments to work we must accept that resurrection by 
recomposition is at least logically possible. Even though it seemingly entails an 
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absurdity (i.e., that my identity could depend on what might happen to some simples 
other than the simples that compose me) holding to the recomposition model does not 
commit one to a contradiction. 
Second, Hershenov develops a principle that stops his theory entailing the absurdity 
that it is possible that there exist two organisms on the Last Day that are equal 
candidates for identification with the organism that has died. Hershenov argues that 
on the occasion that God recomposes two candidates for identification with you, you 
would be identical to the individual that God creates from the simples that composed 
you at the moment of your death and not the individual that God creates from the 
simples that composed you aged seven. To defend this claim Hershenov appeals to 
our intuitions again. He writes, ‘[m]ost of us who believe that we can cease to exist 
and then reappear, insist that the reassembly must be of the parts we had at the time of 
our destruction’ (Hershenov 2003, 31).83 In this case, of the two organisms that exist 
on the Last Day, I would be the organism that is composed of the simples that last 
composed me (i.e., that composed me at the moment of my death and not when I was, 
say, twenty years old). Moreover, says Hershenov, this is not ad hoc; we already 
believe in the possibility of intermittent existence. We already believe that some 
things cease to exist and come into existence again at some later time. Moreover, we 
already believe that these things exist again if and only if they have properties that are 
similar to the properties they had at the last moment of their existence. To support this 
claim Hershenov provides us with some examples. Hershenov writes, ‘[t]he same 
point holds in other cases of intermittent existence such as trials, classes and theatrical 
plays. A trial can be suspended but it must resume where it left off or it would be a 
new trial’ (Hershenov 2003, 32). The legal teams must be relatively similar, the jury 
must be relatively similar and the charges must be the same. 
There is a further response to Hershenov’s argument. The response involves running 
another reductio. However, this reductio, we might think, is stronger than the last. 
This argument attempts to demonstrate that the recomposition model contradicts the 
                                                
83 The italics are mine. 
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principle that any two distinct things are necessarily distinct and so could not become 
one and the same thing.84 
Let us assume, again, for reductio that Hershenov is correct. An organism O2 that 
exists on the Last Day is identical to an organism O1 that died before the Last Day if 
and only if (i) the simples that compose O2 are the simples that composed O1, (ii) 
these simples stand in the same spatial and chemical relationships that the simples that 
composed O1 had previously stood in and (iii) the simples that compose O2 are made 
to stand in the relations in which they stand because God intends them to. The 
following argument against Hershenov involves the introduction of cannibals.  
There is an age-old worry about the resurrection of cannibals and those who have 
been eaten by cannibals. I adapt this worry slightly for my purposes. Let us say that a 
certain traveller strays into a certain violent and primitive cannibal’s territory. The 
cannibal and the traveller are qualitatively identical in the following respect. The set 
of simples that compose the cannibal stand in the exact same spatial and chemical 
relations to one another as the set of simples that compose the traveller (and continue 
to do so).85 Let us say that the cannibal is spooked by seeing another human being 
who is qualitatively identical to him and so catches the traveller and kills him. Feeling 
peckish the cannibal immediately begins to consume the traveller. The cannibal 
consumes the whole traveller. Let us say that,86 rather unexpectedly, all of the simples 
that composed the traveller come to compose the cannibal; eventually replacing all of 
the simples that composed the cannibal previously. Let us also say that, at this point, 
the cannibal dies. In this instance, the cannibal and the traveller are, to use Mark 
Johnston’s phrase, ‘perimortem duplicates’ (Johnston 2010, 32). At the moments of 
their respective deaths the cannibal and the traveller ‘have exactly the same bodily 
matter in the same bodily organization’ (Johnston 2010, 32). As when they met the set 
                                                
84 I assume that this principle is true. I should mention, however, that David Lewis has put forward an 
argument to the effect that this principle is false. See, in particular, Lewis (1993b). I am unconvinced 
by his argument. 
85 One may object, as my friend Ella Walsh objects, by saying ‘that’s not possible!’. Ella pointed out 
that the arrangement of the simples that compose one at the time of one’s death depend upon a certain 
set of very many, very lengthy, causal processes. The simples that compose one’s neurons, for 
example, stand in the certain relations to one another that they do by virtue (at least in part) of the 
particular experiences that one has had. The cannibal and the traveller, so Ella protests, will surely not 
have had the same experiences. What Ella is objecting to is that this scenario is at all likely. Mark 
Johnston, however, points out that this scenario need not be at all likely. What’s needed here is broad 
logical possibility (what Johnston calls ‘per se possibility’ (Johnston 2010, 32). 
86 Contra Athenagoras who thought that human flesh was not digestible. 
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of simples that compose the cannibal stand in the exact same spatial and chemical 
relations to one another as the set of simples that compose the traveller. The question 
remains: when God collects these simples (the simples that composed the traveller 
and the cannibal at the moment of their deaths) together again on the Last Day and 
makes them stand in the same spatial and chemical relationships in which they stood 
at the moment of their deaths, which (the cannibal or the traveller) would exist as a 
result of this action? 
It is consistent with Hershenov’s view (as it stands) that, on this occasion, on the Last 
Day, two organisms (the traveller and the cannibal) could become one organism. That 
is, if it is true that an organism on the Last Day is identical with an organism at the 
moment of its death just in case the simples that compose the organism on the Last 
Day are the same as87 (and stand in the exact same spatial and chemical relations as) 
those simples that composed the organism at the moment of its death then, so it 
seems, it is possible that both the cannibal and the traveller are identical with the 
resurrected organism. This, Johnston argues, ‘yields a sheer contradiction given the 
necessity of distinctness, the principle that any two distinct things are necessarily 
distinct and so could not ever become one and the same’ (Johnston 2010, 34). 
A response is available to Hershenov. He may add a ‘no closest predecessor’ (cf. 
Zimmerman 2013, 138) clause to his criteria of personal identity.88 That is, Hershenov 
could accept that for a pre-mortem organism, O1, to be identical to a post-mortem 
organism, O2, O2 needs to be composed of the same simples that composed O1 at the 
time of O1’s death and these simples need to stand in the exact same spatial and 
chemical relations that they stood in when they composed O1, but add to this criterion 
that this is only the case when there is no ‘equally close predecessor’ (Zimmerman 
2013, 138) to that organism. Where an equally close predecessor is an organism 
whose perimortem state is just as similar to the initial state of the divinely 
reconstructed organism, and which is equally similar in other respects that matter (cf. 
Zimmerman 2013, 138). With this no-equally-close-predecessor clause in place 
Hershenov can argue that his theory does not entail that the principle of the necessity 
                                                
87 Hershenov affirms this view. He writes, ‘the parts an entity had at its most recent moment of 
existence are necessary for it to exist later’ (Hershenov 2003, 32).  
88 Zimmerman uses ‘no equally close predecessor’ and ‘no closest predecessor.’ He uses the latter more 
often than the former. I think he should have used only ‘no-equally-close-predecessor.’ I will, in 
consequence, use ‘no-equally-close-predecessor’ where possible. 
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of distinctness is false. He may argue that O1 and O2 are identical if and only if there 
is no equally close predecessor. 
Hershenov may also add that in normal circumstances (circumstances where there is 
not a perimortem duplicate) reassembly will bring back the deceased human 
organism. Moreover, he may also argue that even when there are perimortem 
duplicates there may, on occasion, be reasons to think that there is some distinction 
between them that means that it is appropriate to deem only one of them identical 
with the post-mortem organism. He may argue, for example, that in the situation 
where there are two suitable candidates for identification with a particular post-
mortem organism, the post-mortem organism will be identical to the pre-mortem 
organism that is, say, temporally closest. In our above story this would be the 
cannibal. At the time of resurrection, the cannibal will be the organism that was most 
recently composed by the simples that compose the post-mortem organism. 
This may not be the only reason we can provide for asserting that a particular post-
mortem organism may not have two equally close predecessors.89 Whatever the 
reason, however, this is in one sense a pyrrhic victory. Whether or not one can 
provide reasons as to why in normal circumstances there will be no-equally-close 
predecessor, it is still possible, on the recomposition model, for a post-mortem 
organism to be identical with two pre-mortem organisms and for these pre-mortem 
organisms to have equal claim to identity with the post-mortem organism. In 
consequence, a no-equally-close predecessor clause will be required. 
What is wrong with accepting a no-equally-close-predecessor clause? The problem is 
that accepting an account of identity that (even if only in principle) requires a no-
equally-close-predecessor clause also requires that one accept that the, rather 
plausible,90 ‘only x and y’ principle is false.91 Put simply, the ‘only x and y’ principle 
states that when considering whether or not x is numerically identical to y (or, for our 
purposes, O1 is identical to O2) the identification of x with y can only depend on facts 
about x and y (O1 and O2) and the relations between them and not about individuals 
                                                
89 See Zimmerman (2010, 138–139). 
90 I do not have sufficient space to provide a lengthy defence of the ‘only x and y’ principle here. Nor, 
however, do I think that the principle needs much of a defence. For a defence of the ‘only x and y’ 
principle, see Noonan (1985). 
91 To be clear, Zimmerman thinks that van Inwagen should reject the ‘only x and y’ principle regardless 
of the fact that it is required for the falling-elevator model. I will consider it in chapter 6. 
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other than x and y e.g. z (or, for our purposes O3). On the recomposition model, 
however, whether or not some pre-mortem organism, O1, is identical with some post-
mortem human organism, O2, depends upon its being the case that there is no equally 
good candidate for identification with O2, say, O3 (an organism that, say, is composed 
of the same simples as O2 and these simples stand in the exact same spatial and 
chemical relations as the simples that compose O2). The identification of O1 and O2 in 
this case depends on the fate of some other organism; namely, O3. In particular, it 
depends on there not being another candidate that is possibly identical to O2. 
If the animalist wants to avoid a no-equally-close-predecessor clause in her account of 
personal identity she must, so it seems, reject recomposition models of the 
resurrection. One way to avoid a no-equally-close-predecessor clause is to hold that 
organisms persist across time when and only when the simples that compose them are 
immanent-causally connected. The animalist must, then, give a model of the 
resurrection such that the xs at time t1 and the ys at time t3 are constituents of the same 
continuing natural process and not two different processes; one brought about by the 
natural course of things the other brought about by God. In particular, there needs to 
be a relevant ‘causal chain’ (van Inwagen 1978, 119) between the xs at t1 and the ys at 
t3 such that the xs and the ys are both a part of the same life. I agree with van Inwagen 
when he says that when considering whether or not it is possible for God to raise, say, 
Socrates from the dead (i.e., whether it is possible for Socrates to be identical with 
some organism that exists on the Last Day)  
[i]n the end there would seem to be no way round the following requirement: 
if Socrates was a material thing, a living organism, then, if a man who lives at 
some time after Socrates’ death and physical dissolution is to be Socrates, 
there will have to be some sort of material and causal continuity between the 
matter that composed Socrates at the moment of his death and the matter that 
any time composes that man (van Inwagen 2015, 7). 
One must, therefore, come up with an account of the resurrection at which there exists 
an immanent causal chain between an organism that has died and an organism that 
exists on the Last Day. Before I consider such accounts, however, I will consider a 
final model that holds that a particular human organism at time t1 and t3, although 
differentiated by a break in a natural process, might still be considered to be the same 
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human organism. At the end of this chapter I will discuss the ramifications of what 
has been said so far for the argument from the logical problem of life after death. 
5.2 Miraculous-event model 
Before I move on to consider some rejections of (B), I must first consider another 
model at which (A) is false. This model stipulates that because van Inwagen’s thesis 
entails that an organism O* exists in virtue of event L*, it follows that God need not 
reassemble the simples that compose O*, nor need there be any immanent-causal 
chain between specific activities of simples at times. Rather, all God needs to do is 
miraculously restart the life, L*, in virtue of which organism O* exists.92  
 
The argument is an argument by analogy. The argument goes like this: there are a 
wide variety of events that cease to exist and then exist again. Lives are events and, 
therefore, lives can probably cease to exist and then exist again too.93 Which events 
are gappy? Richard Sturch (2015) appeals to cricket Test Matches. Test Matches are 
cricket matches that are played over a number of days. There are occasions when all 
the players on the field and spectators in the stands go home. On the occasion that the 
umpire declares that play (and, so says Sturch, the match) has ceased, then that event 
(the match), so it is argued, has ceased.94 But it can begin again. It begins the next 
day. No one doubts that the match that begins the next day is the same match as the 
match that had occurred the day before. It may even be the case that the players of the 
match have changed, as Sturch notes, ‘there might even be a “twelfth man” or 
substitute among them, replacing a member who was unwell.  It is enough that they 
be recognizably the same team’ (Sturch 2015, 350). Test Matches are events that are 
gappy. Likewise, lives (since they are a species of event) may have similar properties 
to Test Matches; namely, they can cease, their constituents can disperse and yet the 
same life can exist again. Sturch writes: ‘[i]n a Test Match, there are long periods 
when the ground and stands are empty and no play takes place, yet no-one says that 
the resumed game may only be a duplicate of that of the previous day. The same 
holds for a resurrection intended from the beginning’ (Sturch 2015, 347). Sturch 
                                                
92 A model similar to the ‘miraculous-event model’ described here was originally put forward by 
Sturch (2015). 
93 Hershenov (2003) has a similar argument. He identifies that there are things that can undergo 
intermittent existence. Hershenov does not exploit the fact that these things are events in his argument. 
94 One may object at this point that the match does not cease but continues. I will accept, for the sake of 
argument, that the match ceases. 
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argues that just like Test Matches are intended to be gappy so, if the lives of human 
organisms are intended to be gappy, they can be.  
To be clear this suggestion need not violate condition (i.ii) of Life. One might respond 
by arguing that since (i.ii) says that lives must be ‘self-maintaining’. That is, certain 
living beings, for example, consume certain simples and excrete other simples 
through breathing and exhaling, eating and defecating and since this activity happens 
within the self-maintaining natural process that results in the existence of human 
organisms, if God restarted a life, then the life that was composed of xs at t1 and the 
life that was composed of the ys at t3 would not be a self-maintaining process but a 
process maintained by God.95 That is, the breathing and exhaling, eating and 
defecating would have to be restarted and, as such, maintained by God and not the life 
itself. 
This response, however, will not work. One may argue that God could, at t3, restart 
the same self-maintaining life that existed at t1. It is only after the life has restarted 
that the self-maintaining condition really matters. That is, if Life is true and it is 
possible that God could restart a life then the token event that is O*’s life – L* – could 
be restarted by God, resulting in O*’s continued existence. In consequence, it seems 
that one could keep much of van Inwagen’s metaphysics and refuse to concede that 
some sort of immanent causal chain between the activity of the xs at time t1 and the 
activity of the ys at time t3 is required. 
I am inclined to think that the miraculous-event model may be a solution for some 
form of Christian materialism; but it cannot be a solution for the animalist and 
certainly not for van Inwagen. This is for two reasons. 
First, to accept this solution animalists would have to abandon their understanding of 
the nature of lives. Many animalists think that once a particular life has ceased in the 
usual way it can never begin again. Van Inwagen, for example, writes, that ‘[i]f a life 
has been disrupted, it can never begin again; any life that is going on after its 
disruption is not that life’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147-148). In consequence, if van 
Inwagen were to allow that human lives can be gappy (that is, human organism O* 
can exist at t1, cease to exist at t2, and then exist again at t3), then van Inwagen would 
                                                
95 Of course, on van Inwagen’s view there would be two lives not one on this occasion. 
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be allowing that the same human organism could exist in virtue of a new event since 
any life after disruption would not be, as he says, ‘that life’ (van Inwagen 1990, 148). 
To accept the miraculous-event model, therefore, would be to give up on this 
understanding of lives. 
Why is it the case that a life that has ceased can never begin again? We are not told by 
van Inwagen nor (as far as I am aware) are we told by any other animalist. We can 
supply a reason for the animalist, however. The animalist may argue that it is, 
perhaps, a law of nature that natural events once they have ceased cannot begin again. 
There is a hint at this view in van Inwagen’s work. Van Inwagen likens God’s 
bringing me back from the dead after my life has been disrupted and my remains have 
undergone physical dissolution to God’s bringing back ‘the snows of yesteryear’ (van 
Inwagen 1995, 486) or the ‘the light of other days’ (van Inwagen 2015, 7). The point 
is, so it seems, that like it is the case that it is conceptually impossible for a snowfall 
(a natural event) that occurs in 2020 to be the same snowfall as a snowfall that 
occurred in 1950 if the snowfall that occurred in 1950 ceased to exist, so it is 
conceptually impossible for a life (a natural biological process) to cease and begin 
again.  
One may argue, therefore, that there is an important disanalogy between Test Matches 
and lives. While it may be the case that Test Matches are events that are gappy, 
natural biological processes are not and cannot be gappy. In order to demonstrate that 
God may cause the life that has ceased (a natural biological processes) to begin again 
we would need an example of a natural biological processes that is gappy. It is this 
last argument that I find most persuasive and which, I hazard, most animalists that do 
not think life after death plausible, will put forward.96 
Second, not only this but the miraculous-event model cannot be true if one has a 
deflationary view about the ontology of events (as van Inwagen seems to: see footnote 
                                                
96 It has been suggested to me, however, that the flowering of a plant or the budding of a tree are 
natural biological processes that can be stopped by cold-weather snaps, and then re-start when the 
weather warms. One can respond to this argument, I think, by saying that ‘budding’ is not a single 
event but rather is a gerrymandered collection of more fundamental overlapping processes that each 
stop and start. In the case of a budding flower or tree we, perhaps, have two processes (or more) 
occurring that stop and start. I think that this point can be extended to a variety of natural processes that 
seemingly stop and re-start. 
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34). Van Inwagen writes that he hopes to be able to ‘show that all true statements that 
apparently imply the existence of events can be paraphrased as statements solely 
about the changing properties of and changing relations among substances’ (van 
Inwagen 2007, 203). That is, van Inwagen does not want to be committed to the 
existence of events and so hopes to be able to find a way to paraphrase them away. If 
events do not exist, however, then God could not miraculously restart the life, L*, in 
virtue of which organism O* exists.97 This is for the simple reason that there is no life, 
L*, in virtue of which organism O* exists; there is nothing for him to restart.98 To put 
it another way the sentence: God can restart the life, L*, in virtue of which organism 
O* exists, expresses an incoherent act-description. Lives do not exist and, as such, 
there is nothing for him to restart. 
We are now in a position to return to the argument from the logical problem of life 
after death; in particular, premise (5¢). Premise (5¢) states: The above propositions 
(1)–(4) form a logically inconsistent set. Is premise (5¢) true? Given the above 
discussion it seems that the answer is ‘no’. Premises (1)–(4) form a logically 
inconsistent set if (A) and (B) are true. It has been demonstrated, however, that while 
one may reasonably believe, say, (a), (A) it is not true. That is, while one may 
reasonably believe that  
 
(a) the life of an organism, O1, at one time, t1, is identical to the life of an 
organism, O2, at another time, t2, if and only if, the simples that compose O1 
and the simples that compose O2 are immanent-causally connected 
 
(a) is not necessary. (A) is a necessity-claim: it is true if and only if its non-modal 
version, (a), is true at every possible world. (A) is not true, however, because there is 
                                                
97 One may argue that one can, in this instance, rephrase the objection in a way that does not make 
mention of lives. In this instance, it strikes me, however, that one will have to phrase the objection it in 
terms of the changing properties and changing relations of one set of simples and the changing 
properties and changing relations of another set of simples. Namely, God can make it the case that the 
changing relations and changing properties of one set of simples are the same changing properties and 
changing relations of another set of simples. God does not restart the life but makes it the case that a 
certain set of simples is arranged in such a way that it is identical with a previously existing set of 
simples. This rephrased argument would, as far as I can see, face similar problems to Hershenov’s 
argument mentioned above. It would require, to some extent, reassembly on God’s part. 
98 One may ask ‘what are we to make of Life, which made explicit mention of lives?’ I hazard that van 
Inwagen will want to paraphrase the mention of lives made in Life too. 
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a world at which (a) is false. The world at which the recomposition model is true, for 
example, is such a world. Now, admittedly, the world at which the recomposition 
model is true is also a world at which one must accept a no-equally-close-predecessor 
clause in one’s account of personal identity. This is not desirable for one accepts a no-
equally-close-predecessor clause at the expense of denying the ‘only x and y’ 
principle. Denying the ‘only x and y’ principle may be highly implausible, but there is 
nothing logically contradictory about it.99 In short, (A) is false since there is a possible 
world at which not-(a) is true. 
 
Having said this it is clear that van Inwagen will reject both the recomposition model 
and the miraculous-event model. This is because he holds to the immanent-causation 
requirement. What is required by van Inwagen, therefore, is a demonstration that (1)–
(4) are logically consistent in a way that does not commit him to denying the 
immanent-causation requirement. This will be the concern of the next chapter. 
In this chapter I have done three things. First, I have provided a defence of the 
immanent-causation requirement. In particular, I have argued that rejecting the 
immanent-causation requirement has implausible consequences for the persistence of 
human organisms. Second, in doing so, I have demonstrated that we should reject the 
recomposition model and the miraculous-event model. Third, I have argued that, even 
so, premise (5¢) of the argument from the logical problem of life after death is false 
and, in consequence, the argument is unsound. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
99 Neither does denying the ‘only x and y’ principle contradict (1)–(4). 
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CHAPTER 6 – (B) 
As has been demonstrated in the last chapter one can reject (A) of the logical problem 
of life after death but only on pain, for example, of denying the ‘only x and y’ 
principle. In consequence, one may choose to reject (B) instead. (B) says: necessarily, 
when we die the simples that last composed us will cease to bear any immanent-
causal connection to any organism. The rejection of (B) is the solution that has had 
the most attention from contemporary philosophers. In fact, there are two favoured 
ways by which one can reject (B). 
 
In this chapter, therefore, I will put forward two more defences of the view that life 
after death is logically possible given animalism. That is, I will put forward two more 
scenarios at which (B) is false. I will then consider some responses to both of these 
scenarios. I will begin by considering a model (or family of models) favoured by van 
Inwagen. 
6.1 Simulacrum models 
In his papers ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’ (van Inwagen 1978), ‘Dualism and 
materialism’ (van Inwagen 1995), ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’ (with postscript) 
(van Inwagen 1998b) and, ‘I look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the 
world to come’ (van Inwagen 2015) van Inwagen argues that proposition (B) is false. 
Van Inwagen’s solution to this problem is to demonstrate that ‘“certain facts about the 
present age” are not facts’ (van Inwagen 1998b, 49); in particular, he disputes that 
when human organisms die their lives get disrupted and their remains undergo 
physical dissolution. Rather, the disruption of life upon death and physical dissolution 
is only, perhaps, apparent.  
 
In ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’ van Inwagen argues just this. He does this by 
providing what he thinks is a metaphysically possible story in which human 
organisms ‘die’ but their lives do not get disrupted. In doing so, he takes himself to 
have established that it is possible for God to resurrect human organisms from the 
dead and, therefore, he takes himself to be justified in asserting that it is possible for 
God to resurrect human organisms from the dead and, likewise, (I take it) asserting 
that it is possible for an organism that has died to exist again on the Last Day.  
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Van Inwagen puts forward the story as follows: 
 
It is part of the Christian faith that all men who share in the sin of Adam must die. 
What does it mean to say that I must die? Just this: that one day I shall be 
composed entirely of nonliving matter; that is, I shall be a corpse. It is not part of 
the Christian faith that I must at any time be totally annihilated or disintegrate. 
(One might note that Christ, whose story is supposed to provide the archetype for 
the story of each man’s resurrection, became a corpse but did not, even in his 
human nature, cease to exist.) It is of course true that men apparently cease to 
exist: those who are cremated, for example. But it contradicts nothing in the 
creeds to suppose that this is not what really happens, and that God preserves our 
corpses contrary to all appearance. Perhaps at the moment of each man’s death, 
God removes his corpse and replaces it with a simulacrum, which is what is 
burned or rots. Or perhaps God is not quite so wholesale as this: Perhaps he 
removes for ‘safekeeping’ only the ‘core person’– the brain and central nervous 
system– or even some special part of it. These are the details.  
I take it that this story shows that the Resurrection is a feat an almighty being 
could accomplish (van Inwagen 1998b, 49). 
There are, in the above passage, two different stories. In the first case, van Inwagen 
argues that God may preserve our corpses contrary to all appearance. In the second 
case, God preserves ‘only the ‘core person’ – the brain and central nervous system– or 
even some special part of it’ (van Inwagen 1998b, 49). I shall consider each story in 
turn. 
There are, primarily, two responses levelled at these suggestions. I will consider one 
more in Part III. The first response levelled at the first suggestion is that these 
suggestions entail some ‘unseemly’ conclusion (Zimmerman 2010, 33). The second 
response levelled at the second suggestion is that it is metaphysically incoherent. 
6.1.1 Bodily-remains simulacrum model 
The first story says that God preserves our corpses contrary to all appearance. Call 
this ‘the bodily-remains simulacrum model’. The first objection to this model says 
that this model entails some unseemly conclusion. Zimmerman writes,  
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However useful the story might be as a way to show that the appearance of 
complete biological death is compatible with the resurrection of these very 
bodies, there is a downside to supposing that the story is true. Large chucks of 
matter do not seem to disappear whenever a human being dies. If God actually 
used this method, He would be in the business of replacing our living bodies 
with dead simulacra, made of entirely new (or at least different, imported) 
material, at the last possible moment; and that would involve God in a sort of 
massive, systematic deception–roughly on the same scale as creating a ‘young 
earth’ but hiding fake dinosaur bones in the ground to make it look as though 
our planet has an ancient and interesting history (Zimmerman 2010, 33). 
 
Put simply, the argument is that van Inwagen’s story entails some unseemly 
conclusion, and if we should not believe stories that have unseemly conclusions then 
we should not believe van Inwagen’s story. The unseemly conclusion is that 
according to the simulacrum story God is a systematic mass deceiver i.e., God 
systematically makes us all believe that it is the remains of our loved ones that we go 
to visit in cemeteries or scatter in scenic places.  
 
Van Inwagen has responded to the claim that his story entails that God is a systematic 
mass deceiver. Van Inwagen asks ‘what is God deceiving us about?’ (cf. van Inwagen 
2015, 8). Perhaps, says van Inwagen, God is not deceiving us at all but the fact that 
God puts something that looks like the bodily remains of our loved ones in the ground 
is, on God’s part, a counterfactual demonstration of ‘what would have been if he were 
no more than a God of justice and had left us to the situation we had earned for 
ourselves by our rebellion against our creator’ (van Inwagen 2015, 8). That is, God 
has a good reason for placing a look-alike in the ground: it shows us what would have 
been our fate were it not the case that Christ died for our sins.100 Moreover, van 
Inwagen also argues that although the belief that we form when our loved ones die 
(namely, that our loved one’s remains are, say, in the ground) is a false belief, there is 
nothing unusual about this. There is nothing out of the ordinary about our forming a 
                                                
100 If this is God’s plan He seems to have failed. This is sufficient reason for me to think that it is not 
God’s plan. 
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false belief under normal conditions.101 
 
I think that this defence against the claim that God, on the bodily-remains simulacrum 
model, is a systematic mass deceiver is successful. This point, however, is rather 
tangential to this thesis. Let us assume for the sake of argument that van Inwagen is 
right; God does place simulacra in the ground as a counterfactual demonstration of all 
that is done in Christ and He does not intend that we form the false belief that we do. 
This may turn back the suggestion that God is a systematic mass deceiver but, apart 
from that, it does not make van Inwagen’s position much more plausible. Whether or 
not God deceives or is engaging in a counterfactual demonstration of all that has been 
achieved in Christ, we still have very little justification for believing that what the 
bodily-remains simulacrum model describes is a very real possibility; that is, a 
possibility that may well be. We have very little reason for believing that God is 
engaged in this kind of activity. There is no evidence for this claim nor is there any 
scriptural warrant for this claim. The substance dualist is hardly going to be 
convinced that van Inwagen’s model of life after death is just as plausible as his own. 
I will return to this point in Part III. 
 
Moreover, one may also argue that van Inwagen’s model trades on a controversial 
view of death; that is, in order for the bodily-remains simulacrum model to be 
considered to be true one needs to count suspension (as I have done thus far) as death. 
In Chapter 3 I outlined three different ways to understand the ‘vital status’ of an 
organism that has had its life suspended. It could be classed as alive, dead, or neither 
dead nor alive. Of these three options, the view that an organism that has undergone 
cryopreservation is ‘dead’ is perhaps the most controversial option. As Loose, for 
example, notes, 
 
in real cases of cryogenic freezing it is usual to consider the organism to be 
alive despite the absence of the normal chemical and biological processes.  For 
example, cryogenically frozen embryos or dehydrated tardigrades, are 
considered alive because they are viable, possessing the capacity for vitality 
                                                
101 Van Inwagen uses ‘optimal conditions.’ It strikes me, however, that there is something strange 
about our forming false beliefs under truly optimal conditions. 
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(Loose, forthcoming). 
 
Not only this but, as mentioned, this is van Inwagen’s ‘preferred’ understanding of an 
organism that has undergone cryopreservation too. That is, he prefers to say that a 
cryogenically preserved organism is alive. I argued that van Inwagen should accept 
that suspension is a form of death so as to enable him to ‘maximise the number of 
possibilities’ at which an organism that has died can be brought back to life. This 
move now, however, seems ad hoc. That is, since van Inwagen himself would prefer 
to say that an organism that has had its life suspended is alive, it seems ad hoc to 
rescind this claim solely to secure resurrection. 
 
For the time being it is not my aim to argue either for or against the view that an 
organism that has had its life suspended is dead. If one so wishes one can argue 
against van Inwagen by arguing that an organism that has had its life suspended is not 
dead. I think, however, that there are ways of arguing that animalism is inconsistent 
with the persistence of human organisms into the afterlife without entering into the 
debate over whether or not a human organism that has had its life suspended is dead, 
alive or neither dead nor alive.  
6.1.2 Brain-remains simulacrum model 
That God preserves the organism in the way described above is not the only 
suggestion that van Inwagen gives. Van Inwagen also writes that ‘perhaps God is not 
quite so wholesale as this: Perhaps he removes for “safe-keeping” only the “core 
person” –the brain and central nervous system– or even some special part of it. These 
are the details’ (van Inwagen 1998b, 49). Moreover, later he says that this is not 
merely a possibility but it is his current inclination to believe that this is the case. He 
writes,  
 
[m]y inclination is to believe that God will somehow –in the way I have 
imagined or in some way I lack the conceptual resources to imagine, “in this 
way or some other”—preserve a remnant of each person, a gumnos kókkos (a 
naked kernel: 1 Cor. 15:37), which will be sown in corruption and raised in 
incorruption (van Inwagen 1998b, 51). 
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This model has several advantages over the bodily-remains simulacrum model. One 
apparent advantage is that this model removes the charge of deception without the 
need to stipulate that God is engaged in an elaborate counterfactual demonstration. 
While our loved one’s remains lie in the grave without the all-important identity 
bearing part of them, it is still their remains that are in the grave; not a pile of simples 
that are made to look like their remains. 
 
Anders (2011), however, has suggested that this amendment to the body-simulacrum 
model renders van Inwagen’s materialist metaphysics of the human person 
incoherent. In particular, Anders takes van Inwagen’s suggestion that God might 
preserve a naked kernel of each person upon death and puts forward an explication of 
what he understands van Inwagen to think is the nature of this naked kernel and what 
he understands van Inwagen to think happens when somebody dies. He then argues 
that, given this explication, van Inwagen’s theory is incoherent; in particular, van 
Inwagen is committed to the possibility of that which is logically impossible. If 
successful, Anders’ argument is substantial. Anders’ argument would entail that it is 
logically impossible for an organism that has died to exist again on the Last Day. I 
think that Anders’ argument is mistaken. 
I will now outline what Anders understands van Inwagen to think happens when 
someone dies and what Anders understands van Inwagen to mean when he says that 
God will preserve a naked kernel before outlining Anders’ argument against van 
Inwagen. Having done this, in (§3) I will respond to Anders.102 
Anders thinks that according to van Inwagen when someone dies the organisational 
structure of that person’s life gets compacted. Anders calls this ‘the principle of death 
as compaction’ (Anders 2011, 34) or ‘PDAC.’ 
PDAC = ‘[i]f a human person p dies at time t1, then p’s life is suspended and the 
organizational structure of p’s life is compacted into a small portion of the simples 
whose activity constituted p’s life at t1’ (Anders 2011, 34). 
                                                
102 My response to Anders’ argument has been published (see Atkinson (2015)). What follows in this 
section is largely taken from that paper. 
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According to Anders, upon PDAC when a human person dies that person’s life gets 
suspended (MD2)103 and the ‘organizational structure’ (Anders 2011, 34) of this life 
gets compacted. It is not entirely clear what the ‘organisational structure of p’s life is 
compacted’ (Anders 2011, 34) means but I will try to explain.   
First, it seems to me that what must be meant by ‘organizational structure of p’s life’ 
is that the ‘multi-grade interrelations of simples’ (Anders 2011, 32) that constitute a 
life upon suspension remain. That is, we might say that the simples are ‘organized’ in 
a certain way in virtue of these remaining relations. Second, upon compaction, these 
multi-grade104 interrelations remain applied to a small portion of simples. That is, 
while the organism was alive it was composed by a relatively large number of simples 
related to one another in a certain way, when the organism dies and gets compacted it 
comes to be composed by a small portion of those simples.  
These simples compose, according to Anders’ description of van Inwagen’s 
metaphysics, the naked kernel. More specifically, we might define Anders’ kernel as 
follows: 
Anders’ Kernel =def. y is a kernel iff y is (i) a small portion of the simples (i.i) that 
composed the relevant portion of a person’s brain (i.ii) whose activity constitutes 
the (i.ii.i) suspended and (i.ii.ii) compacted life of that organism. 
(i), (i.ii), (i.ii.i), and (i.ii.ii) are supported by PDAC. (i.i) follows from the fact the 
persistence of a human person requires not just a portion of simples but a portion of 
simples the activity of which ‘virtually compose a brain, or the relevant portion 
thereof’ (Anders 2011, 31).105 It must be clarified, however, that this relevant portion 
could consist of any of the following: the brain, some relevant portion of the brain, or 
a portion of simples that is larger than the brain but includes the brain. It is not made 
clear by Anders what, precisely, this relevant portion is. It seems, however, that, so 
long as this portion of the organism is composed of fewer simples than the organism 
                                                
103 To remind you (MD2) Suspension = O’s life has been suspended at t if the life, L, in virtue of which 
the simples that composed O has ceased and the simples that were caught up in L retain—owing to the 
mere absence of disruptive forces—their individual properties and their relations to one another (See p. 
34). 
104 A multigrade relation is a relation that fails to be unigrade. A unigrade relation is a relation that has 
a definite degree or adicity (see McBride (2016)). 
105 This follows from PPIHo. 
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was composed of at the time of that organism’s death and more than one simple, we 
can refer to this portion as the ‘relevant portion’. 
Two points of clarification regarding (i.ii.i) and (i.ii.ii) must also be made here. First, 
upon PDAC one may wonder whether or not a life exists. I think that Anders would 
agree that, while a life ‘has ceased’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147) there is a sense in which 
there is still a life ‘there’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147). This life, however, is a life in 
suspended form and, thus, ‘not a life in the strict sense established by van Inwagen’s 
“Life” principle’ (Anders 2011, 35).   
Second, Anders uses the term ‘compaction’ (i.ii.ii) in three ways. First, Anders talks 
about ‘Dave’s compacted life’ (Anders 2011, 35) i.e. he refers to a life being 
compacted. Second, however, as previously noted, Anders says that it is not the life 
that gets compacted but the organisational structure of a life that gets compacted. 
Third, Anders refers to the fact that persons (and not lives or the organisational 
structure of lives) get compacted. He writes, for instance, ‘Steve gets compacted’ 
(Anders 2011, 34). It is not entirely clear, then, that (i.ii.ii) is correct since it refers to 
a ‘compacted life’ and not the compacted organisational structure of a life or the 
compaction of a person.  
While this is unclear, I think we should go with what seems to be the most consistent 
use of the term ‘compaction’; the compaction of the ‘organisational structure’ of 
one’s life as described above. In consequence, when Anders writes that ‘Steve gets 
compacted’, I take him to mean that the various multi-grade relations between simples 
that compose the relevant portion of Steve the moment before Steve’s death retain 
their various multi-grade relations. Likewise, when Anders refers to ‘Dave’s 
compacted life’ I take him to mean that the life in virtue of which Dave exists before 
Dave’s death comes to be constituted by the activity of a small portion of the simples 
that composed Dave before his death that retain their relevant multi-grade 
interrelations. 
After attempting to demonstrate how PDAC is an intended feature of van Inwagen’s 
metaphysics and describing a kernel, Anders develops a thought experiment that, he 
argues, is consistent with van Inwagen’s metaphysics. From this thought experiment 
Anders runs an argument against van Inwagen. I will describe Anders’ thought 
experiment before putting his argument into premises. 
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Anders writes, ‘[c]onsider a secretive young man named Dave with an ill-fated 
enthusiasm for explosives. One day while alone on vacation Dave blows himself to 
bits in the middle of the Mohave Desert’ (Anders 34, 2011). Following this explosion 
Anders suggests that it is consistent with van Inwagen’s metaphysics that person p1 
(Dave) alive at time t1 has died at time t2 in virtue of the explosion. However, 
according to PDAC, death results in p1’s life being suspended and the organisational 
structure of p1’s life being compacted into a kernel of simples, k, therefore avoiding 
disruption. At time t3, however, another person, p2 (Steve), consumes k. This results in 
k’s being caught up in p2’s life. Sometime later, time t4, while still carrying k, p2 also 
dies. Likewise, according to PDAC, p2’s life also gets suspended and the 
organizational structure of p2’s life gets compacted. Specifically, on this occasion, 
according to Anders, the organizational structure of p2’s life gets compacted into the 
same pellet of simples that is k.106 Given that this thought experiment is, apparently, 
consistent with van Inwagen’s metaphysics Anders runs the following argument: 
(1c) It is logically impossible for two persons to come to have all their 
constituents in common at one and the same time. 
(2c) Van Inwagen’s theory entails that it is possible107 for two persons to become 
compacted into one kernel, k, and, in consequence, for ‘two numerically 
distinct persons [to] have all their constituents in common’ (Anders 2011, 37) 
at one and the same time.  
(3c) Any theory that entails that that which is logically impossible is, in fact, 
possible is necessarily false. 
(4c) From (1c) and (2c) van Inwagen’s theory entails the possibility of that which 
is logically impossible. 
Therefore, 
(5c) From (3c) and (4c) van Inwagen’s theory is necessarily false. 
I will now briefly assess each of the premises before offering a more in-depth analysis 
of Anders’ argument. Premise (1c) follows from van Inwagen’s commitment to the 
                                                
106 This does not follow from, but is consistent with, what I have said above. I attempt to clarify below. 
107 Specifically, Anders thinks that it is ‘nomologically’ possible on van Inwagen’s view. I will avoid 
using this term as I do not think it does any significant work in Anders’ paper. 
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jealous nature of lives.108 Premise (2c) is prima facie true in virtue of PDAC and 
Anders’ description of a kernel. It might be pointed out that there are a number of 
alternative possibilities here. One of these possibilities is that God could compact one 
kernel k for p2 and another for p1. This is true; God could do this and other things 
besides, but Anders’ argument only requires that it be possible for two persons to 
become compacted into one kernel, k (see Anders 2011, 35 for a defence of this 
claim), not that this scenario actually occurs. Not only this, but it might be asked why 
one should accept that when p2 eats p1 and dies the organizational structure of p2’s life 
gets compacted into the same collection of simples that is k. Why could it not be the 
case, for instance, that God preserves or removes for safekeeping the kernel k that is 
Dave, and Steve does not, therefore, consume k?109 In response Anders writes that 
‘God need not preserve the kernel of every human being…[and] if God does not 
preserve human beings necessarily, then it is possible that Dave’s kernel be formed 
and that it remain after Dave’s death. If this is possible then the scenario I have 
suggested is possible. What God can or might do does not render my scenario 
impossible’ (Anders 2011, 36). For the sake of the argument at this time I shall grant 
that this is possible.110 I understand premise (3c) to be uncontroversially true. (4c), as 
I have highlighted, is entailed by (1c) and (2c), and the conclusion (5c) follows from 
(3c) and (4c) by modus ponens. This sums up Anders’ argument. I will now offer 
some responses on van Inwagen’s behalf. 
My responses are as follows. First, I contend that Anders’ suggestion that God’s 
preserving a kernel, at least in part, amounts to the compaction of the organisational 
structure of a life into a ‘small portion of the simples’ (Anders 2011, 34) whose 
activity constitutes a suspended life has no support from van Inwagen’s writings. 
Second, I contend that a passage that might be taken as evidence for Anders’ view 
cannot, in fact, be taken as evidence for Anders’ view. Third, I contend that, even if 
we accept that the compaction of the organisational structure of a life into a small 
portion of the simples whose activity constitutes a suspended life is possible, 
regardless of the fact there is no passage in van Inwagen that affirms it, we still have 
                                                
108 To remind you ‘jealous’ means that ‘it cannot be that the activities of the xs constitute at one and the 
same time two lives’ (van Inwagen 1990, 89). 
109 I thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting these two issues with Anders’ argument. 
110 It may be further noted that just because van Inwagen’s position does not rule out the possibility of 
some state of affairs does not mean that his theory entails that state of affairs is possible. One may 
reject Ander’s argument on this point alone.  
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reason to think that van Inwagen could argue that the story Anders tells requires him 
to predicate of kernels a condition that can be fulfilled only by corpses. In 
consequence, van Inwagen could argue that the activity of the simples that compose a 
kernel (as described by Anders) cannot, in fact, constitute a suspended life. Fourth, I 
contend that one need not employ Anders’ description in order to account for God’s 
preserving a naked kernel and, since there is another account available to van 
Inwagen, he need not agree with Anders’ account. 
With regards to my first contention the only defence I have is to state that I cannot see 
any section of Anders’ paper that explicitly shows where, in van Inwagen’s work, one 
can get the idea that ‘God’s preserving a kernel’ means, at least in part, the 
preservation of a ‘small portion of the simples’ (Anders 2011, 34) whose activity 
constituted p’s life at t1 and, consequently, allows for the continuation of persons. I 
shall, then, turn to my second contention, and suggest that the passage that Anders 
might have in mind does not support his view.  
It appears to me that Anders had a specific section of van Inwagen’s 1990 book 
Material Beings in mind when he coined the term ‘compaction’. I think Anders had 
this passage in mind because, first, this passage occurs on the two pages where van 
Inwagen discusses whether or not an organism could survive death and, second, it is 
the passage where van Inwagen discusses ‘suspension’, a condition of Anders’ 
definition of a kernel (i.ii.i). I will quote the passage in full and argue that what van 
Inwagen means here is different to what Anders suggests in his paper if this passage is 
what Anders had in mind when coining the concept ‘compaction.’ 
Van Inwagen writes that upon death person p’s life that 
consisted mostly of chemical reactions and various relatively large-scale 
physical processes (the breaking and establishing of chemical bonds, the 
movement of fluids under hydraulic pressure, the transport of ions), is 
‘squeezed into’ various small-scale physical processes (the orbiting of 
electrons and the exchange of photons by charged particles). Its life became 
the sum of those subchemical changes that underlie and constitute chemical 
and large-scale physical unchange (van Inwagen 1990, 147). 
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According to this passage, upon death the life of an organism is ‘squeezed into’ 
various small-scale physical processes and subchemical changes. This squeezing may 
be what Anders has in mind when developing compaction; that is, Anders might think 
that this squeezing is synonymous with the compaction of the organisational structure 
of the suspended life into a ‘kernel’, where this kernel is a small portion of the 
simples whose activity constitutes a suspended life. I think, however, that this is 
incorrect. This is because the squeezing that is taking place in this passage is not a 
squeezing of the organisational structure of the suspended life into a ‘small portion’ 
(Anders 2011, 34) of the simples that composed that person at the time of that 
person’s death, ‘a pellet’ as Anders says (Anders 2011, 35). Rather, squeezing, 
according to van Inwagen, refers to the squeezing of a life or large-scale physical 
processes into underlying processes. This distinction between simples and processes 
is important. There is no reason to think, from what van Inwagen writes, that the 
person has, in some way, shrunk in size; Steve does not get ‘compacted’ (Anders 
2011, 34) if this means that Steve comes to be composed by a ‘small portion of the 
simples’ whose activity constituted p’s life at t1 (Anders 2011, 34). Rather, it seems 
that, according to van Inwagen, the life of an organism comes to be constituted by the 
activity of the simples caught up in submicroscopic ‘processes’ (van Inwagen 1990, 
147) that underlay the large-scale macroscopic processes that constituted the life of 
the organism before death. We might say that, according to this passage, ‘compaction’ 
is a matter of scope and not a matter of size.  
It must be noted that this is not to say that a person is merely a process. A person 
(according to van Inwagen) is a human organism, and human organisms are 
composed of simples that are the constituents of (lives). It seems to me that van 
Inwagen is merely arguing that the processes that the simples are constituents of at the 
moment of ‘compaction’ cease but the underlying small-scale submicroscopic 
processes continue. The person, then, is still identical with the organism that the 
simples compose, but the simples that compose that organism, at one time, are 
macroscopic processes and, at a later time, are submicroscopic processes. This change 
in scope, however, does not amount to the end of one life and the beginning of 
another life. Rather, van Inwagen allows the submicroscopic processes to suffice as 
the numerically same life as the life of the organism before its life processes changed 
from macroscopic to submicroscopic.  
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If Anders is offering an interpretation of the above passage (van Inwagen 1990, 147) 
when he discusses compaction then I hope to have shown that it is inconsistent with 
what van Inwagen describes. Anders thinks that, for van Inwagen, compaction 
amounts to God’s preserving an essential, small portion of simples that composed 
person p at time t1, while van Inwagen, it seems, actually thinks that compaction 
amounts to the squeezing of the life of a person from large-scale macroscopic 
processes into small-scale submicroscopic processes. These are clearly two different 
accounts. 
Anders may respond, however, by arguing that he does mean to refer to a suspended 
life as a life that has been ‘squeezed’ into subchemical processes and ‘compaction’ 
merely refers to the possibility that the activity of a small portion of these simples 
might (in virtue of their retaining their multi-grade interrelations with one another) 
still constitute a suspended life. There is a further reason, however, to think that there 
is still a response open to van Inwagen. In particular, it is possible that van Inwagen 
could reject the claim that a suspended life (a life that has ceased but can begin again) 
can really exist in virtue of the activity of the simples that compose a kernel (as 
Anders describes) since the suspended life that exists in virtue of the activity of the 
simples that compose the kernel cannot begin again in the way that a suspended life 
that exists in virtue of the activity of the simples that compose a corpse could (the 
only example of a suspended life beginning again that van Inwagen gives). I shall 
now explain why. 
Consider a cryogenically frozen corpse and a corpse that has not been cryogenically 
frozen. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the only condition that van Inwagen cites to 
differentiate between the microscopic activity of a cryogenically frozen corpse and 
that of a corpse that has not been cryogenically frozen (perhaps a corpse that ‘has 
been subject to the normal, “room temperature” processes of biological decay for, say, 
fifteen minutes’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147)) is the fact that the ‘microlevel activity of a 
cryopreserved [corpse] is disposed to expand into its normal state at the moment 
sufficient energy should become available to it’ (Eberl 2008, 71) while the microlevel 
activity of a corpse that has not been cryogenically frozen is not disposed to expand 
into its normal state at the moment the same amount of energy should become 
available to it. Since this is the case, for any corpse, that corpse exists in virtue of a 
suspended life if and only if the microlevel activity of that corpse is disposed to 
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expand into its normal state at the moment a certain amount of energy should become 
available to it. 
The question now becomes whether Anders’ description of van Inwagen’s kernel is 
something of the kind that, like a cryogenically frozen corpse, is disposed to expand 
into its normal state at the moment that amount of energy should become available to 
it. On the face of it, one might think that van Inwagen’s answer would be ‘yes.’ Van 
Inwagen states the condition for the life of an object, y’s, being disposed to begin 
again after its life has been suspended in the following passage: ‘[i]f a life has been 
suspended, it can begin again; if the requisite energy is supplied to the simples whose 
activity has been suspended, in a uniform, nondisruptive way, it will begin again. 
(Perhaps a gentle prod will be required; an electrical stimulus to the heart of the just-
thawed cat, or something of that sort.)’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147-148). We can state 
this condition as follows (mentioned in Part I): 
Disposition condition= an object, y, is disposed to have its suspended life 
begin again if the requisite energy is supplied to the simples whose activity 
has been suspended. 
If we understand a kernel to exemplify the relevant microlevel activity that disposes 
an object to expand into a life again (perhaps ‘multi-grade interrelations between 
simples’ as Anders describes), then the kernel can ‘enliven a new organism that 
bridges the “gap” between death and new life’111 (Anders 2011, 34) and, in 
consequence, can be said to be disposed to begin again.  
It is possible, however, for van Inwagen to disagree. Van Inwagen could argue that 
the above disposition condition is not sufficient condition, but merely a necessary 
condition for an object y’s being disposed to have its life begin again. That is, van 
Inwagen could argue that an object that has had its life suspended can begin again and 
all that it takes for it to begin again is that a certain amount of energy (a gentle prod, 
an electrical stimulus to the heart muscle or something of that sort) be supplied to the 
                                                
111 Anders does not tell us what the ‘transfer of this naked kernel to enliven a new organism’ means, 
precisely, but I take it to mean the following: God takes this kernel and places it among a collection of 
simples arranged humanwise in just the right place and supplies the kernel with sufficient energy for 
the suspended life to begin again such that the collection of simples arranged humanwise gets caught 
up in its life resulting in that collection of simples arranged humanwise becoming a human organism 
with the same life. 
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simples whose activity has been suspended. If this is the case then the life that is 
constituted by the activity of the simples that compose a kernel, is not disposed to 
begin again just on the supply of the relevant amount of energy, since a kernel has to 
be supplied with the requisite energy for life to begin again only after it is placed into 
a pile of simples arranged humanwise i.e. it requires a further condition. In 
consequence, van Inwagen could argue that the disposition condition can be fulfilled 
only by corpses and not by kernels (as described by Anders). 
Moreover, in the light of van Inwagen’s discussion of suspension in Material Beings, 
I think that it is not unreasonable to think that van Inwagen would argue that a 
suspended life exists only in virtue of an object that has retained its large-scale 
structural integrity such that the suspended life can begin again if the requisite energy 
is supplied to the simples whose large-scale activity has been suspended, and that no 
suspended life exists in virtue of a kernel that retains only small-scale structural 
integrity in virtue of the various multi-grade relations between the simples that 
compose it. He writes, for example, that upon suspension a human organism’s ‘life 
became the sum of those subchemical changes that underlie and constitute chemical 
and large-scale physical unchange’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147). This is contra PDAC, 
which requires large-scale physical change.  
This brings me to my third contention. Van Inwagen, it seems, could argue that the 
naked kernel that God preserves is something else, something different from Anders’ 
suggestion. Van Inwagen could argue, for example, that the kernel is the preserved 
functioning brain, or preserved functioning relevant part of the brain, of a human 
organism. That is, perhaps at the moment of death (disruption) God removes the brain 
of the human organism and replaces it with a brain simulacrum. The brain 
simulacrum and accompanying pile of simples arranged humanwise then get placed in 
the grave, while the brain of that human organism is immediately hooked-up to an 
appropriate ‘life-support system’ (van Inwagen 1990, 177) that maintains the ongoing 
life of the organism. I cannot offer a full description here (space will not allow it) of 
how God might achieve this, or explain how this is, in some relevant sense, different 
from van Inwagen’s own simulacrum model, but this is not my aim. My aim is simply 
to show that since there is an alternative description of what a naked kernel might be, 
van Inwagen need not accept Anders’ account and the alleged impossibilities that 
come with that account. 
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Anders may respond, however, by arguing that there are good reasons to reject my 
disposition condition. Anders could argue that organisms undergoing open-heart or 
brain-transplant surgeries, for example, would fail to meet the disposition condition. 
That is, organisms on the operating table undergoing these procedures, it seems, 
would not be disposed to have their lives begin again only on the supply of a certain 
amount of energy (e.g., they also need their organs returning to them first). This is 
problematic because, given what I have said above, if an organism is not disposed to 
have its suspended life begin again, then that organism has ceased to exist and, in 
consequence, the pile of simples arranged humanwise on the operating table can never 
again compose that organism. But, it seems, we would want to say of organisms that 
have had their hearts (I will consider brain-transplants shortly) momentarily stopped 
(or even, perhaps, removed) that they have not ceased to exist.112 
There are two responses available to me (and van Inwagen if he does, indeed, accept 
the disposition condition) one for each example (open-heart surgery and brain-
transplant surgery). First, I will consider open-heart surgeries. It seems to me that van 
Inwagen could (and, perhaps, would) argue that the disposition condition, strictly 
speaking, does not apply to organisms that have had their hearts stopped for surgical 
purposes. This is because organisms that have had their hearts stopped (and for which, 
as is the case in open-heart surgery, a cardiopulmonary bypass machine has been 
temporarily put in place) can still be considered ‘alive’ in the usual sense of the word 
(i.e., the simples that compose them are still caught up in large-scale macroscopic 
processes) and, therefore, they have not had their lives suspended. In consequence, 
there is no need to argue that the human organisms without functioning hearts are 
disposed to have their suspended lives begin again. Van Inwagen, it seems, would 
agree. When writing about organisms that have had their hearts stopped, for example, 
he notes,  
 
I seem to remember that when the heart stops beating, the human organism 
will sometimes cause its arterial walls to contract, in a valiant and pathetic 
attempt to cause the blood to circulate; this indicates that the cells that 
compose the stricken man are still caught up in a continuing homeodynamic 
event (van Inwagen 1990, 146). 
                                                
112 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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In other words, the fact that the human organism can cause its arterial walls to 
contract is evidence that the life of the human organism is still continuing, even 
though the heart of that organism has stopped pumping blood.  
 
Second, consider an organism undergoing a brain-transplant. On the one hand, van 
Inwagen refers to the virtual object on an operating table that has had its brain 
removed (awaiting a new brain) as a ‘brain-complement’ (van Inwagen 1990, 173). 
While, on the other hand, the brain that has been removed from the brain-complement 
and has been hooked up to an ‘elaborate mechanism’ (van Inwagen 1990, 170) ‘is 
now a radically maimed man, a man who is about as maimed as it is possible for a 
man to be’ (van Inwagen 1990, 172). That is, the removed brain of an organism 
(provided it is still alive) is the organism. The ‘brain-complement’ (van Inwagen 
1990, 173), then, is not disposed to have its life begin again on the supply of the 
requisite amount of energy, because the simples that virtually compose a brain-
complement are not caught up in a life and the brain-complement, therefore, is not an 
organism. This, however, should not be considered problematic. Most of us, it seems 
to me, would agree that a human organism without a brain (or, more specifically, a 
brain-complement) is not disposed to have its life begin again. Moreover, the brain 
that has been removed from the brain-complement and has been hooked up to an 
elaborate machine would be, according to van Inwagen, the persisting organism and 
need not, itself, be disposed to have its life begin again on the supply of a certain 
amount of energy, since it is still (like the organism hooked up to a cardiopulmonary 
bypass machine) alive. Van Inwagen could argue then that his story actually supports 
our intuitions regarding the brain-complement; the brain-complement is not disposed 
to have its life begin again, and the brain hooked-up to an elaborate mechanism need 
not be disposed to have its life begin again. 
It may be further argued, however, that another problem arises. Although the brain 
that has been hooked-up to an elaborate mechanism may not need to meet the 
disposition condition (since its life has not been suspended), it now no longer seems 
to meet van Inwagen’s own self-maintaining condition for lives. This is because the 
brain now needs some form of active external support – the elaborate mechanism – to 
keep it going. Van Inwagen seems to disagree. Van Inwagen writes that give a 
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severed head, or brain for that matter, ‘the proper environment and it will maintain 
itself…a life-support system for the head will be no more than an elaborate pump’ 
(van Inwagen 1990, 177-178). Put simply, it will still be the brain ‘doing the work’ of 
keeping the life going and not the elaborate machine. Likewise, we can say the same 
about an organism undergoing open-heart surgery. The cardiopulmonary bypass 
machine is no more than an elaborate pump. In both cases it is the brain that is still 
maintaining and directing the homeodynamic event.  
Anders may, finally, respond by arguing that, if the disposition condition were true, 
then this would not allow van Inwagen to explain bodily resurrection after the 
destruction of a corpse. I will make two points in response. First, I think that it is 
consistent with van Inwagen’s materialist metaphysics to say that if an organism 
really gets blown to bits by a bomb (it is destroyed) its life will cease and, 
consequently, that organism can never exist again. Strictly speaking, then, organisms 
(or freshly dead corpses for that matter) cannot undergo complete destruction if they 
are to survive death.113 Second, however, this is not a problem for van Inwagen. As 
stated above, van Inwagen could (and would, I think) argue that, although he does not 
have an explanation of the actual mechanism by which God might raise a human 
organism from the dead whose corpse has been destroyed, he does have a 
metaphysically possible description of how God might achieve the resurrection. He 
will argue that, although it seems to us like the organism has been blown to bits in 
fact, moments before that organism was blown up, God could preserve a remnant of 
that organism, a naked kernel ‘in the way [he has] imagined]’ (van Inwagen 1998b, 
51) (i.e., the simulacrum model) or in some very similar way (as mentioned above, 
God could, for instance, at the moment of each man’s death, remove the freshly dead 
corpse, functioning brain, or central nervous system for safekeeping and replace it 
with a look-alike). 
In sum it seems that there is a plausible response that can be given on behalf of van 
Inwagen to Anders’ argument and, in consequence, Anders fails to demonstrate the 
falsity of van Inwagen’s metaphysics but, rather, demonstrates the falsity of some 
                                                
113 One may object to Anders’ model on this point alone. Anders argues that when an organism gets 
blown to bits by a bomb its life gets suspended and compacted, but van Inwagen says that when an 
organism gets blown to bits by a bomb its life ceases. I thank Daniel Hill for drawing my attention to 
this point. 
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other (but similar) materialist metaphysics.114 In consequence, van Inwagen’s 
suggestion is not metaphysically incoherent and, as such, van Inwagen’s suggestion 
demonstrates that premise (5¢) is false. It is possible for an organism that has died to 
exist again on the Last Day so long as ‘death’ is understood as MD2 suspension115 
and it is conceded that God could, at the moment of our deaths, take our corpses (or 
relevant part thereof) and preserve them for safekeeping.  
6.2 Falling-elevator model 
There is a final model in the literature that might aid the animalist. As mentioned 
above, one of the primary problems for van Inwagen’s simulacrum model (or models) 
is that it entails the unseemly conclusion that at the moment of one’s death God 
removes one’s ‘corpse and replaces it with a simulacrum, which is what is burned or 
rots’ (van Inwagen 1998b, 49). Zimmerman (1999) puts forward another story at 
which proposition (B) of the problem of life after death is false, and which does not 
require God to replace an organism that has died with a look-alike. Zimmerman calls 
his model ‘the falling-elevator model’116 To remind you proposition (B) = necessarily, 
when we die the simples that last composed us will cease to bear any immanent-
causal connection to any organism. 
 
Zimmerman’s solution is to argue that moments before a particular human organism’s 
death God could allow the simples that compose that organism to bud. That is, the 
simples that compose say, organism O1, at the time of O1’s death, t2, could, so 
Zimmerman argues, undergo ‘something like fission’ (Zimmerman 2010, 36). 
Specifically, to quote Zimmerman,  
God [at death] allows each atom to continue to immanently cause later stages 
in the ‘life’ or history of an atom, right where it is located, as it normally 
would do; but…God also gives each atom the miraculous power to produce an 
                                                
114 This is, of course, still valuable but it is not what Anders is professing to do. 
115 (MD2) Suspension = O’s life has been suspended at t if the life, L, in virtue of which the simples 
that composed O has ceased and the simples that were caught up in L retain—owing to the mere 
absence of disruptive forces—their individual properties and their relations to one another. 
116 It is called this for it is supposed to be reminiscent of the way in which a cartoon character survives 
death by falling elevator: it steps out of the way at the last possible moment. 
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exact duplicate at a certain distance in space or time (or both), at an 
unspecified location I shall call ‘the next world’ (Zimmerman 2010, 36).117  
There are, in consequence, two sets of simples as a result of this budding process. One 
set ‘in this world’ and one set ‘in the next world’.118 The set ‘in the next world’ 
continues to be immanent-causally related to the set that exists in this world. The 
simples that are members of the set ‘in the next world’ also continue to be 
constituents of a life. They are, in consequence, parts of an organism. Let us call this 
organism ‘O2’. The set of simples that (we might say, virtually) compose the 
organism that exists ‘in this world’, however, after the budding process, cease to be 
constituents of the life in which they were previously caught up. In this case, 
therefore, they do not compose anything (or, at least, they virtually compose a 
corpse). On this model O1 has survived its death. O1 is identical with O2 in virtue of 
the fact that the simples that compose O1 and the simples that compose O2 are 
immanent-causally connected; they are constituents of the same life processes. The 
simples that would compose O1, however, are now a mere pile of simples that 
resemble O1. This pile of simples is what is placed in the grave or burned. This 
completes the falling-elevator model. O1 and O2 are identical in virtue of the fact that 
the simples that compose O2 and the simples that compose O1 are constituents of the 
same life.  
The important difference between Zimmerman’s model of the resurrection and van 
Inwagen’s is that, on Zimmerman’s account, we can point to the product of the 
budding process ‘in this world’ and say of it truly ‘there are organism O1’s remains’. 
Moreover, we could point to the organism in the next world (were this possible) and 
say ‘there is organism O1’. In this case the simples that once composed, say, O1 but 
now lie on the operating table or in the mortuary really are O1’s remains. They are not 
a pile of simples that God placed there to look like our remains. Zimmerman’s model, 
therefore, escapes the objection that faces van Inwagen’s model: that God is a 
systematic mass deceiver.  
                                                
117 Importantly, this passage assumes that there can be immanent causation across temporal gaps. I find 
Zimmerman’s arguments for immanent causation across temporal gaps convincing and so will accept 
his most recent model as plausible. 
118 I understand the phrase ‘the next world’ to refer to the same time and place and the phrase ‘life of 
the world to come’ in the Nicene Creed. 
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It should also be noted that while Zimmerman’s model does require one to accept a 
controversial metaphysical thesis (to be discussed) it does not rely upon a 
controversial understanding of death. The simples that compose a particular organism 
need not come to be constituents of a submicroscopic-life in order for that organism 
to persist. The simples that compose a particular organism at the time of that 
organism’s death really do cease to be constituents of a life (in particular, constituents 
of any life; macroscopic or submicroscopic).  
There are, however, a number of objections to the falling-elevator model. I will not 
discuss them all here. This is primarily because I think that one of the main arguments 
against the falling-elevator model is sound.119 The falling-elevator model, it is argued, 
requires the animalist to accept a no-equally-close continuer clause in her theory of 
personal identity and no-equally-close continuer clauses in one’s theory of personal 
identify are to be avoided. In this case a no-equally-close continuer clause would look 
something like this: O1 at t1, is identical with O2 at t2, if and only if, O1 and O2 share 
the same life processes and there is no other equally good candidate (O3) for 
identification with O2 at t2. For the time being I will merely rehearse this argument. I 
will offer a new objection to the falling-elevator model in Part III of this thesis. 
The problem arises when one considers a possible alternative scenario120 to the 
falling-elevator model. In this scenario, rather than it being the case that the simples 
that composed O1 divide into two sets and only one of these sets carries on O1’s life 
processes, both do. Zimmerman gets us to imagine a world where many years before 
O1’s death, God secretly causes O1’s atoms to bud, ‘generating duplicates in the next 
world in just the way the Falling Elevator Model recommends that God do at [O1’s] 
death’ (Zimmerman 2013, 142). However, in this scenario, O1 is not about to die. 
Perhaps this budding occurs when O1 is aged seven. In this case, after budding, there 
exist two organisms that are both candidates for identification with O1 where in the 
other scenario (on the falling-elevator model) there was just one. Let us say that O1 is 
the organism that exists at time t1 (pre-budding), O2 is the organism that exists in the 
next world at time t3 (post-budding) and O3 is the organism that exists in this world 
                                                
119 Zimmerman (2010) responds to the other objections. These objections are Olson’s ‘discontinuous 
momentum’ objection (Olson 2010), Hasker’s ‘necessity of identity’ objection (Hasker 1999, 230–231) 
and Hershenov’s ‘assimilation principle’ objection (Hershenov 2002). 
120 A scenario apparently consistent with the falling-elevator model. 
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(post-budding).121 Zimmerman notes that ‘[o]n the face of it, the mere occurrence of 
this budding event should not have killed [O1]’ (Zimmerman 2013, 142). O1, in my 
imagination, seems to exist as before: O1 is identical with O3 in this world but now 
there is a duplicate existing in the next world, O2. On the falling-elevator model O1 is 
identical with O2 in virtue of the fact that O2 carries on O1’s life processes and O1 has 
died. In the second scenario just described, however, O1 is not identical with O2. 
Rather, O2 is merely a duplicate of O1.  
Both of these scenarios are, it is argued, possible on van Inwagen’s metaphysics. 
Given the possibility of both scenarios, however, it seems that the identity of O2 
depends on facts about O3. It depends on whether or not O3 continues O1’s life 
processes. This is problematic. It is problematic because, as usually understood, y’s 
identity with x, cannot depend on some other thing z. This principle, as mentioned 
above, is referred to as the ‘only x and y’ principle.122 To remind us, the ‘only x and y’ 
principle states that when considering whether or not x is numerically identical 
to y (or, for our purposes, O1 is numerically identical to O2) the identification of x 
with y can only depend on facts about x and y (O1 and O2) and the relations between 
them and not about individuals other than x and y (O1 and O2) e.g. z (or O3). As 
Zimmerman notes, however, the falling-elevator model ‘implies that the (antecedently 
highly plausible) only x and y principle be false’ (Zimmerman 2009, 333). This is 
because when selecting the correct candidate for identification with organism O1 it is 
possible, on the falling-elevator model, that there are two candidates (organism O2 
and organism O3) available for identification with organism O1. As I have mentioned, 
Zimmerman thinks that if O2 does not survive (but is a pile of simples) then O1 is 
identical with O3. This being the case, identification of O1 with some later organism 
O3 is not only dependent upon the facts between O1 and O3 but is dependent upon the 
survival of (and, as such, facts about) O2. 
Most find, as Zimmerman notes, the ‘only x and y’ principle to be ‘highly plausible’ 
(Zimmerman 2009, 333). I suspect that many animalists accept the ‘only x and y’ 
principle too and, in consequence, they may find Zimmerman’s model unattractive. 
Van Inwagen, for example, accepts a version of the ‘only x and y’ principle. He 
                                                
121 Where budding occurs at time t2. 
122 To be clear, Zimmerman thinks that van Inwagen should reject the ‘only x and y’ principle 
regardless of the fact that it is required for the falling-elevator model. I will return to this point shortly. 
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writes, ‘it is absurd, it is utterly incoherent, to suppose that his [an organism’s] 
identity could depend on what might happen to some atoms other than the atoms that 
compose him’ (van Inwagen 1995, 486). Van Inwagen says this in response to the 
duplication objection as raised by a the recomposition model but it goes for budding 
too since van Inwagen’s statement is one about the absurdity of the identity relation 
between two organisms resting on some atoms other than the atoms that compose him 
(and not merely about the recomposition of some previous atoms that composed a 
particular organism). Thus, to accept the falling-elevator model van Inwagen would 
have to give up his commitment to the ‘only x and y’ principle.  
Zimmerman, however, argues that, like it or not, van Inwagen is committed to the 
falsity of the ‘only x and y’ principle regardless of whether or not he accepts the 
falling-elevator model. In consequence, accepting the falling-elevator model should 
come (at least for van Inwagen) at no extra cost.  
I will now explain why. Zimmerman gets us to imagine an organism (the imaginary 
organism that van Inwagen describes in Material Beings). This organism is called 
‘Neocerberus’. Neocerberus is an organism with two brains and two organs of 
maintenance. Each brain ‘is the seat of reasoning, of the processing of sensory 
information, and of Neocerberus’ other “higher” mental functions’ (Zimmerman 
2009, 334). The two organs of maintenance direct the homeodynamic activities of the 
organism. The brain on the left side of the organism is joined by a commissure 
(similar to that of the commissure between the two cerebral hemispheres in all normal 
human organisms) to the brain on the right side of the organism. Likewise, the organ 
of maintenance on the left side of the organism is joined to the organ of maintenance 
on the right side of the organism. Not only this but the two brains and the two organs 
of maintenance are ‘practically mirror images of one another’ (Zimmerman 2009, 
334). Both brains and organs of maintenance send the same signals at the same time 
to the various parts of the organism. In this case, therefore, ‘both conscious bodily 
movements and unconscious regulation of homeodynamic processes are 
overdetermined’ (Zimmerman 2009, 334). The simples that virtually compose the 
brains, the organs of maintenance and other parts of Neocerberus are constituents, so 
says van Inwagen, of the same life. Moreover, the causes of Neocerberus’ ongoing 
life processes are a result of both of the functioning organs of maintenance. 
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Consider the following two scenarios. First, let us say that we were to split 
Neocerberus in two without causing either of the brains or the organs of maintenance 
to cease functioning. Let us say that in the process we effectively perform a 
commissurotomy; cutting the connection between both of the brains and both of the 
organs of maintenance. Second, let us say that we completely destroy half of the 
organism and leave only one brain and one organ of maintenance (perhaps the right-
hand brain and organ of maintenance). Let us say that in both of these situations both 
of the brains and both of the organs or maintenance continue to function. 
In the first scenario, van Inwagen holds ‘that two new organisms have come into 
existence, and that Neocerberus ceased to exist at the moment it became true that the 
simples that had composed him began to compose two organisms’ (van Inwagen 
1990, 203). This is not because there now exists a competitor but because 
Neocerberus is the organism that had two organs of maintenance directing its life, not 
one; it had two different sets of causes underlying the continuation of its life 
processes where it now has one set. The two organisms that come into existence after 
the commissuotomy do so because their lives have different causes from 
Neocerberus’ life.123 This is also the case when, say, one of Neocerberus’ organs of 
maintenance is destroyed. There is a remaining organism and it persists in virtue of 
the fact that there is a continuing life. This life, however, has different causes from the 
life of Neocerberus and, in consequence, so says van Inwagen, is not Neocerberus. 
Zimmerman adapts the Neocerberus example. This adapted example is supposed to 
describe an organism that is similar to Neocerberus. Zimmerman argues that if this 
organism possibly exists, then van Inwagen should accept a closest continuer theory 
of personal identity (and, in consequence, reject the ‘only x and y’ principle). 
Zimmerman describes a creature very similar to Neocerberus called ‘Leftycerberus’. 
The crucial difference is that  
[b]oth of its organs of maintenance are more or less in synch, but the left one 
is a little faster than the right in sending electrical impulses to the rest of the 
body; and the first signal to arrive always pre-empts the slower signal, 
                                                
123 See van Inwagen (1990, 208). Van Inwagen writes that the life of one of the organisms that exists as 
a result of cutting Neocerberus in two ‘is a new event, distinct from Neocerberus’ life because it had 
different causes from Neocerberus’ life’ (van Inwagen 1990, 208). 
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preventing it from causing changes in respiration, pulse rate, and so on. In this 
case, the right-hand organ of maintenance isn’t among the causes of 
Leftycerberus’s Life; and so according to van Inwagen’s reasoning, it can be 
removed without bringing Leftycerberus’s Life to an end (Zimmerman 2009, 
335). 
Zimmerman then further adapts this example. Let us say that Leftycerberus’ right-
hand organ is only successful fifty percent of the time. When it is not successful the 
other left-hand organ of maintenance takes over. Perhaps, Leftycerberus’ right-hand 
organ has a stint at directing the Leftycerberus’ life before it tires, at which point the 
left-hand organ has a stint at directing Leftycerberus’ life. Zimmerman argues that in 
this situation when the left-hand organ takes over control a new life begins and the old 
one ceases. In this case one organism would cease to exist and a new organism would 
begin to exist. This is because a life would begin with ‘different causes’ (Zimmerman 
2009, 335). Zimmerman argues that this is an unwanted result because we find it 
intuitive to say that Leftycerberus would continue to exist (as the same organism) 
even after its life processes were to suddenly become caused by a different organ. 
Zimmerman asks the rhetorical question ‘[w]hy couldn’t Leftycerberus’s heart rate 
alone, be taken over by its right organ of maintenance without the poor thing’s 
ceasing to be?’ (Zimmerman 2009, 336).  
Zimmerman thinks that van Inwagen should accept that Leftycerberus possibly exists 
and Leftycerberus continues to exist when its right-hand organ takes over the 
direction of homeodynamic processes from its left-hand organ. If van Inwagen were 
to allow for the possibility of Leftycerberus and organ-of-maintenance-switching-
without-death he would, says Zimmerman, ‘have to admit that such a creature could 
survive the removal of one of its organs of maintenance’ (Zimmerman 2009, 336). If 
it can survive one of its organs tiring and shutting down for a short while, why can it 
not survive that organ’s removal? 
This is problematic for the animalist who wants to hold the ‘only x and y’ principle. 
Were we to destroy, say, the right half of Leftycerberus (including one of its organs of 
maintenance) then we would be left with an organism that is identical to 
Leftycerberus. Were to cut Leftycerberus in two, however, then there would be two 
resulting organisms and each of these organisms would have equal claim to being 
 96 
identical to Leftycerberus. In the first scenario the remaining (right half) organism 
would be Leftycerberus. In the second neither (right half or left half) organism would 
be Leftycerberus. It cannot be the case that the two resulting organisms are both 
Leftycerberus; one concrete object cannot be wholly in two places at once. In this 
case, the identity of Lefycerberus at one time with Leftycerberus at another time 
depends upon the presence or absence of a competitor (namely, the right half of 
Leftycerberus). This has the unwanted result of entailing that the ‘only x and y’ 
principle is false. The identity of Leftycerberus at one time, t1, with an organism at 
another time, t2, depends upon facts about another individual. 
What is the ramification of this for the purposes of this thesis? First, if Zimmerman’s 
argument is sound and one accepts the ‘only x and y’ principle, then one should 
believe that animalism is false. If this is the case, then we can end the argument here. 
My thesis, to some extent, has been established. It is unreasonable to believe that 
animalism is true and that human organisms that have died can exist again on the Last 
Day because animalism is false. 
Second, however, one may of course argue that Zimmerman’s argument is unsound. I 
suspect that most animalists will attempt to argue that Zimmerman’s argument is 
unsound. However, I have yet to find a convincing demonstration that it is unsound. 
Van Inwagen, for example, as of yet, has not responded to Zimmerman’s argument 
and has recently confirmed that, in effect, he holds to the ‘only x and y’ principle.124 I 
do not know what to make of this. I can only speculate. There are, so it seems to me, 
three main possibilities. First, perhaps van Inwagen thinks that Zimmerman’s 
argument is unsound but he has not yet told us why. Second, perhaps, van Inwagen 
thinks that Zimmerman’s argument is sound but that he would still rather provide an 
account of the possibility of life after death that does not commit him to the falsity of 
the ‘only x and y’ principle. Perhaps he does so on the off-chance that Zimmerman’s 
argument turns out to be unsound. Third, perhaps he simply has not come across 
Zimmerman’s argument. I find this last possibility implausible.  
I think it is probably the case that van Inwagen thinks that Zimmerman’s argument is 
unsound but has not yet told us why. I can think of one way by which van Inwagen 
could respond to Zimmerman’s argument. While this response is very weak and so 
                                                
124 See (van Inwagen 1995, 486) quoted above. 
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one that I would not want to attribute to van Inwagen, I cannot see another response 
available. As Zimmerman notes, in order for van Inwagen’s argument to be 
considered sound ‘[v]an Inwagen must allow for at least the abstract possibility of 
cases of organic fission which break the only x and y principle’ (Zimmerman 2009, 
333). That is, van Inwagen must allow for the story that Zimmerman tells about 
Leftycerberus accurately to describe an ‘abstract possibility’. If by ‘abstract 
possibility’ Zimmerman means ‘broad logical possibility’, then van Inwagen will 
reject Zimmerman’s argument. Van Inwagen is a modal sceptic (of sorts). That is, he 
is sceptical that one is justified when one asserts a modal proposition that is about 
matters that are remote from the practical business of everyday life.125 Perhaps van 
Inwagen thinks that the proposition ‘it is possible that Leftycerberus exists’ is one of 
those propositions that is remote from the practical business of everyday life.  
This, however, would be a desperate move for van Inwagen to make. This is because 
van Inwagen is not, it seems, sceptical about the possible existence of Neocerberus. In 
fact, van Inwagen writes, ‘I can see no faintest hint of impossibility in the cases that I 
shall imagine [one of them being the possible existence of Neocerberus], and, believe 
me, I have looked hard for it’ (van Inwagen 1990, 191). Perhaps van Inwagen will 
argue that he has not yet looked hard for a hint of impossibility in the Leftycerberus 
case and so may retain his scepticism with regards to Leftycerberus until he can ‘see 
no hint of impossibility’. One may think that this is having one’s cake and eating it; it 
is, but I can see no other option here for van Inwagen. 
Whatever his reason for not accepting the falling-elevator model, van Inwagen gives a 
theory of the possibility of life after death that does not entail that the ‘only x and y’ 
principle is false. This is reason enough for me to continue to take the suggestion that 
animalism is compatible with the ‘only x and y’ principle seriously (or, at least, the 
suggestion that God can make it the case that an organism that has died can exist 
again on the Last Day without violating the ‘only x and y’ principle). In consequence, 
I will continue to examine the possibility of resurrection assuming that the ‘only x and 
y’ principle is true. In general animalists should prefer an account of the possibility of 
life after death that does not entail that the ‘only x and y’ principle be false. 
                                                
125 More on this in Part III. 
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So far, I hope to have demonstrated that none of the above accounts of how it is that 
an organism that has died can exist again on the Last Day are logically impossible; 
none of them entail a contradiction. The recomposition model and the falling-elevator 
model may entail that the highly plausible ‘only x and y’ principle is false, but 
denying the ‘only x and y’ principle does not commit one to a contradiction. 
Moreover, the simulacrum models may be far-fetched and trade on some dubious 
assumptions about the nature of death but they do not, again, seemingly entail a 
contradiction.  
Where does this leave the argument for logical problem of life after death? Given 
what has been said above, the argument from the logical problem of life after death is 
unsound. In particular, premise (5¢) is false because premises (A) and (B) are false. 
That is, propositions (1)–(4) do not form a logically inconsistent set because it is 
possible that the simples that compose an organism, O1, that has died and the simples 
that compose an organism, O2, that exists on the Last Day be constituents of the same 
life. This can be demonstrated by appeal to, say, the falling-elevator model and the 
simulacrum models. 
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CHAPTER 7 – PROPOSITION (2) 
Thus far I have been assuming that propositions (1)–(4) are held by all animalists who 
believe in life after death. In general, this is assumed throughout this thesis. It must be 
noted, however, that there are animalists who reject (2).126 I here include a short 
chapter about those who reject proposition (2) for the sake of logical completeness.  
Proposition (2) reads as follows: (2) For any human organism O1 at time t1 and for 
any human organism O2 at time t2, O1 and O2 are identical if and only if the simples 
that compose O1 and the simples that compose O2 are constituents of the same life. 
Some ways by which the animalist could reject (2) can be stated as follows127: 
(i) Animalists could hold that human organisms have irreducibly disjunctive 
persistence conditions. 
(ii) Animalists could hold that an alternative criterion for persistence is true (a 
criterion that contradicts Life). 
(iii) Animalists could hold that anticriterialism is true. 
First, (i), one could argue that human organisms have irreducibly disjunctive 
persistence conditions. An irreducibly disjunctive criterion for the persistence of 
human organisms would have the following schema:  
Irreducibly disjunctive criterion schema: 
Necessarily, for any organism, O1, at time t1, and any organism, O2, at time t2, 
O1 and O2 are identical if and only if either (x)…, or (y)…, or (z)…, or (n)….  
 
One could, for example, hold that either (x) the simples that compose O1 and the 
simples that compose O2 are constituents of the same life, or (y) the simples that 
compose O1 and the simples that compose O2 are identical and stand in the same 
spatial and chemical relations. Proponents of the recomposition model may take this 
route. They may argue that Life is true until the moment of death. If this is the case 
                                                
126 As mentioned this thesis is primarily aimed at those who are of a van Inwagenian stripe and van 
Inwagen seems to employ criteria of identity that rules out the possibility of life after death.  
127 I cannot consider them all. I do not have space. To consider, for example, all of the apparently 
possible combinations of irreducibly disjunctive persistence conditions would, I hazard, take a very 
long time.  
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one can accept an organicist animalist criterion for the persistence of human 
organisms (like Life) but argue that another one is needed for the survival of death.128  
There is nothing wrong with irreducibly disjunctive persistence conditions in and of 
themselves. They do not, for example, necessarily entail that some highly plausible 
principle is false or entail a contradiction. The problem is, as Olson notes, that they 
‘don’t carve nature at the joints. They are artificial, gathering up disparate phenomena 
to suit our interests’ (Olson 2013, 92). Concerning the problem of life after death, for 
example, one may only appeal to an irreducibly disjunctive criterion for our 
persistence in order adequately to account for our interest in the possibility of the 
survival of death. The worry is that this is ad hoc; it is not by virtue of our study of 
what we are that we have discovered that the persistence conditions of human 
organisms are disjunctive, but, rather we have decided that their persistence 
conditions must be disjunctive in order to account for a certain anomaly; namely, in 
this case, the survival of death.  
Moreover, if one antecedently believes that the correct way to understand the 
persistence conditions of organisms is through the study of biology (as many 
animalists do), then letting certain problem cases (e.g., about life after death) guide us 
in our discerning what our persistence conditions are will appear to be a suspect 
method. Olson notes that ‘Organism…is a natural-kind concept if anything is. That 
there is a science devoted to the study of organisms as such is no mere reflection of 
contingent human interests. Organism could hardly be an irreducibly disjunctive 
concept’ (Olson 2013, 92). That is, since we seem very well to understand the kind to 
which we belong and since it is biology that gives us knowledge about the particular 
kind to which we belong, we should let biology supply us with the persistence 
conditions of human organisms: we should not let any other disciplines or 
considerations inform our criterion for personal identity.  
Second, (ii), the animalist could accept that we are human organisms but accept an 
alternative account of personal identity across time; one that conflicts with Life. There 
are a number of alternative accounts that she could accept. I will briefly consider two 
of them. 
                                                
128 Relatedly, Olson (2013) considers irreducible disjunctive persistence conditions as a solution to the 
‘corpse problem’ and finds them wanting for reasons discussed below. 
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First, she could argue that while we are animals, animals need not be material or 
while we are animals, animals could have an immaterial part. This being the case the 
animalist could accept one of a number of other persistence conditions. If, for 
example, we are animals and animals are a compound of matter and form, then the 
animalist can accept a hylomophic account of our persistence conditions. Whatever a 
hylomorphic account of our persistence conditions may be it will not be Life. A 
hylomorphic account would have to mention something about forms; Life does not. 
As I have mentioned the suggestion that we are animals and that animals are in part 
immaterial is not obviously ruled out by animalism. I should say, however, that the 
arguments in this thesis are targeted not merely at animalism (i.e., in its most basic 
form) but at materialist versions of animalism. In consequence, I shall accept that this 
is a legitimate response to the problem of life after death and move on. 
Second, the animalist could argue that we are human organisms but that we have 
psychological persistence conditions. When a surgeon moves your brain from your 
head and places it into another head, you go with your brain not because your brain is 
the ‘organ of maintenance’ but because all of the relevant psychological capacities go 
with your brain. Besides the problems already mentioned with the psychological 
continuity account of our persistence (that you seem to persist when you enter a 
permanent vegetative state) the view also implies the falsity of several animalist 
theses that have been assumed in this thesis so far. For example, the psychological 
account implies that while we are human organisms we are not human organisms 
essentially. A cerebrum that has been cut away from an organism, so van Inwagen 
(for example) might argue, is a hunk of matter not an organism. If one accepts a 
psychological account, however, it seems possible that one could become a non-
organism (a cerebrum).  
Before I leave psychological accounts I should mention one further problem. 
Someone who accepts a psychological account may argue that all God needs to do to 
make it the case that you, for example, exist again on the Last Day after you have 
died, is to make it the case that there is some human organism existing on the Last 
Day whose mental properties are in some way identical to yours now. In this case is 
does not matter if you have been subject to the processes of decay or have had your 
remains eaten by birds. God need not use the parts from which you were composed at 
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any time in your life to bring you back from the dead. All he needs to do is create 
someone psychologically just like you. 
The central problem with this view is that on it, as Olson points out, ‘there would be 
no real psychological continuity here’ (Olson 2010, 56). Your psychological duplicate 
that exists on the Last Day would indeed have, say, memories that were very similar 
to yours but they would not be your memories. The psychological duplicate’s 
memories would have been given to it by God not by, say, the psychological 
duplicate’s having lived through the experiences that you had while you were alive.  
To get around this objection an adherent to the psychological view could respond by 
arguing that the organism that exists on the Last Day could be psychologically 
identical to you because the organism that exists on the Last Day is immanent-
causally connected with you. Perhaps the simples that compose the body with which 
you are intimately related moments before your death immanently cause another 
identical set of simples to appear in the future; on the Last Day. Let us also say that 
this organism is psychologically identical to you. In this case, even though here is a 
temporal gap between you and the organism that exists on the Last Day, there are 
grounds for arguing that this future organism really is you. It has all of your memories 
but they are not memories put there by God to resemble your memories, rather, they 
are there by virtue of some previously existing organism’s causing them to be there. 
Whether or not this account is plausible it does not advance the debate much further. 
The organism with which you are identical on the Last Day still needs to be 
immanent-causally connected to you at the moment of your death. As has already 
been demonstrated, this leads to a number of other problems. 
Finally, (iii), the animalist may reject (2) by arguing that while we are human 
organisms there are no informative sufficient conditions for the survival of human 
organisms. This view is otherwise known as ‘anticriterialism’. Trenton Merricks 
(1998; 2001) is an animalist who holds that there are no informative sufficient 
conditions for the persistence of human organisms across time. Moreover, Merricks 
believes that a human organism that has died can exist again on the Last Day. 
Anticriterialism is supposed to help because, as van Inwagen notes,  
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[t]he real philosophical problem facing the doctrine of resurrection does not 
seem to me to be that there is no criterion that the men of the new age could 
apply to determine whether someone then alive was the same man as some 
man who had died before the Last Day; the problem seems to me to be that 
there is such a criterion and (given certain facts about the present age) it 
would, of necessity, yield the result that many men who have died our own 
lifetime and earlier will not be found among those who live after the Last Day 
(van Inwagen 1978, 116). 
Denying that there is a criterion for the survival of human organism, therefore, 
removes the challenge posed by the doctrine of the resurrection: there is no criterion 
that, of necessity, yields the result that many men who have died our own lifetime and 
earlier will not be found among those who live after the Last Day. 
There are two responses to the anticriterialist. First, as Olson notes, even 
anticriterialists accept that ‘you need immanent-causal connections to persist. No one 
denies that any condition is necessary for us to persist, apart from our persistence 
itself. Anticriterialists merely deny that any nontrivial set of conditions is both 
necessary and jointly sufficient’ (Olson 2010, 58). Given that this is the case it is not 
clear that an appeal to anticriterialism helps in here. That is, given that when we die it 
certainly seems that our remains will undergo physical dissolution and given that it is 
(plausibly) a necessary condition for our persistence that the simples that compose us 
at one time are immanent-causally connected to the simples that compose us at 
another time, then the anticriterialist still needs to give us (at least) a broadly logically 
possible story at which an organism that has died can exist again on the Last Day. I 
agree with Stephen Davis when he writes,  
[s]urely the same intuition that led the critic to propose [say] material 
continuity [or, in our case, material and causal continuity] as a criterion of 
personal identity will still be there and needs to be answered. So I don’t see 
how we are any better off than we were before (Davis 2001, 234). 
Second, one may argue that anticriterialism is absurd.129 The argument can be stated 
as follows: anticriterialists are committed to there being no informative sufficient 
                                                
129 See Duncan (2014). 
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conditions for personal identity across time. If this is true then there could exist an 
organism O2 at a time t2 that has all of the qualitative connections with O1 at t1 (i.e., 
has the same memories as, the same life as, the same conscious stream as, etc., O1 at 
time t1) but O1 is not, in fact, the same organism as O2. This result seems absurd130 
and, in consequence, anticriterialism, one may argue, is false. It is absurd because, as 
Matthew Duncan notes, ‘[i]t’s absurd to think that someone—or a series of 
someones—could be just like a normal persisting person in every single qualitative 
way and yet not be a persisting person’ (Duncan 2014, 290). Take, for example, your 
reading this PhD thesis. According to anticriterialism you may fail to finish reading 
this PhD thesis and this is not because you get bored or can think of something better 
to do but because you will simply, for no reason, fail to persist. This, I take it, is 
absurd. 
This brings Part II to a close. In summary, I have distinguished between two 
arguments: the argument from the problem of life after death and the argument from 
the logical problem of life after death. I have demonstrated that most of the arguments 
presented in the literature thus far have been concerned with the second problem: the 
logical problem of life after death. I have demonstrated that the argument from the 
logical problem of life after death is unsound. In particular, there are three ways by 
which one can respond to the logical problem of life after death. One can reject either 
(A), (B), or both. One can reject (A) by arguing that it is not necessarily the case that 
the life of an organism, O1, at one time, t1, is identical to the life of an organism, O2, 
at another time, t2, if and only if, the simples that compose O1 and the simples that 
compose O2 are immanent-causally connected. One can reject (B) by arguing that it is 
not necessarily the case that when we die the simples that last composed us will cease 
to bear any immanent-causal connection to any organism. That is, one can argue that 
there are possible worlds at which not-(a) and not-(b) are true. While these worlds 
may be wildly implausible (no one believes that it is at all likely that God will replace 
us at the moment of our deaths with simulacrum and very few philosophers are 
prepared to accept that the ‘only x and y’ principle is false), they do turn back the 
argument from the logical problem of life after death. This, I have argued, has been 
                                                
130 Daniel Hill points out that ‘if this is absurd then the view of Jonathan Edwards is also absurd’. For 
the sake of argument, I will accept that the view of Jonathan Edwards is absurd. Or, at least, van 
Inwagen and other animalists of his stripe will likely find Jonathan Edwards’ view absurd.  
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achieved. Finally, I argued that the animalist could reject (2) of the argument from the 
problem of life after death and the argument from the logical problem of life after 
death. I argued that there were a number of problems with rejecting (2). I think that 
the most plausible way to reject (2) is to argue that anticriterialism is true. I gave a 
reason for thinking that anticriterialism is false; that it is absurd. I also gave a reason 
for thinking that even if anticriterialism is true, it is not clear that it helps the debate 
since immanent-causal relations between organisms are required whatever account of 
personal identity one adopts.  
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PART III – POSSIBILITY 
Given that the debate thus far has concerned the possibility of life after death it 
is surprising to note that very little effort has been spent considering the 
implications of modal epistemology for the debate. Rather, most of the debate 
has consisted of various philosophers putting forward various just-so stories to 
describe just how it is that God might make it the case that an organism that 
has died can exist again on the Last Day. I, however, think the time has come 
to take a look at the debate from the fresh perspective of modal epistemology. 
This section is devoted to doing just this. In particular, first, I begin by 
demonstrating that van Inwagen’s own modal scepticism is inconsistent with 
his solution to the logical problem of life after death (8.1). Second, I argue that 
if one does not accept van Inwagen’s modal scepticism there is a more modest 
version of modal scepticism available (8.2). This version of modal scepticism, 
if true, also entails that one should be sceptical about whether one can 
justifiably assert that it is possible for God to raise human organisms from the 
dead. Third (Chapter 9), I demonstrate that even if one is not a modal sceptic 
of any sort one can argue that, while van Inwagen has an adequate solution to 
the argument from the logical problem of life after death, the more general 
argument from the problem of life after death remains unaddressed. That is, 
even if one is liberal about what one accepts is possible, necessary and 
contingent one still may worry that it is not reasonable to believe that it is 
possible for God to raise an organism from the dead, given animalism. In fact, 
I argue that this is what the current debate should have concerned all along. I 
then provide reasons why it is this more general problem that requires a 
response. Fourth (10), I consider some possible solutions to the problem of life 
after death. Finally (Chapter 11), I provide some closing remarks. I summarize 
where the argument stands and what needs to happen next. 
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CHAPTER 8 – MODAL SCEPTICISM 
In this chapter I outline van Inwagen’s modal scepticism and demonstrate that his 
solution to the problem of life after death is inconsistent with his modal scepticism. I 
then state a problem with van Inwagen’s modal scepticism. After this I outline a more 
modest version of modal scepticism that, if true, also entails that one should be 
sceptical about whether van Inwagen is justified in asserting that it is possible for God 
to raise human organisms from the dead.  
8.1 Van Inwagenian modal scepticism and the possibility of life after 
death 
We have seen that van Inwagen’s solution to the logical life-after-death problem is to 
demonstrate that while Life is true ‘“certain facts about the present age” are not facts’ 
(van Inwagen 1998b, 49); in particular, the supposed fact that when human organisms 
die their lives get disrupted and their remains are subject to physical dissolution. 
Rather, the disruption of life upon death and physical dissolution is only, perhaps, 
apparent. In his paper ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’ van Inwagen argues just this. 
He does this by providing what he thinks is a metaphysically possible story in which 
human organisms ‘die’ but their lives do not get disrupted. In doing so, he takes 
himself to have established a possibility (namely, that it is possible for God to 
resurrect human organisms from the dead) and, therefore, takes himself to be justified 
in asserting that it is possible for God to resurrect human organisms from the dead.131 
 
I will briefly outline what I take metaphysically possible stories, in general, to be and 
how they might function in arguments to justify some subject S’s assertion that some 
proposition p is possible and, therefore, enable S to say that she has ‘established a 
possibility’. I will then outline van Inwagen’s modal scepticism and demonstrate that 
it is incompatible with his method of telling a just-so story to defend the possibility of 
God’s raising a human organism from the dead. 
A metaphysically possible story is a story that, since it is conceivable, serves to justify 
the assertion of the possibility of a certain proposition that is entailed by that story. A 
story of this kind can be offered in what I call an ‘argument from conceivability to 
possibility’ or a ‘conceivability argument’. Take, for example, the proposition: flying 
                                                
131 What follows in this section (8.1) has largely been taken from (Atkinson 2016). 
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pigs exist, and the following story and the accompanying conceivability argument. 
Imagine that one day Alice successfully breeds a pig with a large bird. The offspring 
produced by this breeding process results in the existence of a pig with wings. This 
pig takes a running jump off a cliff, flaps its wings and flies. One may then argue that 
if this story is conceivable for one then it follows that one is prima facie justified in 
asserting the possible truth of the proposition that flying pigs exist. That is, in 
asserting that it is possible that flying pigs exist. 
One way the structure of a conceivability argument (such as the above argument) can 
be represented is as follows: 
Conceivability argument structure 
(P1) For any proposition, p, S is prima facie justified in asserting the possible truth 
of p if S takes herself to have conceived of a world w that verifies p.132   
(P2) S takes herself to have conceived of a world w that S takes to verify p. 
 
Therefore, 
(C) S is prima facie justified in asserting the possible truth of p. 
(P1) is the key premise. This premise assumes a particular account of the basis of 
modal knowledge. That is, it assumes a particular account of what it takes for some 
subject S to be prima facie justified in asserting that a particular proposition p is 
possibly true. According to (P1), S is justified in asserting that a particular proposition 
p is possibly true if S takes herself to have conceived of a world w that S takes to 
verify p. The account of what it takes for some subject S to be justified in asserting 
the possible truth of a particular proposition p that I assume in this paper (and is 
assumed in P1) is Stephen Yablo’s account of the basis of modal knowledge (Yablo 
1993). It will become clear why I assume this account shortly. According to Yablo’s 
account, a proposition p is conceivable for S if S can imagine a possible world w that 
S takes to verify p. I will call this ‘Yablo-style conceivability’. 
The metaphysically possible world w that S takes to verify p is referred to in (P2) and, 
given (P1,) so long as this world w is Yablo-style conceivable for S, it follows that S 
                                                
132 I explain the technical term ‘verify’ in more detail below (p.126). Put briefly here if S takes w to 
verify p, S takes w to be good evidence that p. 
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is justified in asserting the possible truth that p. (C) follows from (P1) and (P2). I will 
refer to some subject’s asserting the possible truth of some proposition p as a 
‘possibility-claim’. In consequence, I will prefix ‘p’ with ‘possibility-claim’ when I 
mean to denote the possible truth of some proposition. For example, when one takes 
oneself to have imagined a world at which the following proposition p1 ‘Flying pigs 
exist’ is verified, I shall say that one is justified in asserting the possibility-claim p1 
(i.e., justified in asserting that it is possible that flying pigs exist). 
In his paper ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’, van Inwagen seems to be putting 
forward a conceivability argument (of the kind above). Van Inwagen describes a 
metaphysically possible story (that I will refer to as w¢)133 that he takes to verify the 
proposition (that I will refer to as p¢): God resurrects human organisms. Not only this, 
but van Inwagen hopes that his readers will grant that it is a metaphysically possibly 
story (cf. van Inwagen 1998c, 50). Accordingly, he hopes to have demonstrated that 
he (and anyone else that can imagine the story he tells) is justified in asserting the 
possible truth of p¢ and so will accept that he has established the possible truth of p¢.  
The metaphysically possible world that van Inwagen puts forward to verify p¢ has 
come to be known as the ‘simulacrum story’. To avoid misstating the metaphysically 
possible world w¢ that van Inwagen takes to verify p¢ and to refresh your memory I 
quote the passage in full. 
It is part of the Christian faith that all men who share in the sin of Adam must 
die. What does it mean to say that I must die? Just this: that one day I shall be 
composed entirely of nonliving matter; that is, I shall be a corpse. It is not part 
of the Christian faith that I must at any time be totally annihilated or 
disintegrate. (One might note that Christ, whose story is supposed to provide 
the archetype for the story of each man’s resurrection, became a corpse but did 
not, even in his human nature, cease to exist.) It is of course true that men 
apparently cease to exist: those who are cremated, for example. But it 
contradicts nothing in the creeds to suppose that this is not what really 
happens, and that God preserves our corpses contrary to all appearance. 
Perhaps at the moment of each man’s death, God removes his corpse and 
                                                
133 As mentioned in footnote 74, I use the terms, ‘story’, ‘scenario’, ‘model’ and ‘world’ 
interchangeably. 
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replaces it with a simulacrum, which is what is burned or rots. Or perhaps God 
is not quite so wholesale as this: Perhaps he removes for ‘safekeeping’ only 
the ‘core person’ – the brain and central nervous system—or even some 
special part of it. These are the details. 
I take it that this story shows that the Resurrection is a feat an almighty 
being could accomplish (van Inwagen 1998b, 49).134 
 
We can, then, take the possible world described in the above story and put it into a 
conceivability argument for the possibility of the resurrection.  
The conceivability argument for the possibility of resurrection of material beings 
(P1') For any proposition, p, S is prima facie justified in asserting the possible truth 
of p if S takes herself to have conceived of a world that verifies p. 
(P2') Van Inwagen takes himself to have conceived of a world w¢ (the simulacrum 
story) that he takes to verify p¢ (God resurrects human organisms). 
Therefore, 
(C') Van Inwagen is justified in asserting the possible truth of p¢ (i.e., it is possible 
for God to resurrect human organisms). 
Modal scepticism  
Van Inwagen, however, is a sceptic about modal claims. These are propositions that 
include modal operators like ‘it is possible’ that and ‘it is necessary that’. For the 
purposes of this paper I am only concerned with possibility-claims. Van Inwagen, 
however, is sceptical about only some, not all, possibility-claims. Van Inwagen thinks 
that we should not be sceptical about possibility-claims asserted by philosophers 
regarding ‘ordinary propositions about everyday matters’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 76). 
Claims like the claim that it is possible that the table have been two feet to the left of 
where it in fact was are examples of possibility-claims about everyday matters. He 
thinks we need not be sceptical of these claims because, so it seems, these claims are 
not ‘remote from the practical business of everyday life’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 70), 
                                                
134 There are, perhaps, two metaphysically possible stories here. (i) God preserves a whole corpse and 
(ii) God preserves a part of a corpse. This distinction is important but it should not matter for this 
chapter. In this chapter I will assume (i) but my arguments can apply to (ii). To find out more about (ii) 
one should see (Atkinson 2015; Anders 2011). 
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our knowledge of them is ‘non-inferential,’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 70) and, they 
express ‘no intrinsic impossibility’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 70). These claims, then, can 
be taken to be ‘basic’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 73) and, therefore, prima facie justified.135 
I will call the set of propositions that has as its members basic possibility-claims ‘BP.’ 
 
Van Inwagen doubts, however, that philosophers are also prima facie justified in 
asserting possibility-claims that are far-removed from the practical business of 
everyday life. Claims remote from the practical business of everyday life include such 
claims as the claim that it is possible for naturally purple cows to exist. I will call the 
set of propositions that has as its members possibility-claims that are far-removed 
from the practical business of everyday life ‘FP’.136 Van Inwagen thinks that we 
should be sceptical of claims like these because he thinks that ‘we have no sort of 
capacity that would enable us to know’ them (van Inwagen 1998a, 70). Or, to put it 
another way, there is no adequate ‘source’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 73) (or, perhaps, 
combination of sources) that would enable us to know these exotic possibility-claims.  
That said, van Inwagen does, however, think that there is an account of the source of 
modal knowledge that he says ‘has some very attractive features, and is certainly 
more sophisticated than any other account of modal knowledge’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 
76). Moreover, he writes of it that ‘I am inclined to think that if this account is not the 
whole truth of the matter, it contains a great deal of the truth of the matter’(van 
Inwagen 1998a, 81). This account is Yablo’s account and, importantly, (as 
demonstrated above) it is an account that he seems to be assuming in his argument for 
the possibility of resurrection. Even so, however, van Inwagen still thinks that 
Yablo’s account supports modal scepticism. This is because van Inwagen doubts that 
many of the possible worlds that philosophers have imagined, and which they take to 
verify exotic propositions, have been adequately imagined.  
Given that van Inwagen seems to be assuming something like Yablo’s account of 
modal knowledge when putting forward his argument for the possibility of 
                                                
135 It should be noted that van Inwagen does not discuss the justificatory status of basic modal claims as 
I have done. He merely argues that we know these claims non-inferentially. This should not matter for 
my purposes, however, because I assume that for S to know p entails that S is justified in believing p. 
136 I borrow this terminology from (Hawke 2011). 
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resurrection,137 we can now ask a crucial question; has the world w¢ been adequately 
imagined so as to verify p¢? There are two initial responses that can be given. First, if 
w¢ has been adequately imagined then w¢ can feature as a world that can be referred to 
in a conceivability argument verifying p¢ and, van Inwagen, is, consequently, justified 
in asserting the possibility-claim p¢. Second, if w¢ has not been adequately imagined 
then w¢ cannot feature as a world that can be referred to in a conceivability argument 
verifying p¢ and, van Inwagen, is, consequently, not justified in asserting the 
possibility-claim p¢. I will argue that, given van Inwagen’s arguments for his version 
of modal scepticism, w¢ has not been adequately imagined and, consequently, the 
possibility-claim p¢ is among FP.138 Before I attempt to demonstrate that w¢ has not 
been adequately imagined (given his modal scepticism), however, I must first state 
the conditions under which van Inwagen thinks some world w has not been 
adequately imagined.139  
In his paper ‘Modal Epistemology’ van Inwagen, it seems, gives two arguments why 
one should hold that a particular world w has not been adequately imagined. I will call 
these arguments ‘the structural-detail argument’ and ‘the compatibility with not-p 
argument’. Let us consider each argument in turn. 
The structural-detail argument 
First, van Inwagen argues that we have not adequately imagined a world w if our 
imaginings have not ‘take[n] place at a level of structural detail’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 
80). Van Inwagen considers two propositions and two imagined worlds that 
                                                
137 Below (§4) I will consider objections that argue that even though the possibility-claim p¢ seems to 
be among FP it can either: (a) be counted among BP or (b) it is among FP but can be known by 
testimony. There is a third option: (c) it is among FP but can be arrived at by ‘reason—operating on a 
combination of “basic” modal knowledge…and facts about the way the world is put together’ (van 
Inwagen 1998a, 70). But I will not consider this objection here. This is because arguing for (c) would 
require a significant amount of work. This is beyond the bounds of this chapter. 
138 Since writing this paper I have discovered that Trent Dougherty also thinks that van Inwagen’s 
modal scepticism may undermine his (van Inwagen’s) argument for the possibility of the resurrection 
(see (Dougherty 2006)). I hope to have demonstrated not merely that it may undermine his argument 
for the possibility of the resurrection, but that it does. 
139 As Hartl notes, van Inwagen does not give ‘a clear example of a successful justificatory process via 
Yablo-style conceivability’ (Hartl 2016, 275). Van Inwagen only tells us, and gives examples, of 
unsuccessful justificatory processes via Yablo-style conceivability. That is, he only gives examples of 
worlds that do not count as worlds that have been adequately imagined. I must proceed then in the way 
just described. That is, I cannot say what it takes for some world to have been adequately imagined. I 
can say only what it takes for some world not to have been adequately imagined. This, I think, will 
suffice for my purposes. 
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supposedly verify these propositions and demonstrates that these worlds have not 
been imagined at a level of structural detail sufficient to verify those propositions. 
 
First, van Inwagen considers the proposition that naturally purple cows exist. Van 
Inwagen argues that in order to conceive of a world that verifies this proposition we 
would need to imagine ‘a chemically possible purple pigment such that the coding for 
the structures that would be responsible for its production and its proper placement in 
a cow’s coat could be coherently inserted into any DNA that was really cow DNA—
or even—“cow-like-thing-but-for-color” DNA’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 78). Van 
Inwagen, however, is doubtful that anyone has, or can, given our present knowledge, 
perform this imaginative exercise and, in consequence, concludes that, ‘if a 
philosopher has not attempted to do something like this, then that philosopher has not, 
in any useful sense, attempted to imagine a possible world in which there are naturally 
purple cows’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 78). Consequently, van Inwagen concludes that if 
Yablo-style conceivability is true, and if he is right that in the present state of 
knowledge no one is able to imagine a possible world in which there are naturally 
purple cows, then it follows that ‘no one is even prima facie justified in believing that 
naturally purple cows are possible’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 78). 
Second, van Inwagen considers the proposition that transparent iron exists. As with 
the purple-cow case, van Inwagen thinks that the world that the imaginer might take 
to verify this proposition has not been imagined to a sufficient level of structural 
detail. In order to conceive of the existence of transparent iron to a sufficient level of 
structural detail, van Inwagen suggests one would have to imagine a world that 
contains transparent iron with the ‘structural detail comparable to that of the 
imaginings of condensed-matter physicists who are trying to explain, say, the 
phenomenon of superconductivity’(van Inwagen 1998a, 79). Again, van Inwagen 
argues that ‘so far as I know no one has imagined, at the necessary level of structural 
detail, a world—whether its laws are the actual laws or some others—in which there is 
transparent iron’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 79). Again, in conclusion, van Inwagen will 
argue that, given that no one is, in the current state of our knowledge, able to imagine 
a possible world in which there exists transparent iron it then follows that no one is 
even prima facie justified in believing that the production of transparent iron is 
possible. 
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The compatibility with not-p argument 
Van Inwagen offers a second argument why one should hold that a particular world w 
has not been adequately imagined in order to verify some proposition p. Van Inwagen 
argues that we have not adequately imagined a world w that we can take to verify p if 
our imaginings are compatible with its being the case that not-p. 
 
Consider the example of transparent iron again. If our imagining of a world at which 
there exists transparent iron consists of, say, our imagining a world where  
we imagine a Nobel Prize acceptance speech in which the new Nobel laureate 
thanks those who supported him in his long and discouraging quest for 
transparent iron and displays to a cheering crowd something that looks (in our 
imaginations) like a chunk of glass, we shall indeed have imagined a world, 
but it will not be a world in which there is transparent iron (van Inwagen 
1998a, 79).  
This is because this imagined scenario is compatible with, for instance, the 
background scenario that transparent iron does not exist, but the scientific community 
has somehow been deceived into thinking that it does. The Nobel-Prize winning 
scientist might, for example, merely be holding up a pane of glass while everybody in 
the room believes that it is transparent iron. 
The compatibility-with-not-p argument functions in two ways. First, it functions as an 
argument, on its own, to establish that some imagined world w has not been 
sufficiently imagined so as to verify p. Second, however, it also functions as an 
argument to support the structural-detail argument. That is, one might ask the 
question ‘how do we know when we’ve imagined some world w to a sufficient level 
of structural detail so as to verify p?’. One response is to ask the question ‘is this 
scenario compatible with not-p?’. If it is then one, according to van Inwagen, has 
certainly not imagined the scenario to a sufficient level of structural detail. 
This still leaves the following question open, however: how do we know when we’ve 
imagined some world w to a sufficient level of structural detail so as to verify p when 
it is not clear whether or not w is compatible with not-p?. Van Inwagen does not give 
an explicit answer to this question. However, given what he says in ‘Modal 
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Epistemology’, I think we can conclude that it would be something along the lines of 
the following:  
Has the imaginer imagined w to the level of structural detail that an expert in 
the relevant scientific field concerned with verifying p would have imagined 
w?  
If the answer is ‘yes’ then p has been verified; if ‘no’ then it has not. I say this 
because van Inwagen’s two examples (the example of the purple cow and the example 
of the transparent iron) both require the imaginer to have imagined the world to the 
level of structural detail that an expert in the relevant field of scientific enquiry would 
have imagined that world. In the transparent-iron example, for instance, van Inwagen 
says that in order to be justified in asserting that it is possible that transparent iron 
exists one would have to imagine a world that contains transparent iron with the 
‘structural detail comparable to that of the imaginings of condensed-matter physicists’ 
(van Inwagen 1998a, 80). Moreover, in the case of the naturally purple cow van 
Inwagen argues that he doubts the philosopher has imagined the world at which there 
is a naturally purple cow to the level of structural detail concerning ‘the coding 
structures that would be responsible for [the purple pigment and] its production and 
its proper placement in a cow’s coat’ (van Inwagen 1998a, 78). This is a level of 
detail that, I would expect, could be achieved only by a scientist working in the area 
of genetics or microbiology. In sum, it seems that, according to van Inwagen, for any 
proposition p, if the imagined world w that one takes to verify p has not been 
imagined to a sufficient level of structural detail, or is compatible with not-p, then the 
possibility-claim p should be considered among FP.  
Modal scepticism and the possibility of the resurrection 
We can now return to our question: does the possibility-claim p¢ belong to FP? Given 
my above discussion in order to answer this question we need to answer the following 
further questions. First, ‘has the world w¢ that verifies p¢ been imagined to a sufficient 
level of structural detail?’. Second, ‘has w¢ been imagined to a sufficient level of 
structural detail such that it rules out the compatibility of w¢ with not-p¢?’. 
 
The answer to the first question, prima facie, seems to be ‘no’. One reason for this is 
that we are still left with several questions about the details of w¢ that remain 
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unanswered. What does it take for God to remove some organism O’s corpse? What 
does it take for God to replace O’s corpse with a simulacrum? Are we to believe that 
van Inwagen has imagined this scenario in some structural detail comparable to that 
of the imaginings of, say, an astrophysicist examining the pressures and strains on an 
organism traveling to the outer reaches of space? Are we to believe that van Inwagen 
has imagined the preservation processes that God would have to carry out in order to 
preserve a corpse for thousands of years that would enable it to have its life begin 
again? 
Posing these questions does not demonstrate that van Inwagen has not imagined w¢ to 
a sufficient level of structural detail so as to verify p¢, nor does it demonstrate that 
imagining w¢ is compatible with its being the case that not-p¢. To do this we need to 
point out where the relevant detail is lacking in the story and/or describe how it is that 
w¢ is compatible with not-p¢. I think there are many areas of detail that one would 
expect to find (but that we do not get) in van Inwagen’s simulacrum story that, given 
further discussion, might lead to our viewing w¢ as not having been imagined to a 
sufficient level of detail so as to verify p¢, or might lead to our thinking that w¢ is 
compatible with not-p¢. It is sufficient for our purposes, however, to point out just one 
area of van Inwagen’s simulacrum story that has not been adequately imagined. In 
what follows, I focus on the preservation and resuscitation of the corpse.  
A part of God’s task, according to the simulacrum story, would be to preserve the 
corpses of the dead such that the processes of biological decay would stop before 
progressing too far. How will God preserve the corpses of the dead? Van Inwagen’s 
simulacrum story does not tell us. Cryogenic freezing, however, seems to be the best 
candidate explanation that we have to help us conceive of this scenario. I say this for 
two reasons. First, cryogenic freezing seems to be a method that lends itself well to 
the task of explaining how God could preserve the corpses. Second, the example of a 
cryogenically frozen corpse is the only example that van Inwagen gives of a corpse 
that has been preserved in a way that is sufficient for the continuation of that 
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particular corpse’s life.140 Upon the cryopreservation of a cat, for example, van 
Inwagen writes,  
I find it attractive to suppose that the cat’s life persists even when the cat is 
frozen. I would describe the frozen cat’s life this way: Before the cat was 
frozen, its life consisted mostly of chemical reactions and various relatively 
large-scale physical processes (the breaking and establishing of chemical 
bonds, the movement of fluids under hydraulic pressure, the transport of ions); 
when the cat was frozen, its life was ‘squeezed into’ various small-scale 
physical processes (the orbiting of electrons and the exchange of photons by 
charged particles.) Its life became the sum of those subchemical changes that 
underlie and constitute chemical and large-scale physical unchange. But the 
life was there, disposed to expand into its normal state at the moment 
sufficient energy should become available to it. I, who am fond of oxymorons, 
would describe the frozen cat as a living corpse (van Inwagen 1990, 147). 
What is it about a particular cryogenically frozen corpse that is sufficient for the 
persistence of its life? It seems that, according to van Inwagen, it is the ‘various 
small-scale physical processes’ that are sufficient for the continuation of that corpse’s 
life. That is, even though these ‘small-scale physical processes’ (e.g., the orbiting of 
electrons and the exchange of photons by charged particles) are not equivalent to the 
‘large-scale physical processes’ (e.g., the breaking and establishing of chemical 
bonds, the movement of fluids under hydraulic pressure, the transport of ions) that are 
typical of life, the life, as van Inwagen notes, is still ‘there’. Consequently, van 
Inwagen calls a corpse that has been frozen before the processes of biological decay 
have progressed too far a ‘living corpse’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147). 
Van Inwagen realizes, however, that there are some who may argue that because the 
large-scale physical processes that are typical of a life have ceased, it is contrived to 
say that the organism that has been cryogenically frozen (a living corpse) ‘is alive’ 
(van Inwagen 1990, 147). In consequence, van Inwagen allows it to be the case that 
                                                
140William Hasker also supplies van Inwagen’s God with this method. He notes, ‘[a]t death, God plays 
the part of the practitioners of cryonics, placing the body in suspension to prevent further damage or 
deterioration. Then at the resurrection, God assumes the role of the future medical rescuers: he 
reanimates the corpse, heals its fatal injury or illness, and puts the revitalized person on the road to a 
fuller life’ (Hasker 1999, 223). 
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one can say of an organism that has been cryogenically frozen that its life has been 
‘suspended’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147). Van Inwagen writes that ‘in general, a life has 
been suspended if it has ceased and the simples that were caught up in it at the 
moment it ceased retain—owing to the mere absence of disruptive forces—their 
individual properties and relations to one another’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147). 
Accordingly, we might say that an organism whose life has been suspended (not 
disrupted) can have its life begin again, but because its life has ceased (i.e., the large-
scale physical processes typical of life have ceased) we can say that the organism is 
dead.141  
This distinction between a life that has been squeezed and is still there and a life that 
has been suspended is, I think, purely terminological. The ontological nature of a 
corpse that has had its life suspended is the same as a corpse that has had its life 
squeezed. The simples that compose a corpse that has had its life squeezed and the 
simples that compose a corpse that has had its life suspended both possess the same 
(type) ‘small-scale physical processes’. The difference is just that there is, for those 
who prefer to say that the life has been suspended, a ‘stipulative sharpening of the 
meaning of “alive”’ (van Inwagen 1990, 147). For the sake of argument, I will adopt 
van Inwagen’s interlocutor’s stipulative sharpening and continue to refer to organisms 
that have had been cryogenically frozen as organisms whose lives have been 
suspended. 
This is where the problem arises for van Inwagen. A corpse that has not been 
cryogenically frozen also possesses persistent ‘small-scale physical processes’ at, for 
example, the subatomic level. The simples that virtually compose a corpse whose life 
has been disrupted, for example, still constitute various kinds of small-scale physical 
processes, and are involved in activity such as the orbiting of electrons and the 
exchange of photons by charged particles. This being the case, as Jason Eberl notes, 
although  
[v]an Inwagen shares the general intuition that the persistent microlevel 
activity of an unfrozen corpse is insufficient to characterize it as alive…[h]e 
                                                
141 This point is contested. See, for example, (Gilmore 2013). One may argue that (as Gilmore does) in 
this case the organism should be classified as neither dead nor alive. For the purposes of fulfilling van 
Inwagen’s requirement that all those who share in the sin of Adam must die, however, I will classify 
cryogenic freezing as a form of death. 
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allows…the same level of activity in a cryopreserved body to suffice as the 
life—and the numerically same life—as the organism before its macrolevel 
life functions were suspended. The only difference van Inwagen cites to 
differentiate the two cases is that the microlevel activity of a cryopreserved 
body is ‘disposed to expand into its normal state at the moment sufficient 
energy should become available to it’ (Eberl 2008, 71).  
That is, according to van Inwagen, the cryogenically frozen corpse and the corpse that 
has not been cryogenically frozen are, at least given our current imaginative powers, 
structurally indistinguishable. 
So, the answer to the question whether the world w¢ that verifies p¢ has been imagined 
to a sufficient level of structural detail seems to be ‘no’. Van Inwagen has not told us 
what it is about the cryogenically preserved corpse (i.e., anything about the intrinsic 
properties and relations between the simples that compose the cryogenically 
preserved corpse) that enables it to have its suspended life begin again that does not 
also go for a corpse that has not been cryogenically frozen. One might think, though, 
that in order adequately to have imagined the preservation process to a sufficient level 
of structural detail so as to verify p¢ one should be able to imagine what it is about the 
two corpses (a corpse that has been cryogenically frozen and a corpse that has not) 
that enables one, and not the other, to have its life begin again. After all, this is just 
the level of structural detail that van Inwagen, it seems, requires other philosophers to 
give of other imagined worlds.  
Take, for example, van Inwagen’s case of the naturally purple cow. Many know 
(some in more detail than others) that there is something about a particular cow’s 
DNA that disposes it to be a cow with certain pigmentation. Moreover, many share 
the general intuition that if we were to change the relevant section of a cow’s DNA it 
would change that cow’s colour. But we do not know, precisely, what it would take 
for, say, purple pigmentation to be inserted into any cow DNA or ‘cow-like-thing-but-
for-colour’ DNA. Likewise, many share the intuition that it is something about the 
microlevel activity of a cryogenically frozen corpse that disposes it to have its 
suspended life begin again. We do not, however, know what it is, at the level of 
structural detail concerning the properties and relations between the simples that 
compose a cryogenically frozen corpse, that enables it to be disposed to have its 
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suspended life begin again. Since I doubt that any philosopher has imagined what it is 
about a cryogenically preserved corpse that disposes it to have its suspended life 
begin again, I suggest that, if we accept a version of van Inwagen’s modal scepticism, 
we should not accept that the simulacrum story establishes that it is possible for God 
to preserve the corpse of a human organism in such a way as to ensure that it can have 
its suspended life begin again. 
Whether or not one accepts my argument to demonstrate that w¢ has not been 
imagined to a sufficient level of structural detail to verify p¢ on van Inwagen’s own 
terms, there is a further difficulty for van Inwagen. This difficulty concerns the 
question whether the world w¢ that verifies p¢ has been imagined in such a way as to 
rule out the compatibility of w¢ with not-p¢. In other words, are there any other 
propositions that are consistent with not-p¢ but that are also consistent with one’s 
imagining w¢? 
I think there are. Take the proposition p¢¢ that is consistent with not-p¢: God, on the 
day of resurrection, causes the simples that virtually compose a particular corpse that 
he has kept for safekeeping to be caught up in a new life.  
In order to demonstrate that w¢ is consistent with p¢¢ let us assume, again, that God’s 
chosen method of preservation is cryogenic freezing. As mentioned above, however, 
we do not know what it is about the simples that compose a cryogenically frozen 
organism that enable it to have its suspended life begin again, and what it is about the 
simples that virtually compose a non-cryogenically frozen corpse that does not enable 
it to have its life begin again. Since this is the case, it is compatible with our 
imagining w¢ that the corpse that God resurrects does not in fact meet the relevant 
conditions for having its life restarted again (since we do not know what it would take 
for any corpse to meet these conditions). In consequence, it may be the case that, 
while we think that we have imagined God’s preserving a corpse whose life has been 
suspended, we have actually imagined God’s preserving a corpse whose life has not 
been suspended but disrupted; a (virtual) corpse that has been subject to the normal 
room-temperature processes of biological decay sufficient for disruption and has, 
perhaps, then been frozen. The simples that virtually compose a corpse such as this, 
upon resurrection, will get caught up in a new life, a life started by God’s miracle. 
Consequently, in this case, we have not imagined a case of resurrection, but a case of 
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God’s bringing a new organism into existence. We have imagined p¢¢: that God, on 
the day of resurrection, causes the simples that virtually compose a particular corpse 
that he has kept for safekeeping to be caught up in a new life. 
In this respect the simulacrum story seems comparable to the transparent-iron case. 
Just as the Nobel-prize-winning scientist holds up a (supposed) piece of transparent 
iron, and this is consistent with its being the case that he is not holding up a piece of 
transparent iron but a pane of glass, so too our imagining God’s resurrecting a human 
organism according to w¢ is consistent with God’s giving a pile of simples arranged 
humanwise (that were once caught up in a life) a new life. 
This brings me to the end of my argument. If my argument is correct, it establishes 
that van Inwagen should be sceptical of the possibility-claim p¢ and, if this is the case, 
then van Inwagen has not, as he aimed, ‘establish[ed] a possibility’ (van Inwagen 
1998b, 50).142 
Objections 
There are several objections that van Inwagen could make to my argument. I will state 
each objection before offering a response. 
 
Objection 1: Van Inwagen may respond by arguing that he never says that cryogenic 
freezing is the method that God uses to preserve a corpse, so any objection that I 
mount against his metaphysics of the resurrection that turns on the nature of a 
cryogenically frozen corpse is to attack a straw man.  
Response: Two things must be noted in response. First, as mentioned above, I 
supplied van Inwagen’s God with the process of cryogenic freezing because a corpse 
that has been cryogenically frozen is the only example that he gives of an organism 
that has had its life cease but has not had its life disrupted and so can have its life 
restarted. So, in the absence of any description of this preservation process, I use a 
process that van Inwagen affirms is plausible. Second, even if we remove cryogenic 
freezing from the story, my argument still stands. Perhaps I merely imagine a human 
organism floating free in space that is seemingly not undergoing any processes of 
                                                
142 This, of course, requires something like the following to be true: for any proposition p, S cannot 
take p to have been ‘established’ if S is sceptical of the possible truth of p. I take this to be 
uncontroversial. 
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decay. My imagining this scenario (sans cryogenic freezing) is still compatible with 
its being the case that this corpse was once a human organism that has now had its life 
disrupted. If this is the case then my then imagining this organism’s subsequent 
animation is not my imagining God’s bringing the organism that has died back to life, 
but God’s causing the simples that virtually compose this organism’s corpse to get 
caught up into a new life. 
Objection 2: Van Inwagen may argue that one could be justified in asserting the 
possible truth p¢ even though S cannot imagine a world that verifies p¢ because God, 
for example, through Scripture, has told her that p¢ is true and God, being infallible, 
cannot be mistaken about p¢. 
Response: In reply, we can simply point out that Scripture does not tell us that p¢ is 
possible. Scripture does tell us that the resurrection is possible but it does not tell us 
that materialism with regard to the human person is possibly true (or that the 
resurrection given a materialist account of the human person is possibly true). 
Consequently, given that van Inwagen’s materialist metaphysics of the human person 
makes the resurrection seem impossible (even for an omnipotent being) to achieve, in 
order to be justified in asserting the possible truth of p¢ Scripture would need to tell us 
that materialism is possibly true (as well as tell us that the resurrection is possible). 
Objection 3: van Inwagen may respond by arguing that the possibility-claim p¢ is not, 
in fact, far-removed at all, but can be counted among BP.  
Response: Responding to the claim that the possibility-claim p¢ is among BP is 
difficult, not least because van Inwagen does not explicitly give us any necessary 
and/or sufficient conditions for saying when a certain possibility-claim can be counted 
among BP,143 besides stating that a possibility-claim can be counted among BP if it is 
a claim about the ‘ordinary,’ is known ‘non-inferentially’ and contains no ‘intrinsic 
impossibility’.  
There is, however, a response. One can note that this would certainly be a strange 
response to come from van Inwagen. If he thought that the possibility-claim p¢ was 
                                                
143 He writes, for example, ‘how do we know “simple, obvious” modal statements to be true? What is 
the ground of “basic” modal knowledge? I do not know how to answer these questions’ (van Inwagen 
1998a, 74). 
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among BP then he should not need to go to the trouble of telling a story that verifies 
p¢. Furthermore, it seems as though van Inwagen does need to tell such a story. As 
mentioned above given his materialist metaphysics of the human person ‘it is 
absolutely impossible, even as an accomplishment of God, that a man who has been 
burned to ashes or been eaten by worms should ever live again’ (van Inwagen 1998b, 
48). Since it certainly seems that some human organisms or, at least, their remains, 
will be eaten by worms, this does seem to demonstrate, given van Inwagen’s 
metaphysics, that it is absolutely impossible for God to restore these human 
organisms to existence. The assertion of the possibility-claim p¢, therefore, needs 
some sort of justification if it is to believed in the light of van Inwagen’s materialist 
metaphysics. 
Objection 4: van Inwagen might point out that, since conceivability arguments are 
subject-dependent, and given that what one subject takes to verify some proposition 
may be different from what another subject takes to verify that same proposition, w¢ 
can still serve to justify the assertion of the possible truth of p¢, so long as a particular 
subject takes w¢ to verify p¢. That is, so long as that particular subject is not a modal 
sceptic. 
Response: In response we should note that my aim in this section has only been to 
show that one cannot simultaneously accept van Inwagen’s modal scepticism and van 
Inwagen’s argument as put forward in ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’. This, I think, 
has been achieved. It is, unfortunately, outside the scope of this Chapter to argue in 
favour of modal scepticism (or something relevantly similar). In consequence, I leave 
it up to the reader to decide whether or not she finds van Inwagen’s modal scepticism 
(or something similar) independently plausible.144  
In sum, van Inwagen, in his argument for the possibility of the resurrection, fails to 
establish that it is possible for God to resurrect human organisms. This is because the 
world that van Inwagen describes in order to verify that it is possible for God to 
                                                
144 I might add that there is a strong precedent for modal scepticism of a van Inwagenian sort, 
especially concerning matters of personal identity across time. As Paul Snowdon, for example, notes 
when considering the brain-transplant intuition, ‘[t]he link between imaginability and genuine 
metaphysical possibility has been thoroughly debated recently, with the result, as I see it, that 
imaginability cannot be taken as a guide to possibility’ (Snowdon 2014, 207). See also (Wilkes 1993; 
Gendler 2002). 
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resurrect human organisms has neither been imagined in a sufficient amount of 
structural detail nor imagined in a way that rules out the possibility of its being the 
case that God does not resurrect a human organism, but only brings a new organism 
into existence. 
8.2 Moderate modal scepticism and the possibility of life after death 
The above argument is an ad hominem argument: it is an argument against van 
Inwagen and van Inwagen alone (or, at least, those who accept something very similar 
to van Inwagenian modal scepticism). Ad hominem arguments are risky because their 
scope is narrow. By refuting van Inwagen on his own terms I leave out of 
consideration all of those folk who accept that materialism is possibly true and that 
one of the simulacrum models is possibly true (i.e., those who are not modal sceptics 
since no one to my mind has demonstrated that the simulacrum models are 
incoherent). In fact, one may argue that van Inwagen’s interlocutors will probably not 
be modal sceptics. They will probably not be modal sceptics because they may need 
controversial modal premises (of the kind the sceptic will refuse) to justify their belief 
in the existence of, for example, souls.145 Not only this, however, but it seems to me 
that at least one of van Inwagen’s arguments for modal scepticism is flawed. In 
particular, I think that van Inwagen’s modal scepticism proves too much. Here is why. 
 
Take the compatibility with not-p argument mentioned above. We can state this 
argument formally as follows. 
Let ‘p’ stand for any non-modal proposition and ‘P’ be the modal form of that 
proposition. For example, if p1=flying pigs exist, then P1= it is possible flying pigs 
exist.   
 
(1d) One can justifiably assert some modal proposition P if one has imagined a 
situation, S, that one takes to verify p (this is a form of Yablo-style 
conceivability (cf. Yablo 1993)).   
                                                
145 I should add that I do not appeal to any modal arguments to justify my belief in the existence of a 
soul and so it is not necessary that one need not be a modal sceptic if one is to believe in the existence 
of the soul.  
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(2d) If S is compatible with not-p, then one should not take S to be a situation that 
verifies p. 
(3d) If p is an extraordinary proposition then the imagined situation S is likely to 
be compatible with both p and not-p. 
Therefore, 
(4d) One should be sceptical that one can justifiably assert an extraordinary modal 
proposition P if one takes oneself to be justified in asserting P in virtue of 
one’s imagining a situation, S, that one takes to verify p.   
There is, however, a major problem with this argument (and arguments of this type). 
The problem is that they prove too much. Put simply, if one accepts that the argument 
is sound then one has reason to be sceptical about some of the more mundane modal 
claims; modal claims that the modal sceptic does not want to be sceptical about.    
 
Take, for example, the claim that it is possible that John F. Kennedy died from natural 
causes.146 Let us say that I take myself justifiably to assert this claim by imagining a 
situation in which John F. Kennedy is old, lying on his bed and takes his final breath. 
If the above argument is sound, however, one should be sceptical of this claim. This is 
because this situation is compatible with, say, John F. Kennedy’s having been 
poisoned. In this case, we should not take ourselves to be justified in asserting some 
of the more mundane modal propositions —modal claims that van Inwagen takes us 
to be justified in asserting. 
 
There is, primarily, one reason for instability: current sceptical arguments place too 
strict a constraint on the sources of our modal knowledge. For example, in order to 
imagine a situation at which p is true one needs to imagine a situation in such a way 
as to ensure that it is incompatible with not-p. This is an overly demanding task for 
reasons given above; even imagining situations that we take to verify relatively 
                                                
146 Geirsson (2005) makes a similar point to the point I am making here. Geirsson, however, takes the 
structural-detail argument (or what he calls the ‘completeness argument’) as his target. 
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quotidian modal claims do not meet this constraint. For this reason, van Inwagen’s 
argument for modal scepticism is flawed.147    
 
There are two ways by which one can progress, however. First, one could come up 
with a more modest argument for modal scepticism that is not unstable but still rules 
out one’s justifiably asserting possibly p¢. Second one could reject modal scepticism 
but still hold that van Inwagen does not succeed at achieving another, perhaps more 
important aim. I will consider both. 
First, there are other arguments for modal scepticism that do not fall prey to the 
charge of instability. Peter Kung (2010) argues that assignment is the central problem 
with our using the imagination as a source of our modal knowledge. It is assignment 
that, I think, occurs when one imagines scenarios at which certain far-removed 
propositions are true. I will rehearse Kung’s account of the imagination now. 
As mentioned, I take the standard account of the imagination as the source of our 
modal knowledge to be Yablo’s (1993) account. Put simply, it can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
For any proposition, p, S is prima facie justified in asserting the possible truth 
of p (i.e., P) if S takes herself to have imagined a world that verifies p.  
 
Importantly,it should be noted that I assume that some subject S’s relation to some 
imagined world, w, at which p is true is an evidential one.148 By this I mean that S 
takes w to be evidence that P. While it is an evidential relation, however, it is a strong 
evidential relation. After all, merely having evidence that some proposition P is true 
does not mean that one should take P to be verified by that evidence. Verification of 
some proposition P requires a preponderance of evidence for P over evidence against 
P. Evidence that, let us say, makes P probable for one with respect to one’s total 
evidence set excluding that proposition. 
                                                
147 I think that this argument can be amended once one takes into account the prior probability of one’s 
hypothesis. I will not pursue this line of thought here, however, as it would take me too far from the 
main aim of this thesis. 
148 As far as I am aware this is the standard understanding. Both Kung (2010) and Geirsson (2005), for 
example, understand it this way. 
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Whether or not Yablo’s account is true,149 I understand Yablo’s account to be a 
plausible description of what happens when philosophers take some imagining to be a 
guide to the possibility of some proposition. The question to which I will now turn is 
this: what is it that happens when philosophers imagine worlds that they take to verify 
p? I will begin by considering the most prolific kind of imagining, and the kind of 
imagining that I understand philosophers to be using when they take themselves to be 
justified in asserting, say, modal propositions that are remote from the practical 
business of everyday life: visual imagining. I should note that what I say for visual 
imagining below can go for any kind of sensory imagining e.g., auditory imagining, 
olfactory imagining etc. I will consider non-sensory imagining after visual imagining.  
 
Visual imagining involves mental imagery.150 Let us say that I want justifiably to 
believe that it is possible for me to run out Aaron Finch during a cricket match. To do 
so, according to Yablo, I could imagine a possible world that I take to verify this 
proposition. Let us say that I visualize (i.e., ‘picture’ or ‘bring before my mind’s eye’ 
a mental image of) a batsman in cricket whites on a cricket field hitting a cricket ball. 
I also visualize the batsman opposite running for the wicket. I also visualize a fielder, 
myself, picking the ball off the grass and throwing it at the wicket before the batsman 
can make it across the crease.  
 
Kung asks about a similar imagining ‘[h]ow should we theorize what you imagine, 
the content of your imagining?’ (Kung 2016b, 107). Following Kung we can reply 
that some of the content was basic qualitative content. It comes from the image itself: 
that the batsman’s kit is white and that the cricket ball is red, for example. Much of 
my imagining’s content, however, is not basic qualitative content but assigned. I 
imagine that it is I, Thom Atkinson, picking up the ball. I am imagining that it is a 
cricket match that I am playing in and not, for example, a game of quick-cricket with 
a few friends. There is nothing about the basic qualitative content of my imagining 
                                                
149 That is, whether or not one is, in fact, prima facie justified in asserting the possible truth of p if one 
has imagined a world that one takes to verify p. 
150 I should add that I wish to remain neutral here with regards to the debate over whether or not mental 
imagery consists in representational brain states. 
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that confirms these supposed facts; they are assigned by me to the imagining.151 The 
central difference between basic qualitative content and assigned content is that basic 
qualitative content is a part of your mental image while assigned content is not. 
 
Assigned content comes in two forms: labels and stipulations. When one makes an 
assignment about the basic qualitative content of a certain imagining one can do so by 
labelling that content. For example, when I imagine the fielder who successfully 
throws the ball at the wicket as being me —Thom Atkinson—	I am labelling that 
fielder <Thom Atkinson>. There is nothing especially distinctive about my mental 
image that makes it the case that the fielder is Thom Atkinson, but there is some basic 
qualitative content to my imagining that I can label <Thom Atkinson>. One can also 
make an assignment that is independent of the basic qualitative content of the 
imagining altogether. When this occurs we can say that one is making a stipulation. 
For example, when I assign that my imagining is happening during a cricket match. 
There is no part of my mental image that I can label <during a cricket match>. Both 
labelled and stipulated content is non-pictorial.  
 
It is assignment that makes trouble for modal epistemology. The central problem is 
that ‘non-pictorial content does not provide evidence for metaphysical possibility’ 
(Kung 2016a, 234). The reason for this is that there are very few constraints, if any, 
on what we can assign to a specific imagining, and what ‘constraints there are have no 
modal evidential value’ (Kung 2016b, 110). Kung demonstrates that what constraints 
there are have no modal evidential value by comparing the constraints on our basic 
qualitative content to the constraints on our assigned content. 
 
There is one fairly obvious constraint on our basic qualitative content. Kung notes 
that the basic qualitative content of our imaginings is ‘constrained by what kind of 
mental imagery we can produce’ (Kung 2016b, 110). Take, for example, the 
proposition: it is possible that there exists a square circle. Kung notes that we cannot 
visualize a shape that is both round and square. 
 
                                                
151 I agree with Kung that this is not a two-stage process. One does not imagine basic qualitative 
content and then assign certain facts to that content. 
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Assignments, however, have no constraints that are of any worth for modal 
epistemology. (I will consider one possible constraint below). The problem with this 
is that ‘[i]f assignment has no constraints at all —if for any p, we can imagine that p 
via assignment—	then imagining via assignment provides no evidence for possibility 
because it fails to discriminate between possible and impossible ps’ (Kung 2016b, 
110). In fact, as Kung points out, ‘assignment makes imagining the impossible 
possible’ (Kung 2016b, 110). Most of us, for example, take ourselves to be able to 
imagine Back to the Future. That is, we take ourselves (problems concerning fictional 
entities aside) to be able to image a world at which the following proposition is true: 
Marty McFly travels back in time to 1955 and changes his father from a loser into a 
confident leader (cf. Kung 2010, 621–622). But what we have imagined is impossible; 
no one can change the past. Kung’s theory accurately explains why. Part of the 
imagined content is stipulated; in particular we imagine that we have a case of ‘time 
travel by stipulating in some scenes that it is 1955…again’ (Kung 2010, 622). 
 
Kung does, however, go on to consider one possible constraint on our assigned 
contents, and demonstrates that it has no modal evidential value. One possible 
constraint on our assignments is absolute certainty.152 Kung asserts that if we are 
absolutely certain that some proposition p is false then we will not be able to imagine 
a world at which p is true and vice versa.153 Kung gives the example of imagining that 
2 = 2. Many of us cannot imagine it to be the case that ‘2 = 2’ is false. Kung argues 
that because we are absolutely certain that 2 = 2, we cannot imagine a world at which 
it is false. Likewise, if we are ‘absolutely certain’ that some proposition is false, we 
cannot imagine a world at which it is true. He goes on to point out, however, that if 
there are no constraints other than certainty on our being able to visually imagine 
some world at which p is true, then what makes us able to assign p to some imagining 
is, seemingly, our mere lack of certainty that not-p. But here is the central problem: 
one’s not being certain about the truth of not-p cannot be ‘counted as evidence of p’s 
possibility’ (Kung 2016b, 111). In consequence, if some proposition p is true at some 
                                                
152 By ‘absolute certainty’ Kung means ‘the strongest possible psychological certainty: to have no 
doubts at all, for there to be nothing one is more certain of. This kind of certainty marks the cogito and 
very few other propositions’ (Kung 2016b, 110–111). 
153 One may argue that this seems wrong. For example, one may be absolutely certain that one exists 
but one may find it easy to imagine a world at which they do not exist. I refer the reader to Kung’s 
response to this point. See (Kung 2010, 629–630). 
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imagined world w and this follows from S’s assignment alone, then w cannot be taken 
as a world that verifies p.  
 
At this point we should acknowledge that we cannot escape intuition here. When we 
bring before our minds a possible world, w, at which it seems to us that p is true we 
can ask the question: what source are we using to evaluate the possible world, w, as 
evidence for P? I agree with Kung (2010, 650–652) that it must be intuition. Or, at 
least, I do not know what else it could be.154   
 
I can now, briefly, return to non-sensory imagining. Non-sensory imagining is 
imagining that contains no imagery. As David Chalmers notes, ‘[t]here is a sense in 
which we can imagine situations that do not seem to be potential contents of 
perceptual experiences’ (Chalmers 2002, 151). Take, for example, my imagining ‘the 
existence of an invisible being that leaves no trace on perception’ (Chalmers 2002, 
151). In this case I do not (and perhaps cannot) form a mental image of this invisible 
being. Nevertheless, as Chalmers notes, when imagining p in a non-sensory way ‘we 
do more than merely suppose that [p], or entertain the hypothesis that [p]. Our relation 
to [p] has a mediated objectual character that is analogous to that found in the case of 
perceptual imaginability’ (Chalmers 2002, 151). Occurrences of non-sensory 
imagining, given what I have said above, however, cannot verify some modal 
proposition P. This is because non-sensory imagining is merely imagining by 
stipulation. I merely stipulate that p is true at some possible world w; there is no 
pictorial content to my imagining that I take to be evidence that P.155 
 
This is not to say, however, that the imagination cannot provide evidence for the 
possible truth of some proposition p. In particular, some imagining may provide 
evidence for possibility on two occasions. First, when there is no assigned content to 
one’s imagining. Take, for example, the proposition that there exists a three-sided 
shape. In order justifiably to assert the possible truth of this proposition one may 
                                                
154 As Colin McGinn recognises, it could not be perception. He writes, ‘[i]magining that p is not a 
special case of perceiving that p, since it is not a type of perceiving at all’ (McGinn 2004, 146). 
155 I should note that I realise that there are, discussed in the literature, forms of nonimaginative 
conceiving. They are not considered in this paper. My reason for not considering them is the same as 
Kung’s; I remain suspicious of them ‘[u]ntil we have a…satisfying account of what nonimaginative 
conceiving is’ (Kung 2010, 657). 
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attempt, among other things, to imagine a possible world at which this proposition is 
true. One could, for example, visually imagine a three-sided shape. This imagining 
seems to verify the possible truth of the proposition that there exists a three-sided 
shape, and this imagining does not contain any assignments.156 
 
Second, some imagining may provide evidence for possibility when the assigned 
content of one’s imagining has been independently corroborated or, as Kung notes, 
‘authenticated’ (Kung 2010, 642). Take, for example, my imagining running Aaron 
Finch out during a cricket match. My imagining this scenario (as described above) 
may be authenticated. I have a reason (independent of my mental image) to think that 
the assigned content of my mental image is metaphysically possible. My reasons may 
be twofold. First, I may know via some other source that some assigned content of my 
mental image is metaphysically possible. For example, I may have it on good 
authority (via testimony) that Aaron Finch actually exists and so is metaphysically 
possible. Second, I may be able to engage in a further imaginative exercise, say, 
imagining another possible world at which the assigned content of my original 
imagining is not itself assigned. 
 
Likewise, my imagining that John F. Kennedy died from natural causes may be taken 
as evidence that it is possible that John F. Kennedy died from natural causes. The 
reason for this is that the assigned content of my imagining can easily be 
independently corroborated. I know that it is metaphysically possible that John F. 
Kennedy exist because I know that he actually did exist. I also know that it is 
metaphysically possible for human beings to die from natural causes and that John F. 
Kennedy was a human being. 
 
The fact that the imagination can, on occasion, provide evidence for some 
proposition’s possibility, however, is consistent with van Inwagen’s argument. As 
Peter Hartl (a recent critic of van Inwagen157) points out, van Inwagen allows it to be 
                                                
156 Hartl notes that van Inwagen does not give ‘a clear example of a successful justificatory process via 
Yablo-style conceivability’ (Hartl 2016, 275). I take the case just mentioned to be one.  
157 My primary aim is to respond to Geirsson and not Hartl. This is primarily because Hartl’s criticism 
of van Inwagen is, to a large extent, the same as Geirsson’s. Moreover, Hartl is engaging, it seems to 
me, primarily with Peter Hawke’s modal epistemology or van Inwagen’s ‘completeness argument’. I 
attempt to defend neither Hawke’s position nor the completeness argument.  
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the case (at least implicitly) that the imagination ‘can in principle be a guide to 
possibility’ (Hartl 2016, 271). What van Inwagen contests is that the imagination can 
be a guide to the possibility of propositions that are far-removed from the practical 
business of everyday life and, I take it, that my running Aaron Finch out during a 
cricket match is not far-removed from the practical business of everyday life. It is not, 
for example, at the periphery of scientific investigation or in the realm of 
metaphysical debate (I hope). 
 
All of this, I think, provides us with a reason for endorsing a form of modal 
scepticism.158 Given the above account it is clear, I think, why: the possible truth of 
some modal proposition P that is about matters that are remote from the practical 
business of everyday life will probably follow from the assigned content of one’s 
imagining alone. Moreover, these assignments will probably not be amenable to 
authentication or, at least, authenticating one’s assigned content is rarely, if ever, an 
operative factor in the philosopher’s justifying some modal claim via imagination.  
 
Take, for example, the two modal propositions that van Inwagen focuses on in his 
paper, j: it is possible that there exists a naturally purple cow and k: it is possible that 
there exists transparent iron. In order justifiably to assert j one may visually imagine, 
say, a purple cow standing in a field. The problem is that imagining that this cow is 
naturally purple follows from an assignment alone. It follows, in particular, from the 
stipulation that the cow’s being purple is natural. Likewise, in order justifiably to 
assert k one may visually imagine a  
 
Nobel Prize acceptance speech in which the new Nobel laureate thanks those 
who supported him in his long and discouraging quest for transparent iron and 
displays to a cheering crowd something that looks (in our imaginations) like a 
chunk of glass (van Inwagen 1998a, 79).  
 
The problem is that imagining that what the Nobel laureate is holding up is iron 
                                                
158 Kung does not think that his account supports modal scepticism of a ‘pervasive’ or ‘thoroughgoing’ 
(Kung 2016a, 241) sort. If by this he means that his account does not support radical modal scepticism 
(i.e., scepticism with regards to all modal propositions) then I agree. On the other hand, if he means 
that he does not think his account supports scepticism about some philosophers’ justifiably asserting a 
modal proposition that belongs to FP, then I take this Chapter, in part, to demonstrate that he is wrong. 
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follows from assignment alone; in particular, our labelling the object that the Nobel 
laureate is holding up <iron>. Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that anyone, given 
our current state of knowledge, will be able to authenticate the assigned content of the 
worlds that we have so far imagined and take it to verify j or k. Consider, for example, 
j. The philosopher will have to authenticate that, for example, that  
 
there is a chemically possible purple pigment such that the coding for the 
structures that would be responsible for its production and its proper 
placement in a cow’s coat could be coherently inserted into any DNA that was 
really cow DNA—or even ‘cow-like-thing-but-for-color’ DNA (van Inwagen 
1998a, 78).  
 
For further examples of imaginings that are unsuccessful in their verifying some 
philosophically important proposition for reasons of assignment see Kung (2016b, 
114–115; 2016a). 
 
I should finish my remarks on the imagination as a source of modal knowledge by 
saying that, in this Chapter, I take myself to have given a fallibilist account of our 
justifiably asserting modal propositions that are arrived at via the imagination. In 
general, our intuitive responses to everyday imagined scenarios (as described) may be 
taken as prima facie justified. This does not mean, however, that we should take all 
assertions of possibility that are arrived at via imagination as prima facie justified. In 
particular, one should take the above to be an argument for the conclusion that it is 
reasonable to suspend judgment as to whether or not an assertion of some possibility-
proposition that is on the periphery of scientific investigation or in the realm of 
metaphysical speculation is justified. 
 
What are the results of this for this thesis? First, since P¢ is a modal claim that is 
remote from the practical business of everyday life one is justified in being sceptical 
of this claim. Any world that I may imagine at which p¢ is true will be one at which 
this truth probably follows from assignment alone. We can, however, do one better. 
We can demonstrate that the possible truth of p¢ at w¢ follows from assignment alone; 
in particular, the truth of p¢ at w¢ follows from a label. To do this, remember that an 
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organism that has had its life suspended and an organism that has recently died via 
MD1 disruption are, in my imagination, structurally indistinguishable. I cannot 
imagine wherein the difference between these two organisms consists. Since this is 
the case, in order for the organism in my imagination to be an organism that has had 
its life suspended and not an organism that has, say, had its life disrupted, I need to 
label the organism that I am imagining as an organism whose life has been suspended 
and not one that has recently undergone disruption. When I visually imagine, say, an 
organism floating free in space I must label that organism <cryogenically preserved>. 
Nothing about my mental image makes this label true. That is, nothing described by 
van Inwagen makes this label appropriate or, at least, more appropriate than the label 
<life disrupted>.  
This is not to say, however, that one cannot, for example, imagine a possible world at 
which this assigned content is true, or authenticate this assigned content in some other 
way. Van Inwagen has not, however, shown that he has done this. That is, he has not 
shown that he has done what is required in order for him to be justified in asserting 
that it is possible for God to raise human organisms from the dead. 
Now it must be clarified that this is not a form of ‘scepticism’ in the Cartesian sense 
of the word. I agree with van Inwagen when he writes that the name ‘modal 
scepticism’  
was perhaps ill-chosen, since, as I have said, I think that we do know a lot of 
modal propositions, and in these post-Cartesian days, ‘skeptic’ suggests 
someone who contends that we know nothing or almost nothing. It should be 
remembered, however, that there has been another sort of skeptic: someone 
who contends that the world contains a great deal of institutionalized pretense 
to knowledge of remote matters concerning which knowledge is in fact not 
possible. (Montaigne was a skeptic in this sense, as were, perhaps, Sextus and 
Cicero.) It is in this sense of the word that I am a modal ‘skeptic’ (van 
Inwagen 1998a, 69).  
It is this meaning of the word ‘scepticism’ or ‘sceptic’ that I too wish to endorse. 
Having said this, modal scepticism is still not especially popular. I fear that so long as 
a position is called ‘scepticism’ it will have its detractors. There is, however, one 
more way by which one can respond to the exotic modal claims made by philosophers 
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who try to defend the possibility of the resurrection given animalism. This response is 
not a sceptical response, however. In short, one may respond by arguing that although 
it may be metaphysically possible for an organism that has died to exist again on the 
Last Day it is not reasonable to believe that an organism that has died can exist again 
on the Last Day, and that this is what substance dualism was interested in all along. 
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CHAPTER 9 – ANIMALISM, DEFENCES AND THE PROBLEM OF LIFE AFTER 
DEATH 
In this chapter I argue that even though the animalist may have successfully 
responded to the argument from the logical problem of life after death (provided that 
the above accounts of modal scepticism are false) they have not responded to the 
more general argument from the problem of life after death. In particular, I argue that 
to respond to the more general argument one needs to do more than describe a 
possible world at which God raises a human organism from the dead. Rather, one 
needs to describe a possible world at which God raises a human organism from the 
dead and this world needs to be one that it is reasonable to believe may well be actual.  
9.1 Defences and the argument from the problem of evil 
Consider the argument from the logical problem of evil. 
(1b) God is omnipotent. 
(2b) God is omniscient. 
(3b) God is perfectly good. 
(4b) Evil exists. 
(5b) The above propositions (1b)–(4b) form a logically inconsistent set.  
(6b) It is unreasonable to believe a set of propositions that are logically 
inconsistent. 
(7b) The theist that believes in the existence of evil believes propositions (1b)–
(4b). 
 
Therefore, 
 
(8b) The theist that believes in the existence of evil believes something 
unreasonable.159  
 
There is no syntactic contradiction to be found among propositions (1b)–(4b)). In 
consequence, proponents of the logical problem of evil attempted to demonstrate that 
a semantic contradiction could be deduced from (1b)–(4b). As James Beebe notes, a 
                                                
159 The conclusion of the original logical problem of evil was, perhaps, stronger than this. Proponents 
of the argument argued that it is not merely that the theist believes something unreasonable but the 
theist is irrational if she believes in evil.  
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contraction can be seen between (4b) and (1b)–(3b), ‘once we think through the 
implications of the divine attributes cited in (1b) though (3b)’ (cf. Bebee 2016, sect 
1). Proponents of the logical problem of evil, so Bebee argues, reason as follows: 
(i) If God is omnipotent, he would be able to prevent all of the evil and 
suffering in the world. 
(ii) If God is omniscient, he would know about all of the evil and suffering in 
the world and would know how to eliminate or prevent it. 
(iii) If God is perfectly good, he would want to prevent all of the evil and 
suffering in the world (cf. Bebee 2016, sect. 1). 
Statements (i)–(iii) ‘jointly imply that if the perfect God of theism really existed, there 
would not be any evil or suffering’ (Bebee 2016, sect. 1). We know, however, that 
evil exists. To demonstrate this one needs only to point to cases of child molestation, 
rape, murder, hurricanes, and tsunamis etc. Bebee states that the proponent of the 
logical problem of evil concludes, therefore  
(iv) If God knows about all of the evil and suffering in the world, knows how 
to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and yet does 
not prevent it, he must not be perfectly good. 
(v) If God knows about all of the evil and suffering, knows how to eliminate 
or prevent it, wants to prevent it, and yet does not do so, he must not be 
omnipotent. 
(vi) If God is powerful enough to prevent all of the evil and suffering, wants to 
do so, and yet does not, he must not know about all of the suffering or 
know how to eliminate or prevent it—that is, he must not be omniscient 
(Bebee 2016, sect. 1). 
From (iv)–(vi) the proponent of the logical problem of evil may infer (give the 
existence of evil (4b)), 
(vii) God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient or not perfectly good. 
Theists, however, believe that  
(viii) God is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. 
 138 
Thus, we have our required contradiction: the theist asserts (viii) and the existence of 
evil implies (vii), in consequence, the theist that believes in the existence of evil, 
therefore, believes a contradiction (namely, that (vii) and (viii) are both true). Premise 
(5b) is, therefore, justified; the above propositions (1b)–(4b) form a logically 
inconsistent set because a contradiction can be deduced from (1b)–(4b). The claim 
that a particular set of propositions contradictory is, of course, equivalent to the claim 
that it is impossible for all of the propositions in that set to be true at the same time. 
This claim itself is, in turn, equivalent to the claim that necessarily, if one of the 
claims in the set is true then at least one of the other claims (or conjunction of the 
other claims) cannot be true at the same time. The claim made by proponents of the 
logical problem of evil, therefore, was that necessarily, if evil exists then God (an 
omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good being) does not exist. Call this ‘the crucial 
modal premise’. It is this premise that distinguishes the logical problem of evil from 
other, later, problems, for example, problems of evil that attempt to demonstrate that 
the probability of God’s existence is low given the existence of evil. 
One way by which the theist can respond to the logical problem of evil is by 
providing a defence. In order to give a defence against an argument one can do a 
number of things. First, one can show that the argument’s structure is invalid. Second, 
one can show that one of the premises of the argument is false.160 Third, one can 
attempt to cast reasonable doubt on one of the argument’s premises (these last two 
options are not mutually exclusive: one can cast reasonable doubt on one of the 
premises of an argument by demonstrating that that premise is false. This, however, is 
asymmetric: one cannot demonstrate that some proposition is false by casting 
reasonable doubt on that premise. When one casts reasonable doubt on some premise 
one is, I take it, merely showing that that premise is more likely than not going to turn 
out to be false). Fourth, one can attempt to cast reasonable doubt on the validity of the 
argument’s structure. 
 
The argument structure employed by proponents of the argument from the logical 
problem of evil is clearly valid. To give a defence against this argument, therefore, 
                                                
160 I should make two things clear. First, in this thesis, I understand truth value to be a binary feature 
and not a scalar feature. Second, in this thesis I am assuming that one cannot show that a premise is 
false by casting reasonable doubt on that premise: one has merely shown that it is doubtful (i.e., likely 
to be false). 
 139 
one must do one of two things: either one must show that one of the premises of the 
argument is false, or one must cast reasonable doubt on one of the premises of the 
argument. In the case of the logical problem of evil the most prominent response has 
been to demonstrate that premise (5d) (or its equivalent ‘the crucial modal premise’) 
is false. 
Most notably, Alvin Plantinga has attempted to rebut the logical problem of evil by 
demonstrating that (5b) is false.161 He does this by demonstrating that the existence of 
God and the existence of evil are compossible. For, of course, if it is possible that God 
and evil co-exist, then it is not the case that necessarily, if evil exists then God does 
not exist. As David Lewis, speaking of Plantinga’s usage of the term ‘defence’ in the 
context of the logical argument from evil, notes,  
‘Defence’…means just any hypothesis about why [an] omniscient, 
omnipotent, benevolent God permits evil. Its sole purpose is to rebut the 
contention that there is no possible way that such a thing could happen. To 
serve that purpose, the hypothesis need not be put forward as true. It need not 
be at all plausible. Mere possibility is enough (Lewis 1993a, 151).  
In order to put forward a defence of this kind Plantinga described a possible world, w, 
at which the crucial modal premise and, in consequence (5b) , is false; that is, he 
described a possible world at which God and evil co-exist. In particular, Plantinga 
described a possible world, w1, at which God brings about the great good of the 
existence of human free will (said to be incompatible with divine predestination) and 
where this great good outweighs the existence of evil that follows from the existence 
of human free will. So, Plantinga argued, it is possible that evil exists and God exists 
because God wanted to achieve some greater good (i.e., the existence of human free 
will). So far so good. This defence, however, is only supposed to account for the 
existence of God and the existence of moral evil, for example, rape, genocide and 
child molestation. Natural evil (for example, earthquakes, famine and tsunamis) 
however, still needs to be accounted for. To do so Plantinga argued that it is possible 
that natural evil be attributed  
                                                
161 See, for example, (Plantinga 1978, Ch. 9). 
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to Satan and his cohorts. Satan, so the traditional doctrine goes, is a mighty 
nonhuman spirit who, along with many other angels, was created long before 
God created man. Unlike most of his colleagues, Satan rebelled against God 
and has since been wreaking whatever havoc he can. The result is natural evil. 
So the natural evil we find is due to free actions of nonhuman spirits. 
(Plantinga 1974, 57) 
This sums up Plantinga’s defence against the logical problem of evil. To generalise 
we might describe this kind of defence as follows: 
Defence1: To give a defence against a particular argument one can describe a 
possible world, w, at which the negation of the non-modal form of one of the 
modal premises of that argument is true.162 
Take the crucial modal premise: necessarily, if evil exists then God (an omnipotent, 
omniscient and perfectly good being) does not exist. To give a defence of kind 
Defence1 one can describe a possible world, w1, at which it is not the case that if evil 
exists then God (an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good being) does not exist 
i.e., a possible world at which God and evil co-exist.  
The aim of defences of this type is to demonstrate that one of the premises of an 
argument is false and thereby demonstrate that the argument, such as the above 
argument from the logical problem of evil, is unsound. Overall Plantinga’s defence 
against the logical argument from evil has been judged a success. Indeed, one of the 
first proponents of the logical problem of evil, John Mackie, writes of Plantinga’s 
argument: 
[s]ince this defence is formally possible, and its principle involves no real 
abandonment of our ordinary view of the opposition between good and evil, 
we can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the 
central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another (J. L. 
Mackie 1982, 154). 
Mackie continues, however, to assert that Plantingian-style defences (that is, defences 
of type Defence1) are strategically very weak, even if they are successful in the way 
                                                
162 In particular, by ‘modal premise’ here I mean ‘necessity-premise’. That is, a premise that asserts, 
‘necessarily,…’. 
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outlined: ‘whether this [defence] offers a real solution of the problem is another 
question’ (J. L. Mackie 1982, 154). One reason why this kind of defence might not 
offer a ‘real solution’ to the problem of evil is because showing that it is possible that 
God and evil co-exist (thereby showing that the crucial modal premise is false), does 
not show that it is reasonable to believe that God and evil could co-exist. 
Indeed, many will argue that w1 may describe a metaphysically possible scenario at 
which God and evil co-exist, and that, in consequence, this makes it the case that the 
crucial modal premise of the argument from the logical problem of evil is false, but 
that it is not a scenario that is reasonable to believe may be actual. There are three 
reasons why this scenario may be taken to be one that it is not reasonable to believe 
may be actual. The first two are context-dependent. First, if one’s interlocutor is an 
atheist she will likely find the existence of ‘Satan and his cohorts’ wildly implausible. 
So, appealing to a defence by stating that there is a possible world at which the free 
actions of Satan and his cohorts are responsible for evil will be ineffective. Second, if 
one’s interlocutor is a theist she may well find the existence of free will (of the kind 
that is said to be incompatible with divine predestination) implausible. So, again, 
appealing to a defence by stating that there is a possible world at which the free 
actions of Satan and his cohorts are responsible for evil will be ineffective. Third, as 
van Inwagen notes, w1 may be metaphysically possible but, even at w1, it could still 
be the case that God is able to being about the greater good of human free will 
without allowing all the evils that we observe. In consequence,  
[a]t the very least, a defence will have to include the proposition that God was 
unable to bring about the greater good without allowing the evils we observe 
(or some other evils as bad or worse). And to find a story that can plausibly be 
said to have this feature is no trivial undertaking (van Inwagen 2006, 68). 
In consequence, Plantinga’s interlocutors will likely (and indeed did) change the 
argument slightly so as to outflank defences of type Defence1, making defences of 
type Defence1, in effect, redundant. To speak broadly, the key move made by 
proponents of the logical problem of evil was to change the argument. They argued 
that, while (1b)–(4b) may be compossible, it is not reasonable to believe that (1b)–
(4b) are true in our world. In consequence, this argument cannot be resisted by merely 
describing some possible world at which God and evil co-exist. In order to resist this 
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argument one will have to describe a possible world that might well be actual. Call 
this argument ‘The argument from the problem of evil.’ 
The argument from the problem of evil 
(1b) God is omnipotent. 
(2b) God is omniscient. 
(3b) God is perfectly good. 
(4b) Evil exists. 
(5b') It is unreasonable to believe propositions (1b)–(4b) at the same time. 
(6b') The theist that believes in the existence of evil believes propositions 
(1b)–(4b). 
Therefore, 
(7b') The theist believes something that is unreasonable.  
It is important to note that the line of reasoning that I have presented so far does not 
mean, however, that one need now give a theodicy rather than a defence. That is, one 
need not provide the actual reason(s) as to why God permits evil. One can still give a 
defence of sorts (i.e., give a possible reason as to why God permits evil). My 
argument does mean, however, that it is not the case that any possible reason as to 
why God permits evil will do. Rather, given the above argument, one needs to give a 
possible reason that it is reasonable to believe may well be actual. 
Van Inwagen himself (2006) makes a similar point. Van Inwagen provides an 
example to demonstrate that describing some possible world at which the negation of 
one of the premises of an argument is false will not always do. Van Inwagen 
describes a scenario at which an attorney is defending Clarissa (a mother of two) from 
Aunt Harriet’s charge of child neglect due to Clarissa’s leaving her two children 
alone. Clarissa’s defence attorney describes a far-removed possible world at which 
Clarissa is innocent. Van Inwagen writes of this move on behalf of Clarissa that the 
possible world the defence puts forward, 
may be a possibility—I suppose it is a possibility—but it is too remote a 
possibility to raise real doubts in anyone’s mind. What you’re trying to 
convince Aunt Harriet of (and the jury) is that there is, as we say, a very real 
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possibility that Clarissa had a good reason for leaving her children alone (van 
Inwagen 2006, 66). 
The jury are not going to be convinced by the defence’s putting forward a far-
removed possible world to demonstrate Clarissa’s innocence. Upon seeing the 
bemused faces of the jury Clarissa’s defence attorney would, quite likely, very 
quickly realise her mistake and move on to describe a more plausible possibility.163 
Likewise, as van Inwagen notes,  
[t]he debate [concerning the existence of God given the existence of evil] 
evolved fairly quickly out of this early, ‘logical’ stage into a discussion of a 
much more interesting question: whether the statement ‘God and evil both 
exist’ could be shown to be probably false or unreasonable to believe (van 
Inwagen 2006, 67).  
Arguments concerning the existence of evil and the existence of God were thus 
developed that do not make use of the modal assertion, making defences of type 
Defence1, or similar, quickly redundant. In fact, van Inwagen laments the distinction 
between the ‘logical’ problem of evil and the ‘so-called evidential (or probabilistic) 
problem of evil’ (van Inwagen 2006, 67). He notes that, ‘[d]iscussions of the problem 
of evil even today tend to replicate this episode in the evolution of the discussion of 
the argument from evil…I find the distinction artificial and unhelpful’ (van Inwagen 
2006, 68). He finds it artificial and unhelpful, I take it, because, while Mackie’s 
formulation of the argument was a ‘logical’ one, describing a remote possible world 
at which God and evil co-exist was never going to convince the proponent of the 
problem of evil.  
Overall, I think that we can draw the following conclusion from the above discussion. 
A defence of type Defence1 may be sufficient to demonstrate that the logical problem 
of evil is unsound. However, merely demonstrating that the negation of one of the 
modal premises of an argument is possibly true is, strategically, a very weak 
defensive move. One’s interlocutor will not likely be swayed by one’s providing some 
description of a far-removed possible world at which their claim is false. Modal 
arguments that have been refuted by appeal to defences of type Defence1 will 
                                                
163 Or, of course, perhaps it is more likely that she would not even make the move in the first place. 
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probably be replaced by non-modal arguments that cannot be refuted by appeal to a 
defence of type Defence1. One might as well take out both arguments in one fell 
swoop. 
In order to have a sufficient defence against arguments like the argument from the 
problem of evil, therefore, one must (if one wants to go the route of providing a 
defence) show that it is possible that God and evil co-exist and the world that one 
describes to verify that it is possible that God and evil co-exist must be a world that is 
a ‘very real possibility’ (van Inwagen 2006, 66).164  
There is, therefore, another, stronger, type of defence:  
Defence2 = To give a defence against a particular argument one can describe a 
close possible world, w, at which the negation of one of the premises is 
true (i.e., the premise might well be true of the world in which we live). 
 
Materialist defences and the problems of life after death 
I will now assess materialist defences in response to the arguments from the problems 
of life after death. As previously mentioned, the argument that is most commonly 
dealt with in the literature on life after death is something like the argument from the 
logical problem of life after death. 
 
The argument from the logical problem of life after death 
(1) We are human organisms. 
(2) For any organism O1 at a time, t1, and for any organism O2 at a time, t2, O1 and 
O2 are identical if and only if the simples that compose O1 and the simples that 
compose O2 are constituents of the same life. 
(3) We will die. 
(4) We will exist (after our deaths) on the Last Day. 
(5') The above propositions (1)–(4) form a logically inconsistent set. 
(6') It is unreasonable to believe a set of propositions that are logically 
inconsistent. 
                                                
164 The question remains, then: when is it reasonable to believe that some world is possibly actual? I 
say ‘when the probability of w’s being actual, given the proposition one is trying to verify, p, and given 
our background knowledge, k, is sufficient for reasonable belief.’ 
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(7') The animalist that believes that human organisms that have died can exist 
again on the Last Day believes propositions (1)–(4). 
Therefore, 
(8') It is unreasonable to believe that animalism is true and that human organisms 
that have died can exist again on the Last Day. 
As previously mentioned, (1)–(4) do not directly form a logical contradiction; there is 
no syntactic contradiction to be found between propositions (1)–(4). Instead a 
contradiction has to be deduced from (1)–(4); that is, one must demonstrate that there 
is a semantic contradiction between (1)–(4). To remind you, I argued that (1)–(4) 
form a (semantic) contradiction if (A) and (B) are true. If it is the case that, (A) 
necessarily, when we die (3) our remains cease to be immanent-causally connected to 
any organism (call this physical dissolution) and, (B) necessarily, in order for us to 
exist again on the Last Day the simples that compose us (before our deaths) and the 
simples that compose us (after our deaths on the Last Day) need to be continuously 
immanent-causally connected (call this ‘material and causal continuity’)165, then it is 
impossible that a human organism that has died to exist again on the Last Day. 
Van Inwagen expresses the challenge for materialist believers in the resurrection as 
follows,  
‘physical dissolution’ and ‘material and causal continuity’ are hard to 
reconcile. To show how the continuity requirement can be satisfied, despite 
appearances—or else to show that the continuity requirement is illusory—is a 
problem that must be solved if a philosophically satisfactory ‘materialist’ 
theory of resurrection is to be devised. (van Inwagen 2015, 7)  
Van Inwagen, and others, think that the requirement for material and causal continuity 
(or something very much like it) is not illusory. The remaining option, therefore, is to 
show how it is that this requirement can be satisfied despite appearances. Van 
Inwagen described a possible world at which (1)–(4) are true and, in consequence, 
demonstrated that (5¢) is false. Or, equivalently, he attempted to describe a possible 
                                                
165 Remember this is van Inwagen’s thesis. This thesis is stronger than the causal-continuity 
requirement. 
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world at which his interlocutor’s claim, that necessarily, if animalism is true then it is 
not the case that an organism that has died can exist again on the Last Day, is false. In 
order to do so, he put forward the simulacrum models. The simulacrum models were 
supposed to demonstrate that (A) was false and, in consequence, (5¢) was false. He 
writes that this story166 
is best understood by considering the familiar distinction, familiar to students 
of the problem of evil, between a theodicy and a defense— these terms being 
used in the senses that Plantinga has given them. The story I have told is 
analogous to a “defense,” not to a theodicy (van Inwagen 2015, 9).167 
That is, I take it, van Inwagen is arguing that he can provide a story that demonstrates 
that (5¢) is false. He writes, ‘[m]y method was to tell a story, a story I hoped my 
readers would grant was a metaphysically possible story, in which God accomplished 
the Resurrection of the Dead’ (van Inwagen 1998b, 51). 168 
The question that remains now is: ‘can this story feature as a part of a sufficient 
defence against the argument from the logical problem of life after death, given the 
above discussion?’. I think that the answer is, in one respect, ‘yes.’ 169 This is because 
the simulacrum stories are stories that can be used to demonstrate that premise (5¢) of 
the argument from the logical problem of life after death is false. Most of the 
discussion in the literature has concerned this problem. 
Having said this I think we should reply, a la van Inwagen, that the time has come to 
move away from the ‘logical’ stage onto a discussion of a much more interesting 
question: whether the statement ‘not even God can raise a human organism from the 
dead’ ‘could be shown to be probably false or unreasonable to believe’ (van Inwagen 
2006, 67). Van Inwagen may have demonstrated that it is not impossible for God to 
                                                
166 He gives, I take it, one story that describes two models. 
167 Italics added by me. 
168 Above I have argued that van Inwagen should not take this story to establish a metaphysical 
possibility. I argued that given van Inwagen’s modal scepticism he should be sceptical that this story 
establishes that the resurrection of human organisms from the dead is possible. Here, however, I am 
assuming that this story does express a metaphysical possibility. This has the added benefit that it will 
assist us in seeing that one need not be a modal sceptic in order to reject van Inwagen’s argument. 
169 So long as one is not a modal sceptic. 
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raise human organisms from the dead, but what is left to be shown is that it is 
reasonable to believe that God can raise human organisms from the dead.  
In the light of this fact we can simply amend the argument from the logical problem 
of life after death. The argument that I stated at the very beginning of Chapter 3 will 
do. This is an argument that cannot be responded to by way of appeal to a defence of 
type Defence1, that is, by way of describing a metaphysically possible world at which 
God removes for safe-keeping our freshly-dead corpses and replaces them with look-
alikes. 
(1) We are human organisms. 
(2) For any organism O1 at a time, t1, and for any organism O2 at a time, t2, O1 and 
O2 are identical if and only if the simples that compose O1 and the simples that 
compose O2 are constituents of the same life. 
(3) We will die. 
(4) We will exist (after our deaths) on the Last Day. 
(5) It is unreasonable to believe propositions (1)–(4) at the same time. 
(6) The animalist that wants to believe that human organisms that have died can 
exist again on the Last Day believes propositions (1)–(4). 
 
Therefore, 
 
(7) It is unreasonable to believe that animalism is true and that human organisms 
that have died can exist again on the Last Day 
It is, I hope, clear from what has been said above that, in response to the more general 
argument from the problem of life after death, a defence of type Defence1 will not do; 
the argument from the problem of life after death does not assert that it is impossible 
for a human organism that has died to exist again on the Last Day. It is, I hope, also 
clear from what has been said above that w¢ may describe a possibility but it does not 
describe a possibility that may well be true. I think van Inwagen would agree. As van 
Inwagen notes,  
I am inclined now to think of the description that I gave in ‘The Possibility of 
Resurrection’ of how an omnipotent being could accomplish the Resurrection 
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of the Dead [i.e., the simulacrum story] as a ‘just-so story’: Although it serves 
to establish a possibility, it probably isn’t true (van Inwagen 1998b, 51).  
Van Inwagen does not tell us, precisely, why he thinks that his description of a world 
at which God raises an organism from the dead is probably is not true, but the reasons 
are not hard to fathom. Put simply, the evidence strongly suggests that when human 
organisms die the vast majority of them are, in fact, subject to the normal processes of 
biological decay, decomposing in the grave, being incinerated at the crematorium, 
being blown to bits by a bomb or subject to some such disruptive forces. 
As mentioned above, however, ‘reasonable to believe’ is, to some extent, context-
sensitive. Any context, however, in which van Inwagen gives his defence of the 
possibility of resurrection is not one in which one can afford to give far-removed 
descriptions. If van Inwagen takes himself to be providing an apologetic (i.e., a 
response to those who say that there is no actual resurrection (because materialism is 
true)) then his just-so story is not likely to be taken seriously.170 Moreover, if van 
Inwagen takes himself to be answering those people who are saying that materialism 
is actually false (because life after death is true) such as, for example, Christian 
substance dualists, then his just-so story is, again, not likely to be taken seriously. 
In consequence, while van Inwagen may have established that it is metaphysically 
possible for God to raise human organisms from the dead he has not established that it 
is reasonable to believe that God can raise human organisms from the dead. But this is 
what’s needed. Assuming that Scripture underdetermines which view about what we 
are is true, and assuming that there are no good arguments (independent of any 
theological or biblical considerations) for materialism or, at least, against substance 
dualism, then the debate will be won or lost on the above argument. I hope to have put 
the ball in the materialist’s court. Consider the following statement from van 
Inwagen: ‘dualism seems to me to be an unnecessarily complicated theory about my 
nature—unless there is some fact or phenomenon or aspect of the world that dualism 
deals with better than materialism’ (van Inwagen 1995, 476). The fact or phenomenon 
that dualism deals with better than materialism is life after death. If van Inwagen is 
                                                
170 Indeed, when I was presenting a version of this material to my Department a senior member could 
not keep himself from laughing out loud as I recited van Inwagen’s just-so story. I took this to be an 
expression of his agreement that this story is not sufficient to cast reasonable doubt on (5). 
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happy to admit that dualism is just as likely to be true as materialism prior to 
considerations about life after death, then the fact that we will survive our deaths 
seems to tip the argument in favour of substance dualism: it is best explained on a 
dualist account of what we are.  
The same can be said of Zimmerman’s account of life after death too. Zimmerman 
may have established that it is metaphysically possible for God to raise human 
organisms from the dead but he has not established that it is reasonable to believe that 
God can raise human organisms from the dead. As Zimmerman notes, having put 
forward his model,  
Were I a materialist arguing for the possibility of survival…I would want to 
conclude the telling of such tales with van Inwagen’s qualifications: 
My method was to tell a story, a story I hoped my readers would grant was a 
metaphysically possible story, in which God accomplished the Resurrection of 
the Dead…[T]here may well be other ways in which an omnipotent being 
could accomplish the Resurrection of the Dead than the way that was 
described in the story I told, ways I am unable to even form an idea of because 
I lack the conceptual resources to do so. 
These are, after all, ‘just-so stories’ (Zimmerman 2013, 145). 
The falling-elevator model is, in this respect, no better than the simulacrum models.171 
Zimmerman admits that the falling-elevator model is merely a ‘just-so story’. Just-so 
stories are not supposed to be taken to express very real possibilities; that is, they are 
not supposed to be stories that describe how the actual world might actually happen to 
be. 
What then of the other models surveyed in this thesis? What then of the 
recomposition model and the miraculous-event model? As mentioned, both the 
recomposition model and the miraculous-event models describe logically possible 
states of affairs. The question remains: is it reasonable to believe that these logically 
possible states of affairs may well be actual? I think that the answer is ‘no’. The 
                                                
171 There are certain respects in which the falling-elevator model is better than the simulacrum model. 
Most notably, it does not require that God ‘deceive’ anyone to achieve his purposes. 
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recomposition model may prima facie be the most reasonable story172 but the 
materialist animalist will not be likely to accept, and should not accept, the 
recomposition model as a plausible defence, since the recomposition model commits 
one to the denial of the ‘only x and y’ principle. Similar considerations pertain to the 
miraculous-event model. The miraculous-event model may describe a metaphysically 
possible state of affairs, but if one accepts the miraculous-event model then one has to 
accept that lives are events that can begin again. The animalists that I have surveyed 
so far will not be likely to accept that lives are events that can begin again and, I 
think, are justified in asking for an analogy that takes into account the fact that lives 
are events of a specific kind: natural processes.  
9.2 The falling-elevator model and the constitution view 
So far I have merely considered animalist accounts of what we are. A version of the 
argument that has been made above, however, can also be applied to other materialist 
theories of the human person besides animalist theories. Although van Inwagen’s 
materialism provides the context into which I have placed the problem of life after 
death, I think that the arguments from the problem of life after death could be 
deployed against other materialist theories so long as they give ‘pride of place to a 
causal element in criteria of identity over time’ (Zimmerman 1999, 197). This is 
because any materialist account that gives pride of place to a causal element in criteria 
of identity over time will be likely to need a story (such as the falling-elevator model 
or the simulacrum model) to justify the assertion that it is possible for God to 
resurrect human organisms from the dead. 
 
As I mentioned earlier, animalists claim that a human person is a human organism. 
The ‘is’ in the previous sentence, on animalism, is the ‘is’ of identity. There is a view, 
however, in the near vicinity of animalism that says that a human person is a human 
organism, but that the ‘is’ here is the ‘is’ of constitution. As mentioned earlier, 
Sydney Shoemaker holds that ‘a person “is” an animal, not in the sense of being 
identical to one, but in the sense of sharing matter with one’ (Shoemaker 1984, 113). 
This view is known as ‘the constitution view’. Some advocates of the constitution 
view also face the problem of life after death. This is because, while those that hold 
the constitution view think that for a person at one time to be identical with a person 
                                                
172 It is the model that most appeal to when first presented with the problem of life after death. 
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at another time those persons need to ‘share the same first-person perspective’, they 
still think (so as to avoid duplication objections) that human first-person perspectives 
are necessarily embodied.173 In this case, even if one does not identify a human 
person with a human organism but with a particular first-person perspective, one still 
needs immanent-causal connections between two organisms at two different times in 
order for them to be considered identical.  
In consequence, some advocates of the constitution view appeal to the falling-elevator 
model: it is a possible world at which a human organism dies but at which immanent-
causal continuity is maintained.174 A version of the above argument can, therefore, 
apply equally well to them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
173 Loose (2012) makes this point. Loose notes that Kevin Corcoran (a Christian that holds to the 
constitution view) requires ‘an explanation of how a particular body could persist through death’ 
(Loose 2012, 441).   
174 See (Corcoran 2001a). 
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CHAPTER 10 – THE KERNEL 
Perhaps we can help van Inwagen. Perhaps we can describe a possible world that it is 
reasonable to believe may well be actual at which life after death is possible, given 
animalism. As mentioned, to a certain extent reasonableness is context-sensitive. 
While the atheist may think that it is unreasonable to believe that the possible world at 
which Satan and his cohorts are the cause of natural evil may well be actual, the theist 
may not. The theist, after all, may already believe in the existence of Satan and his 
cohorts. The context that this thesis concerns is that of the debate between Christian 
substance dualists and Christian materialists. Certain facts may, therefore, be assumed 
in this context that cannot be assumed elsewhere. It may be assumed, for example, 
that the Bible provides us with various explanations or analogues of, say, the ways in 
which God acts. 
Van Inwagen, for example, appeals to a certain passage in 1 Corinthians 15 in part to 
justify his belief in the resurrection given animalism. In this passage Paul says: 
But someone will ask, ‘How are the dead raised? With what kind of body will 
they come?’ How foolish! What you sow does not come to life unless it dies. 
When you sow, you do not plant the body that will be, but just a seed, perhaps 
of wheat or of something else.  
Van Inwagen writes of his belief in the resurrection of the dead,  
[m]y inclination is to believe that God will somehow—in the way I have 
imagined or in some way I lack the conceptual resources to image, ‘in this 
way or some other’—preserve a remnant of each person, a gumnos kókkos (a 
naked kernel: 1 Cor. 15:37), which will be sown in corruption and raised in 
incorruption’ (van Inwagen 1998b, 51).  
One wonders if the continuity that Paul was trying to describe here really was one of 
material and causal continuity. The historical, contextual and textual debate 
concerning how this verse should be read is still raging. I will not enter this debate 
here, but here are some of the options. First, the materialist may argue that the 
‘kernel’ here is to be understood as a material part of a person (as van Inwagen does). 
Second, the dualist may argue that the ‘kernel’ here could be understood as an 
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immaterial part.175 Third, the materialist or dualist may argue that the point of the 
analogy here is not an expression of the fact that there will be a continuing part of a 
person, but, rather, the analogy expresses the idea that there will be some kind of 
continuity between earthly and resurrection bodies, but not necessarily a substantial 
continuity, perhaps, qualitative identity or numerical identity of some unknown sort. 
Let us concede for the sake of argument, however, that Paul’s reference to a naked 
kernel could, in some sense, refer to a material part.  
Here van Inwagen is interpreting verse 37 quite literally. When God, as it were, sows 
the earth ready for the day of resurrection he does not plant the whole organism but 
just a small portion of the organism. I take it that van Inwagen is arguing that there is 
a biblical precedent for belief in the continuous material and causal continuity 
between a person that has died and a person that exists again on the Last Day; just as 
a seed that is planted in the ground will grow into a plant, so a portion of a person 
may be sufficient for it to survive its death.  
Van Inwagen says that this version of his story is preferable to the version where God 
preserves the whole corpse. The reason is that it turns back the argument that his 
model (bodily-remains simulacrum model) would make ‘nonsense of the Pauline 
principle that a corpse is a temple of the Holy Spirit’ (van Inwagen 2015, 9). The 
argument proceeds as follows: if we knew the truth that God replaces our loved ones 
with look-alikes there would be no reason to treat corpses with dignity. But we do 
rightly treat corpses with dignity and, in consequence, we should reject van Inwagen’s 
model. To get around this argument van Inwagen says that if God merely removes a 
special personal-identity-bearing part of a person then we should still treat ‘corpses 
with reverence, and properly so’ (van Inwagen 2015, 9). Just as it is the case that 
when the undertaker has removed much larger parts of corpses we treat them with 
dignity so when God removes a very small identity-bearing part of them we should 
treat them with dignity. 
When van Inwagen first put forward this suggestion he need not have provided us 
with a description of this remnant, naked kernel or portion. The notion of a naked 
kernel or portion was, as it were, a variable. The ontological nature of this kernel, so 
                                                
175 See (Cooper 1989, 140–141) for a defence of a dualist reading of this passage and (Green 2008, 
177–178) for a materialist gloss on this passage. 
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van Inwagen might have claimed, was unknown. He was merely claiming that there 
was biblical precedent for some kind of material and causal continuity. He need not, 
therefore, have given a description of the ontological nature of the kernel because he 
took himself to have established the possibility of the resurrection of material beings 
in some other way; namely, by appeal to the bodily-remains simulacrum model. 
The picture is now, however, somewhat different. First, since van Inwagen has not 
established the possibility of the resurrection (given his modal scepticism) he now 
needs to explain how it is that the resurrection is metaphysically possible given 
animalism. Second, in the light of the more general argument from the problem of life 
after death, van Inwagen needs to explain how it is that the resurrection is 
metaphysically possible and the world that he describes in order to justify his claim 
that the resurrection is metaphysically possible needs to be one that it is reasonable to 
believe may well be actual. On the assumption that 1 Corinthians 15:37 describes 
some kind of material and causal continuity between an organism that has died and an 
organism that will be raised from the dead, describing a world at which this is the 
mechanism that God uses will lend credibility to the animalist’s position. As it stands, 
however, the suggestion is ontologically non-committal. Van Inwagen has not told us 
anything about the ontological nature of the kernel.  
This is problematic. Put simply, for the suggestion that God preserves a remnant of 
each person to feature in an argument in support of the very real possibility of the 
resurrection, it needs to be a suggestion of which his readers can conceive. Van 
Inwagen, though, has not yet offered any description of what this kernel is that 
continues to exist between my death and resurrection in a way that would enable us to 
assess the suggestion’s very real possibility or even metaphysical possibility. The 
‘kernel,’ we might think, is a variable; it stands in place of several descriptions by 
which God could ensure the persistence of a human organism across death. In 
consequence, I will now delineate what I take to be all of the possible descriptions of 
this kernel (given animalism) and raise some problems with each one. I will argue that 
each possible description is no better than van Inwagen’s simulacrum model. 
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There are several options open to van Inwagen that I can think of. These models can 
be divided into those that rely upon MD2 suspension176 and those that require the 
continuation of a life. I begin with those that rely upon MD2 suspension. 
10.1 Suspension models 
10.1.1 The suspended life of a portion of simples 
There is one attempt that I have found in the literature to describe what the ‘kernel’ is 
that van Inwagen appeals to. As mentioned, in his paper ‘Mind, Mortality and 
Material Being’ (Anders 2011) Anders puts forward a description of what might 
happen to a human organism upon death and a related definition of a kernel that might 
ensure the persistence of a particular human organism across death. I will briefly 
restate Anders’ suggestion. Anders argues that at the moment of one’s death God 
suspends one’s life processes and the ‘organisational structure’ (Anders 2011, 34) of 
one’s life processes gets ‘compacted’ (Anders 2011, 34) (i.e., the organism comes to 
be composed by a small portion of the simples that last composed it and these simples 
stand in the same spatial and chemical arrangement in which they previously stood). 
For God to resurrect a particular human organism God need only place this kernel 
into a collection of simples arranged humanwise and restart the suspended life of this 
kernel for the organism that has died to come back to life again. This portion of the 
simples that constitute this suspended life need to be simples that recently composed 
the brain or the organism that died. 
 
I have argued, however, that this view is incompatible with van Inwagen’s 
metaphysics.177 Put simply, the inconsistency is this: the compaction model supposes 
that a kernel (as described by Anders) could sustain a suspended life but, it seems, van 
Inwagen would reject this supposition. That is, the suspended life that exists in virtue 
of a kernel (as described by Anders) cannot be restarted in the way that a suspended 
life that exists in virtue of a corpse can (the only example of suspension that van 
Inwagen gives). Anders’ kernel does not, therefore, really sustain a suspended life (as 
he supposes), but, rather, is merely a collection of simples. I argued that ‘a life that 
has been suspended can begin again, if and only if, the requisite energy is supplied to 
                                                
176 To remind you (MD2) Suspension = O’s life has been suspended at t if the life, L, in virtue of which 
the simples that composed O has ceased and the simples that were caught up in L retain—owing to the 
mere absence of disruptive forces—their individual properties and their relations to one another. 
177 Both earlier in this thesis (subsection 6.1.2) and in Atkinson (2015). 
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the simples whose large-scale activity has been suspended’ (Atkinson 2015, 589). A 
small portion of simples is not disposed for life.  
10.1.2 Suspended life of a corpse 
It is consistent with what van Inwagen writes, however, that the kernel need not be a 
small part of a corpse but could be a corpse that has had its life suspended and has not 
undergone any significant large-scale physical change. Van Inwagen writes that, 
‘[m]y inclination is to believe that God will somehow—in the way I have imagined or 
in some way I lack the conceptual resources to imagine, “in this way or some other”—
preserve a remnant of each person, a gumnos kókkos (van Inwagen 1998b, 51).178 By 
‘in this way’ I take van Inwagen to be referring to the bodily-remains simulacrum 
model. Perhaps the kernel is, therefore, a whole living-corpse or at least a very large 
part of the whole living corpse; an object that is disposed to have its suspended life 
begin again on supply of the requisite amount of energy. 
 
This description of a kernel, however, is no better than van Inwagen’s initial 
suggestion. This is because, if (as it appears) human organisms die by disruption, God 
would still be in the business of, at the moment of death, suspending our lives, 
removing our corpses, and replacing us with replicas which are burnt in a 
crematorium or placed in the ground to rot. 
10.2 Non-suspension models 
Consequently, it seems that models that involve suspension cannot help van Inwagen. 
They are either inconsistent with van Inwagen’s metaphysics or no better than the 
original story he put forward in ‘Possibility of Resurrection’. In fact, given what I 
have said above, the following disjunction seems true: either a portion of simples is 
too small, so that it is not disposed for life on the supply of the requisite amount of 
energy, or it is too large for God to sustain without God’s being required to place a 
look-alike in the ground.  
 
The question now becomes ‘are there any models that do not require suspension that 
van Inwagen can accept?’. The answer prima facie seems to be ‘no’, for a number of 
reasons. First, any human organism, or sufficiently large portion thereof that 
                                                
178 Italics added by me. 
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continues the life of the organism, will have to be removed for safekeeping by God 
and replaced with a simulacrum. After all, it appears to us that our loved ones really 
do die. In consequence, these models would appear to be no better than the 
simulacrum models described by van Inwagen. Second, van Inwagen admits that all 
who share in the sin of Adam must die. But, so it seems, there are only two ways by 
which an organism can die. Discounting suspension models leaves models at which 
those who die by MD1 disruption and, as has been defended in this thesis, it is not 
reasonable to believe that a man who has been burned to ashes or been eaten by 
worms (has had his life disrupted) should ever live again given animalism. 
 
10.3 A final worry: organisms and organs of maintenance 
A final worry remains, however. The worry is that we may have been looking in the 
wrong place for an account of the resurrection at which God preserves a remnant of 
each person and that remnant must be, at least in part, an organ of maintenance: 
namely, the brainstem. The problem is, so I am told (cf. Shewmon 2001), that the 
organ of maintenance cannot be reduced to a single ‘localized’ (van Inwagen 1990, 
191) part of the human organism. This can be demonstrated by pointing out, as Alan 
Shewmon (2001) notes, that there are biological activities essential for life that 
continue when the brain has died. These activities include: maintenance of body 
temperature, fighting infections and foreign bodies, wound healing, sexual 
maturation, gestation of a foetus, the absorption of oxygen from the blood (needed for 
respiration), the breakdown of food into elemental forms and (in the case of a child) 
proportional growth, to name but a few (cf. Shewmon 2001, 468–471). Shewmon 
concludes that ‘[s]omatic integration is not localized to any single “critical” organ but 
is a holistic phenomenon involving the mutual interactions of all the parts’(Shewmon 
2001, 473). Olson seems to agree: he writes, ‘there can be a human life without an 
organ of maintenance. It won’t be a healthy life, but it is still the life of an animal. 
The activities required for there to be a living human organism need no central 
direction’ (Olson 2016, 298). 
 
What should we conclude from this? We can conclude that there is no privileged part 
of the human organism that is somehow responsible for our survival and so needs to 
be preserved by God upon death for future resurrection; the brain is not needed for the 
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life of a human organism to persist. Contra previous thought on the matter Olson 
writes,  
[s]uppose my brain were removed from my head and provided with the best-
possible inorganic life-support machinery. Shewmon appears to have shown 
that in the right circumstances, the headless remainder would be a living 
human animal, since a human life needs no central direction. In that case it 
seems natural to assume that this animal would be me, the organism from 
which the brain was removed. (Olson 2016, 299) 
This leaves us with the question: ‘what if the detached brain would be an organism?’ 
(Olson 2016, 300). Let us assume that it is. After all, we have not attained any new 
information about the brain that rules out its being able to function if isolated from a 
body and connected to an elaborate life-support machine as we have been supposing. 
In this case, upon my death God could preserve either my brain or my body and either 
one would be sufficient for my persistence, so long as the brain and/or the body can 
support the relevant aspects of a human life.  
Say I suffered a terrible accident and died. Let us say, God, in this scenario, very soon 
after my death, preserves my brain, ‘which will continue to exist throughout the 
interval between my death and my resurrection and will, at the general resurrection, 
be clothed in a festal garment of new flesh’(van Inwagen 1995, 487). Given what we 
now know—that there is no organ of maintenance—it is also the case that He could 
have preserved my brainless body. He need not have preserved my brain. Moreover, 
He could have preserved both. He could, on the day of resurrection, give my 
preserved body a new brain and give my preserved brain a new body. If both my brain 
and my body’s life processes continue, then, on the Last Day, it is possible that there 
are two organisms that are both equal candidates for identification with me and can 
stand side by side and utter ‘I am Thom Atkinson’. Which one would be Thom 
Atkinson? Van Inwagen would argue, so it seems, ‘neither or both, it would seem, 
and, since not both, neither’ (van Inwagen 1995, 486). Why could I not be both? I 
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should not be both because it is logically impossible for a concrete object (namely 
me) to be wholly in two different places at once.179 
Now one may respond by arguing, ‘God would not do that’. I respond, a la van 
Inwagen, I daresay He would not. But if He were to keep, say, just my brain for 
resurrection, the resulting person would be me. But, he would be me, in this case, as 
in the reassembly case, only because God had not also kept my body for safe-keeping. 
My post-mortem identity, in this case, would depend on what might happen to some 
atoms other than the atoms that compose me. As van Inwagen notes, this result is 
‘absurd, it is utterly incoherent’(van Inwagen 1995, 487). 
In consequence, van Inwagen’s suggestion that God could preserve a remnant of each 
person is no better than his suggestion that God could reassemble me from the atoms 
that composed me moments before my death. The kernel solution to the problem of 
the survival of death seems to entail the same absurdity as the reassembly solution to 
the problem of the survival of death; post-mortem identity will depend on what might 
happen to some atoms other than the atoms that compose me. This is, of course, only 
true if the detached brain would be an organism; perhaps the animalist should now 
deny that this is the case. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
179 One may object by arguing, ‘in this scenario you are not wholly in two places at once. You may 
only partly be in two places at once. Maybe you are partly here and partly there, just as a drum kit may 
be partly here (where the bass drum is) and partly there (where the crash cymbal is).’ That may be so 
for drum kits but it is not, so, according to van Inwagen, for organisms. Van Inwagen asserts, I think 
quite plausibly, the following principle: ‘[i]f the activity of the xs constitutes a life, then none of the xs 
is causally isolated from the others’ (van Inwagen 1990, 151). This is true of all of the simples that 
compose organisms in general, but not true of the all of the simples that (virtually) compose a drum kit. 
All of the simples that compose an organism are in some way causally related to one another. Given 
this principle if one is to be partly located in two significantly different places, then the activity of the 
simples that compose one would need to be causally related. But this would surely not the case when, 
for example, a surgeon removes a brain from a body. Were a surgeon to separate my brain from my 
body she would be severing any causal relationship between my brain and my body. This is certainly 
true of liver or kidney transplant operations. When the surgeon cuts the liver away from a particular 
body it ceases to be causally related to the body from which it came. 
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CHAPTER 11 – CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have argued that it is unreasonable to believe that the following 
propositions are true simultaneously: 
(1) We are human organisms. 
(2) For any organism O1 at a time, t1, and for any organism O2 at a time, t2, O1 and 
O2 are identical if and only if the simples that compose O1 and the simples that 
compose O2 are constituents of the same life. 
(3) We will die. 
(4) We will exist (after our deaths) on the Last Day. 
 
I argued for this thesis as follows. First, I demonstrated why, in the past, it has been 
argued that it is unreasonable to believe that (1)–(4) are true simultaneously. It has 
been argued that it is unreasonable to believe that (1)–(4) are true simultaneously 
because propositions (A) and (B) are, supposedly, true. 
(A) Necessarily, the life of an organism, O1, at one time, t1, is identical with the 
life of an organism, O2, at another time, t2, if and only if, the simples that 
compose O1 and the simples that compose O2 are immanent-causally 
connected.  
and 
 
(B) Necessarily, when we die the simples that last composed us will cease to bear 
any immanent-causal connection to any organism. 
 
Second, however, I demonstrated that (A) and (B) are false. (A) and (B) are false, I 
have argued, because there are possible worlds at which not-(a) and not-(b) are true. 
Third, I argued that while (A) and (B) may be false their non-modal forms (a) and (b) 
are highly plausible. If one rejects (a) then one has to, for example, reject the ‘only x 
and y’ principle. If one rejects (b) then one has to, for example, deny an obvious truth: 
our remains will rot or will be burned. In the light of this, I argued that while it is not 
impossible (provided modal scepticism is false) for an organism that has died to exist 
again on the Last Day, it is still unreasonable to believe that an organism that has died 
can exist again on the Last Day.  
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I then argued that it is the task of the Christian materialist to demonstrate that this is 
not the case. Indeed, van Inwagen’s argument, as it stands, will probably not satisfy 
either the atheist who argues that there is no actual resurrection (because materialism 
is true) or the Christian substance dualist who argues that materialism is actually false 
(because life after death is true). This is not because the atheist and the Christian are 
modal sceptics. Rather, it is because they have good reasons to doubt that van 
Inwagen’s suggestion may well be actual, and so have good reasons to doubt that the 
resurrection of material beings is a feat the almighty being may well achieve.  
Overall, I hope to have moved the argument concerning the possibility of life after 
death given animalism away from its early ‘logical’ stage on to the, much more 
interesting, ‘plausibility’ stage. I say the ‘much more interesting’ plausibility stage 
because, of course, this is the charge that Christians substance dualists will likely 
bring against the Christian materialist. Although it may be possible for an organism 
that has died to exist again on the Last Day it is still not reasonable to believe that an 
organism that has died can exist again on the Last Day.  
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